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Abstract 
This thesis explores the concept of dirty hands in democracies. It argues that dirty hands are 
instances of moral conflicts in which some of our core moral values and commitments clash. 
Accepting the existence of such a clash, contrary to what some critics have argued, does not 
have to be irrational and we can make sense of this phenomenon irrespective of the wider 
beliefs about the nature of rational moral judgement that we hold. The thesis goes on to 
defend the view that getting one’s hands dirty results in a moral remainder that can best be 
described as “tragic-remorse”. Experiencing this emotional response, it is argued, fulfils 
important functions because it helps the agent understand what is morally required in the 
situation, ensures that they deliberate in the right way, and makes their behaviour intelligible 
to others. The thesis then goes on to argue that being confronted with a dirty hands conflict 
is particularly pernicious because, once faced with such a situation, it is impossible to keep 
our hands clean. Dirty hands therefore point us towards morality’s tragic nature. The thesis 
then questions what this means for democratic politics. It rejects criticisms that dirty hands 
can, neither in theory nor in practice, be compatible with democratic politics. If dirty-handed 
measures can indeed be a part of democratic politics, we should then ask who gets their 
hands dirty and can share the moral responsibility for the dirty-handed outcome. The thesis 
emphasises that political leaders do not share this burden alone. They act in a complicated 
web of relations with other politicians and public officials and many of them will get their 
hands dirty as well. Additionally, it is argued, to the extent that citizens voluntarily participate 
in or contribute to a given dirty-handed decision or the wider democratic process, they will 
also share some of the dirt and moral responsibility for what their politicians do for them 
and in their name. The thesis concludes by arguing that dirty hands in democratic politics are 
not borne by a single political leader acting alone, but are shared by many in the polity. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Democratic Dirty Hands 
Imagine a politician who is committed to being morally good. She wants to act in the best 
interest of her citizens and adhere to her deep-rooted moral convictions. Immediately she is 
confronted with the following situation: the leader of one of the violent factions in the capital 
has been arrested and is thought to know the location of various bombs hidden in the city 
and set to explode by the end of the day. If the suspicions prove to be true, hundreds of 
innocent people will die in the explosions. Questioning has had no success, so our politician 
is now asked to authorise a more drastic measure. Should she order for the prisoner to be 
tortured in order to extract the information? Michael Walzer famously introduced this ticking 
bomb scenario1 and concluded that “no one succeeds in politics without getting his hands 
dirty” (1973, p. 164). No matter how good a politician’s intentions are, politics will confront 
her with situations in which she will be forced to get her hands dirty.  
While the literature on the issue of dirty hands has been steadily growing since the publication 
of Walzer’s article, writers have not given enough thought to how the democratic context of 
such political action ought to influence our understanding of dirty hands and those who 
engage in them. Much of the dirty hands literature focusses on the political realm but 
surprisingly little has been said about the way in which dirty hands interact with a form of 
government that claims to be both for and by individuals, but where these individuals do not 
make or execute the actual dirty-handed decision themselves. It is the purpose of this thesis 
to make a start at closing this gap and to examine the concept of democratic dirty hands.  
The first aim of the thesis will be to defend and define the notion of dirty hands more 
generally. There is broad agreement that dirty hands situations are instances in which an 
agent has to commit an action that is the overall right thing to do and yet leaves the agent 
having done something wrong (Walzer, 1973; Stocker, 1990; Cunningham, 1992; Dovi, 2005; 
de Wijze, 2007; Archard, 2013; Tigard, 2019). This formulation, however, has led some critics 
to argue that dirty hands are nothing but irrational. How, after all, could one and the same 
action be simultaneously right and wrong (Yeo, 2000, pp. 159-161; Nielsen, 2007, pp. 20-22; 
Coady, 2009, pp. 79-84)? Before going into any detail of the nature of democratic dirty hands, 
it will therefore be crucial to defend the coherence of the notion of dirty hands itself. After 
having done so, though, we will be faced with yet another problem in the dirty hands 
                                            
1 While I will make use of the ticking bomb scenario throughout this thesis because of its prevalence in the 
literature, the use of it as an example of dirty hands has been criticised. For further details see Steven Lukes 
(2006) and Henry Shue (2006). 
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literature. There is widespread disagreement on how best to define the notion of dirty hands. 
Some argue, following Michael Stocker (1990), that dirty hands are caused by a clash of plural 
and conflicting values. Others, following Walzer (1973), think that the conflict is best 
conceived as a clash between our deontological and consequentialist commitments. Yet 
another camp argues, following Thomas Nagel (1993), that what gives rise to dirty hands 
problems is a clash between our role obligations qua private and qua public individual. 
Hence, there does not appear to be an agreement about the nature of the conflict inherent 
in dirty hands. The disagreement does not stop here: there are also a variety of views on what 
distinguishes dirty hands situations from other kinds of moral conflict. Some argue that there 
is a difference in kind between dirty hands and other moral conflicts because dirty hands are 
characterised by the fact that the agent is forced to further the evil plans and projects of a 
third party (Stocker, 1990; de Wijze, 2007). Others think that the difference is that dirty hands 
are grievous instances of moral conflicts so that the difference between the two is quantitative 
in nature (Cunningham, 1992; Walzer, 2004) so that the relevant distinction is not one of 
kind, but rather of magnitude. Yet another position argues that dirty hands are different to 
other moral conflicts in that they involve some form of evil conduct, where evil is different 
both in kind and in magnitude from mere wrongdoing (Kramer, 2018). What exactly 
differentiates dirty hands from other moral conflicts has not been settled in the debate so 
far. What there does appear to be agreement on is that dirty hands are associated with certain 
negative emotional responses that agents are said to experience in the wake of getting their 
hands dirty. The fact that we can observe these emotional responses is said to give credence 
to the existence of dirty hands (Stocker, 1990, p. 125; Gowans, 1994, pp. 88-116; de Wijze, 
2004, p. 458), while at the same time, a lack of such an emotional response gives us good 
reason to judge that the agent in question has not fully understood the moral features of the 
choice situation they were faced with. There is, however, considerable disagreement about 
the kind of emotion that is appropriate in dirty hands scenarios. Carla Bagnoli (2000, p. 178) 
has advocated Bernard Williams’s notion of “agent-regret” (1976, pp. 123-126), Marcia 
Baron has argued for an emotional response in which “remorse and agent-regret mutually 
temper one another” (1988, p. 274), and Steve de Wijze advocates a notion he calls “tragic-
remorse” (2004). Given the varied disagreements in the dirty hands literature about how to 
define the very notion in question, the first aim of my thesis is to take a principled stance on 
these debates and make clear how I understand the nature of dirty hands. 
The second aim of my thesis is to clarify the relationship between dirty hands problems and 
democratic politics and to understand what it means for the former to arise in the latter. This 
is necessary because the notion of democratic dirty hands, i.e. the idea that it can be 
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permissible to get one’s hands dirty in democratic politics, has been challenged on several 
fronts. The first criticism argues that dirty hands reasoning has no place in politics because 
it is erroneously concerned with a lone political actor that makes decisions all by herself, 
which is far removed from the actual workings of democratic politics. David Shugarman 
thinks that “the picture painted of the dirty-hands leader is a composite of wily negotiator, 
clever manipulator, no-nonsense general, and ‘father-knows-best’ moral actor. It is a highly 
romanticized view of leadership and a dangerous one” (2000, pp. 242-243). Such an 
understanding of dirty hands is not surprising, given that much of the dirty hands literature 
is solely concerned with the actions of a political leader without much thought to how actual 
democratic decision-making works. Take for example Richard Bellamy who repeatedly calls 
the politician a “democratic prince” (2010, p. 424;427). When we look at actual democratic 
decision-making, however, this notion does not make any sense. Politicians act with others 
in a complicated web of relations and we will have to acknowledge that dirty hands are not 
a problem that a solitary politician has to solve. Once we accept this it becomes a lot more 
difficult to determine, however, who exactly is getting their hands dirty. Dennis Thompson 
argues that, “because many different officials contribute in many different ways to decisions 
and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify who is morally 
responsible for political outcomes” (1987, p. 40). This problem is sometimes described as 
“the problem of many/no hands”. The question of which political actors actually get their 
hands dirty for a given decision in a democratic setting has not been sufficiently taken up in 
the literature so far. 
Once we start thinking about the involvement of various political actors in the democratic 
decision-making process, we ultimately will also have to take into account the involvement 
of citizens in democratic politics. There is a very specific relationship between citizens and 
politicians in a democratic society in which the latter are the elected representatives of the 
former. In the case of dirty hands it has been argued that, as Thompson puts it, “the bad that 
the official does, he does not only for us, but with our consent – not only in our name but 
on our principles” (1987, p. 18). Similarly Elizabeth Wolgast argues that, “a political 
representative acts for his constituents and in their name. […] Except for him they lack a 
political voice. His voice is theirs, he acts as them” (1991, p. 276). On a similar note David 
Archard asserts that, “the democratic public authorizes its politicians to act on their behalf. 
[…] The public is the true author of the actions performed by others” (2013, p. 781). The 
existing arguments on the responsibility of citizens for the dirty hands of their leaders have 
several shortcomings, though. Firstly, they do not consider the complicated nature of 
representation. It is unclear what politicians ought to represent (e.g. the express wishes, or 
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the best interest of citizens) and to what extent they act independently from or are 
constrained by citizens. Secondly, there appears to be broad agreement that citizens will be 
morally responsible, but when we take a look at the extensive moral responsibility literature 
and look at the conditions that an agent has to fulfil in order to be morally responsible, we 
can see that ascribing moral responsibility to citizens is far from straightforward and 
uncontroversial. It is particularly noteworthy that dirty hands theorists tend to claim that the 
entire public, irrespective of their standing in, or contribution to, democratic politics, will be 
responsible (Archard, 2013, p. 781; de Wijze, 2018, p. 142). I will show that this does not 
sufficiently differentiate between citizens and does not account for the varying degrees of 
responsibility that they will hold. The way in which the responsibility and dirt falls back on 
citizens in a democracy therefore needs further elucidation. 
One issue regarding the dirty hands of citizens that has caught the attention of writers is the 
secrecy, lies, and deception likely involved in dirty hands decisions in politics. Such means 
can result in a violation of the democratic process and a secondary dirty hands problem. Take 
the following example: in 1993 it was leaked that Prime Minister John Major had secretly 
been in contact with the IRA over the ongoing conflicts in Northern Ireland. At the time 
these negotiations were part of a wider attempt to end the continuing violent struggles in the 
country and bring peace. We can assume that, in the first instance, Major had to make a 
decision between the conflicting values of not negotiating with terrorists on the one hand, 
and doing everything in his power to facilitate the peace process on the other. What was so 
interesting about the leak at that point in time was that this revelation came only weeks after 
Major had declared to parliament that talking to those terrorists “would turn my stomach” 
(Bevins, et al., 1993). In addition to the primary conflict he faced, Major also had to make 
the following choice: either he was to publicise these negotiations and risk upsetting the 
delicate balance that had been struck, or he was to keep them a secret while at the same time 
putting on the mask of someone who wholeheartedly opposed negotiating with terrorists. 
The initial justifiability of the dirty hands in the primary problem (i.e. having to negotiate 
with terrorists in order to facilitate the peace process) therefore already has to take into 
account the additional cost of violating the democratic process in the resulting secondary 
dirty hands problem (i.e. having to keep these negotiations a secret from the public to whom 
the politician ought to be accountable). This is a complication that seems to be unique to 
dirty hands in democracies that rely on a reciprocal relationship between politicians and the 
public in which the latter give certain decision-making powers to the former, but where the 
former are simultaneously accountable to the latter. The secondary dirty hands problem then 
arises from violating the ability of citizens to hold politicians accountable. Politicians in 
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democratic settings therefore may have to get their hands doubly dirty, first through the 
initial dirty hands problem, and then a second time by keeping their dirty hands a secret from 
citizens.  
This feature of dirty hands in democracies has, however, lead to another criticism. S.L. 
Sutherland argues that dirty hands theories depict the public as a “passive collection of 
individuals” and as excluding “the prospect of the reciprocity between citizens and leaders” 
(1995, pp. 483,486). This critique is also brought forward by David Shugarman who describes 
dirty hands as drawing on a picture of democracy that is “highly elitist requiring a very 
restrictive understanding of both the nature of citizenship and the relationship between 
citizens and leaders” (2000, p. 232). Maureen Ramsay urges us to consider the way in which 
secrecy and lies go against the key democratic principles of “accountability”, “participation”, 
“consent” and “representation” (2000a, p. 35). When politicians do not reveal certain actions 
or policies, it shields them from being held accountable. Furthermore, the withholding of 
information prevents citizens from participating in free and open discussion about the issue 
at hand. It also implies that the government does not need to respond to the public’s 
demands, and sees itself as being allowed to make decisions without its consent. Finally, 
when using secrecy or lies, politicians fail to take seriously those that they are said to represent 
and take away their opportunity to make their wishes and opinions heard. This leads Ramsay 
to argue that the damage done to the democratic process by secondary dirty hands dilemmas 
gives us a very weighty reason to refrain from using secrecy and lies in those situations. David 
Archard, while slightly more open to the idea of dishonesty in politics than Ramsay, still 
voices the concern that “a public that delegates to its politicians the discretion to act on its 
behalf may increasingly fail to recognise the proper limits of such delegation. Politicians may 
be more disposed to see it as unnecessary to disclose what it is that they are doing in the 
public’s name; the public for its part may be increasingly unwilling to demand an account of 
what it being done” (2013, p. 788). As a result one might wish to argue that “if citizens cannot 
know what officials have done, they cannot, in any substantial sense, approve or disapprove 
of their actions” (Thompson, 1987, p. 22).  
On the other hand, though, Lukes argues in his paper on torture in liberal democracies that 
there will always continue to be people that will “take on the burden of making decisions 
that we would prefer not to know about. Perhaps in these cases we democratically endorse 
being non-democratic” (2006, p. 15). If we in fact prefer not to know of certain morally 
questionable means being used by the politicians we elect and who are said to act in our name 
and for us, this would call into question whether the fact that we do not explicitly know 
about these acts implies that we are not morally responsible for them. Richard Bellamy gives 
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the example of secret services: it is clear to most citizens that the operation of secret services 
can only ever be public to a limited extent, “so we tolerate wire tapping of terrorists and 
spying on unfriendly powers, but prefer not to be told” (2010, p. 426). Similar considerations 
lead David Archard to ascribe a form of “collective bad faith” to the public in these cases, 
“both knowing and affecting not to know that something bad has been done in its name” 
(2013, p. 784). If this is an accurate depiction of the democratic public, then maybe the fact 
that citizens do not know about some, or even many, dirty hands decisions does not 
necessarily undermine their responsibility and dirty hands. In order to answer this question, 
however, we will first have to understand the underlying relationship between citizens and 
their representatives. As mentioned above, this has not been sufficiently examined in the 
dirty hands literature so far. The second aim of my thesis is therefore to understand how the 
dirt and moral responsibility for dirty-handed actions is dispersed among political actors and 
citizens in democratic politics. 
1.2. Thesis Outline 
My project is divided into two parts. Given the large differences in accounts of dirty hands, 
the first part will develop my understanding of the conflict more generally. In the second 
part, I will then move on to respond to the issues raised regarding the issue of democratic 
dirty hands. 
Chapter two aims to provide an analysis of dirty hands as a particular type of moral conflict. 
It begins by giving an account of conflicts as instances of clashing values. It then considers 
how dirty hands conflicts have been standardly considered as a clash between absolute moral 
values and how this has led some thinkers to criticise dirty hands theorists as being irrational. 
The standard view of dirty hands is based on a picture of moral reasoning that does not 
equate rationality with coherence. Our moral judgements can sometimes rightfully be messy, 
contradictory, and not uniquely action-guiding (i.e. not providing us with an unequivocally 
right course of action). This position is opposed to one that conceives of rational moral 
judgement as having to be coherent and action-guiding, and according to which conflicts of 
absolute moral values would be impossible. I offer a solution to make the concept of dirty 
hands intelligible not only on the messy view of moral judgement, but also on the coherence 
view. In doing so I draw an alternative picture of dirty hands in which it is not absolute 
reasons, but pro tanto reasons that conflict and cause the need to get one’s hands dirty. The 
idea is that, as a result, no matter what one’s conception of rational moral judgement, we 
should be able to make sense of the phenomenon of dirty hands. Finally, the chapter 
establishes what distinguishes dirty hands situations from mere moral conflicts. Dirty hands 
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involve the violation of a core moral commitment and results in a weighty moral remainder 
that attaches to the agent. 
In the next chapter I raise a difficulty in the conceptualisation of dirty hands that has received 
little to no thorough attention in the literature so far: once an agent is faced with a dirty hands 
situation, could she keep her hands clean, or does she have to get her hands dirty no matter 
what she does? Positions arguing in favour of the former I will call “asymmetry views” while 
I call positions arguing the latter “symmetry views”. I survey the different, often implicit, 
stances that writers on dirty hands have taken on this issue. Ultimately, I argue, the division 
comes down to different understandings of what makes an action dirty. According to 
asymmetrical views the violation of an important moral requirement does not necessarily 
equate to that action being a dirty one. Dirtiness requires something in addition (e.g. violating 
one’s integrity or innocence). I show that such a view is undesirable because it requires the 
agent to engage in a form of moral compartmentalisation, cannot account for the appropriate 
emotional response to a dirty hands situation, and provides us with unpromising 
understandings of the notions that are supposed to make an action dirty. When an agent is 
faced with a dirty hands situation, it will be too late to keep her hands clean. Ultimately this 
means that accepting the reality of dirty hands must lead to an acknowledgement of the tragic 
nature of our moral lives. 
I then turn to the emotional response appropriate to such conflicts. Chapter four begins by 
arguing that emotions have rational standards of fittingness as responses to our perceptions 
of certain features of a situation. If emotions can be rational in this way, and if agents fittingly 
experience a certain negative emotional response to dirty hands scenarios, then this gives 
credence to the position that dirty hands scenarios involve a genuine moral conflict in which 
choosing the lesser evil cannot do away with the fact that an important moral value has been 
overridden. I then turn to the question of what the appropriate emotional response in dirty 
hands situations looks like. Various versions of regret and remorse have been suggested in 
the literature, but I will defend the notion of “tragic-remorse” (de Wijze, 2004) as the most 
fitting one. Finally, this chapter considers how emotions help ethical decision-making in dirty 
hands situations. I argue that having the right emotional response in such scenarios exhibits 
a commitment to the forgone value, aids in the agent’s deliberation, and can make her 
behaviour intelligible to others. Experiencing the appropriate moral emotion during and in 
the wake of a dirty hands conflict is both inherent and instrumental to being a good moral 
agent.  
Having supplied this analysis of the notion of dirty hands itself, the thesis then moves on to 
consider issues regarding its application to democratic politics. Chapter five deals with 
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criticisms of the notion of democratic dirty hands. To have democratic dirty hands can be 
understood as shorthand for getting one’s hands dirty in a way that is permissible in a 
democracy. While chapters six and seven will provide answers to the worries that dirty hands 
reasoning cannot account for actual democratic decision-making and cannot make sense of 
the role of citizens in democratic politics, I want to argue that these criticisms actually stem 
from some even more fundamental objections to the problem of dirty hands and it is to these 
that chapter five will respond. The first is that getting one’s hands dirty is contradictory in 
principle because we cannot use dirty-handed means to pursue democratic ends. The second 
argues that it is contradictory in practice to use dirty-handed means because they will always 
undermine democracy more than they will promote it. Lastly, the final criticism argues that 
the notion of democratic dirty hands makes no sense because the use of dirty hands signals 
that democracy has at that point failed. I analyse the underlying conception of both 
democracy and dirty hands that has led these critics to renounce the idea of dirty hands, to 
show why their assumptions are wrong, and why this means that their objections to 
democratic dirty hands ultimately fail.  
Having defended the idea that it can be permissible to dirty one’s hands in democratic 
politics, I can then move on to analyse who actually gets their hands dirty. Chapter six 
concentrates on the moral responsibility for dirty hands of different political actors. The 
purpose of this chapter is both to dispel the myth of the single-handed political leader in the 
dirty hands literature and to emphasise that political leaders in a democracy are unlikely to 
bear the sole responsibility for dirty-handed decisions. I begin by giving a brief account of 
what it means for an agent to be responsible. She will have to fulfil certain cognitive, 
epistemic, voluntary, and causal criteria in order to be an appropriate target for ascriptions 
of moral responsibility. While most political leaders will at first glance fulfil these conditions 
most clearly with regards to a dirty hands decision, I will take into consideration the way in 
which their status as a representative could potentially affect this. Ultimately I argue that 
because leaders represent the wishes and interests of their citizens with a considerable 
amount of autonomy, this status cannot be used to undermine their responsibility 
significantly. I then turn to other political actors and political advisers and consider the 
different excuses and justifications that may be able to undermine the epistemic, voluntary, 
and causal criteria respectively in their case. While some of these can in fact be successful 
and therefore limit the agent’s responsibility for dirty hands, many of them cannot. Having 
established the ways in which responsibility falls on different agents in a dirty-handed 
decision-making process, I then consider whether we ought to praise or blame them, 
ultimately suggesting that both will be an appropriate response, highlighting different 
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features of the agent’s dirty hands. The chapter concludes by applying the above analysis to 
a real life example: the Claudy Bombing in Northern Ireland. 
The final chapter then considers the way in which citizens are implicated in the dirty-handed 
decisions of their politicians. It goes through the four individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for moral responsibility established in the previous chapter and shows 
how, and to what extent, many citizens can, and in fact do, satisfy all of them. Many citizens 
are causally implicated in the dirty-handed actions of their leaders in virtue of their 
participation in or contribution to that particular action or the wider democratic process 
more generally. In a democratic society many acts of participation or contribution can be 
said to be voluntary. Even for those citizens who only marginally contribute to politics simply 
in virtue of happening to live within the confines of the state, this contribution can be 
understood as voluntary in as far as citizens have voluntarily endorsed a picture of themselves 
as members of their political community and where their actions are constitutive of that 
membership. While the citizens who voluntarily participated in or contributed to a given 
political action might not have known, and were not even able to know, about the dirty-
handed decision in question, this is not enough to show that they cannot share in the dirt 
and moral responsibility. When citizens have set up or sustained a system in which they 
enable politicians to take decisions for them and in their name without being able to know 
about it, they can be said to have contrived their own ignorance and can thus be appropriate 
targets for ascriptions of moral responsibility. Finally, of these citizens most will have the 
required cognitive capabilities. The only exceptions are adults with certain mental disabilities 
or illnesses and children and younger teenagers who are unlikely to have the necessary 
abilities to understand complex political decision-making and their role in the political 
community. Overall, politicians do not shoulder the dirt and responsibility in a democratic 
society alone, the dirt and responsibility are shared amongst many in the polity, even though 
to varying degrees. 
The thesis will conclude by summing up the various findings of the previous chapters that, 
combined, will give us an understanding of what the concept of dirty hands in democracies 
looks like, how we can best apply dirty hands reasoning to the democratic context, and the 
results this has for the various actors involved in dirty-handed decision making. Additionally 
I will give a brief overview of the positions that could be taken when we ask who should and 
can be held accountable for dirty hands in practice and how. On the one hand there are those 
who argue that politicians ought to reveal their dirty hands to the public and in this way stand 
accountable to them. Within this position there is disagreement about whether it would be 
appropriate to subject the politician to punishment for their dirty hands (Thompson, 1987; 
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Sutherland, 1995; Ramsay, 2000a; Levy, 2007; Meisels, 2008; de Wijze, 2013). On the other 
hand, however, there are those who argue that politicians do not have a responsibility to 
reveal their dirty hands to the public and instead should be wearing “clean gloves” (Bellamy, 
2010; Tillyris, 2016). The work done in this thesis should enable us to work out a more 
principled stance on this issue in the future. 
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PART I: The Problem of Dirty Hands 
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2. Defining Dirty Hands 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will be introducing the problem of dirty hands. I will begin by giving a brief 
introduction to the issue of moral conflicts in general. Dirty hands, I argue, are a kind of 
moral conflict. I will then turn to the standard way in which dirty hands have been defined 
in the literature, according to which the values that clash are absolute in nature. This position 
relies on an understanding of rational moral judgement as sometimes rightfully being messy, 
contradictory, and not uniquely action-guiding. This will lead me to consider a potential 
objection to such a definition that argues that clashes of absolute values are irrational. This 
position relies on a view of rational moral judgement as having to be coherent. On this view 
our moral judgements have to be consistent, complete, and action-guiding. Subscribing to 
such an understanding of morality does not mean, however, that such individuals will have 
to deny the existence of the problem of dirty hands altogether. To show this, I will then offer 
a second way of defining the problem of dirty hands; one that captures the essential conflict 
it describes while avoiding any problems with the background assumptions of the coherence 
view of rational moral judgement. On this view the values clashing in dirty hands problems 
are of a pro tanto nature. Thus, I argue, no matter which wider view of rational moral 
judgement we take, we can make sense of the existence of dirty hands problems. I conclude 
by outlining what sets dirty hands conflicts apart from mere moral conflicts. Dirty hands, I 
argue, are grievous instances of conflict because they are situations in which some of our 
core moral commitments clash. 
2.2. Moral Conflict 
Before going into a detailed discussion of the best way to characterise dirty hands, I will first 
give a definition of moral conflict (dirty hands being a special kind of moral conflict) in 
general. I will be referring to the concept of moral conflict at various points in this thesis, so 
it will be useful to be clear about what I mean by it. Firstly, what I am concerned with in this 
thesis are certain kinds of, what I will call, ontological conflicts; i.e. the facts about morality 
are such that the agent is faced with conflicting moral requirements. There are two types of 
ontological conflict. In the first, while acts A and B are in conflict, there is an overall winner; 
i.e. we can discern the better option or at least the lesser evil. In the second type we are faced 
with a tie, such that no better option or lesser evil is discernible. What I do not mean when 
talking about moral conflict is an agent’s uncertainty about what to do; people might think 
that they face a conflict of one type (winner/tie), while actually they are facing another, or 
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they might not be sure which one they are facing, or they might be uncertain whether they 
are facing one at all, or they might be uncertain which option to choose. When referring to 
moral conflict in this thesis I will be concerned with ontological and not such epistemic 
notions of conflict. 
In the following I will develop my definition of moral conflict from Thomas Hurka’s 
discussion on value theory and conflict. He argues that to see what is at stake in moral 
conflicts, we need to understand what it means for two values to be “distinct” from one 
another; “in a weaker sense, X is a distinct good from Y if X is both an instance of some 
generic good and in some way [intrinsically]2 distinct from Y. In a stronger sense, X is a 
distinct good from Y if it is an instance of a distinct generic good from Y” (1996, p. 563). 
Whenever two options are distinct, Hurka argues, we will face a conflict because in doing 
one act we will be losing out on the value the other act had to offer. Let us consider three 
cases to make sense of this.  
In the first case I can choose between giving my friend five units of happiness or ten units 
of happiness. This is, according to Hurka, an example of an “inclusion case” in which, “the 
better instance includes the less good as a proper part” (p. 563). Five units of happiness are 
a proper part of ten units of the same kind of happiness. In these kinds of choice scenarios 
the less-good option is not distinct from the better option in either the strong or weak sense 
of the word. The options are neither instances of distinct generic goods, nor instances of the 
same generic good but in some way intrinsically distinct. Because of this, there are no grounds 
for this being a moral conflict. We can fulfil the demands of both options because the lesser 
option is included in the better one; this means we should simply choose to provide our 
friend with ten units of happiness. 
In our second example, a government has to choose between two policies: one that promotes 
greater equality, and one that pushes for more liberty. These two options are plural and 
distinct in the strong sense of the word and therefore are grounds for moral conflict. Equality 
and liberty are distinct generic goods. That means that the option that we do not choose has 
a value, the loss of which the all-things-considered better option cannot fully make up for. 
                                            
2 He adds the word “intrinsically” later on in the paper (1996, pp. 569-570) to account for choices between 
options that have the same value attached to them but are only externally different. An example of this would 
be a choice between two cream cheese bagels that have the exact same quality, texture, size, dough to cheese 
ratio etc.; while the two bagels are surely distinct in the sense that they are two separate objects, there is no 
difference in their intrinsic make up. The distinction is merely an external one. Therefore there are no grounds 
for this being a conflict. 
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Whichever policy I choose under the circumstances, I will lose out on something of moral 
importance and this makes our situation one of moral conflict.  
In our third example I have to choose between five units of happiness for my sister, and ten 
units of happiness for my brother. Let us assume that the latter option is the all-things-
considered better course of action. I think that there are two ways to attempt to conceptualise 
what exactly is causing the moral conflict in this case. One approach has been offered by 
Michael Stocker, who defends the claim that conflicts require plural values that are distinct 
in the strong sense of the word; i.e. options that are instances of distinct generic goods. He 
argues that what might initially look like two instantiations of the same value (i.e. in this case 
happiness), actually turns out to be two different values; he describes this as “indexical 
individuation” (1990, p. 247). Most moral theories, Stocker says, will tell us a story about 
how to treat friends and strangers respectively; sometimes this will lead us to favour our 
friend, sometimes the stranger, and sometimes it might not make a difference at all to a given 
theory. Either way, most of these moral theories will allow for indexical individuation to 
make an evaluative difference (e.g. by ascribing special importance to personal relationships, 
or to impartiality). Given this evaluative difference he suggests that it does not seem far-
fetched to say that we are actually dealing with two distinct values in our case of choosing 
between different amounts of happiness for a sister and a brother; as Stocker puts it: “this-
person’s-happiness and that-person’s happiness involve plural values” (1990, p. 248).  
Hurka, however, wants to argue against this explanation because he thinks that indexical 
individuation could lead to our understanding of value becoming empty and useless, since if 
every single person’s happiness was a distinct and plural good, it would become exceedingly 
difficult to engage in comparing values. According to Hurka, it is therefore better to argue 
that my siblings’ happinesses are distinct in the weak sense of the word; while the same value 
of happiness is at stake, my sister and my brother are intrinsically different human beings. 
The situation can therefore ground a moral conflict about producing ten units of happiness 
for my brother, but none for my sister; “although the happinesses of different people are 
different individual goods, what makes them good is in each case the same, namely, just their 
involving happiness” (Hurka, 1996, p. 564). A similar claim can be made about a case in 
which I have to choose whether to give someone the same units of happiness, but at different 
points in time; a temporal difference results in the two options being distinct from one 
another in the weak sense. Hurka considers the objection that happiness experienced by 
distinct individuals or happiness experienced at different points of time by the same 
individual is not an intrinsic feature of happiness and therefore does not satisfy the definition 
of weak distinctiveness. As a response he reminds us that values such as happiness are not 
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free floating but can only be considered as being situated within a given individual at a given 
point in time. Particular individuals and times are therefore intrinsic aspects of happiness. 
We can now turn Hurka’s discussion about the distinctness of value into a definition of what 
we mean when we say that we face a moral conflict. Moral conflicts arise whenever (1) an 
act A has value x, (2) another act B has either (i) value y, or (ii) has value x but is in some way 
intrinsically distinct from A, and (3) it is possible to perform act A and act B separately but 
not jointly. 
After having briefly defined the idea of moral conflict, I want to take a closer look at the 
problem of dirty hands itself in the next section.  
2.3. Value Conflict and Dirty Hands 
There are broadly three ways of explaining the nature of dirty hands problems. I will argue 
that the one that captures dirty hands most accurately understands the nature of the conflict 
inherent to it as a clash of plural moral values. I will explain in section 2.6. what I think sets 
apart dirty hands scenarios from other kinds of conflict that results from the clash of plural 
moral values.  
There exist a variety of moral values that we reasonably think to be important but that cannot 
always be aligned or easily traded off with one another without a significant remainder. For 
Stocker, dirty hands conflicts arise when we face situations in which people will be “wronged, 
they and their trust, integrity, and status as ends […] violated, dishonoured, and betrayed” 
(1990, p. 17). Additionally they can also involve the destruction of items of great worth (e.g. 
art or a holy place) or “the violation of an important principle rather than a person” (1990, 
p. 18) (e.g. circumventing justice). Choosing the lesser evil does not mean that the competing 
value or principle not acted upon is therefore annulled or cancelled. While it may have been 
outweighed in this case, its normative force is still intact. This then results in a moral 
remainder that attaches to us. Not every choice between conflicting values that results in a 
remainder is a dirty hands situation, though. Stocker argues that what sets dirty hands apart 
from ordinary moral conflicts is that the former involve the agent being coerced into 
implementing the evil or immoral plans of a third-party. Dirty hands situations are clashes 
of plural and conflicting values that result in a particular remainder because they require the 
agent to violate or betray a person, or important value or principle. This view opposes two 
potentially more common understandings of the problem. 
In Walzer’s article “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands” he sums up the issue in 
the question of “how can we get our hands dirty by doing what we ought to do” (1973, p. 
164). Walzer illustrates this through the before-mentioned ticking bomb scenario in which a 
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political leader is asked to authorise the torture of a suspect in custody who is said to know 
the location of bombs in several buildings across the capital set to go off soon (1973, p. 167). 
Walzer argues that the reason this choice is so difficult is that we are torn between our 
deontological and consequentialist commitments. On the one hand, we have the obligation 
not to torture, but on the other, we are faced with the potentially disastrous consequences 
of not doing so. Torturing “may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet 
leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong” (1973, p. 161). According to Walzer, the 
politician’s consequent guilt is a sign that she takes her deontological commitments seriously 
and will only override them when absolutely necessary. The problem with this conception is 
that it unduly limits the kinds of situation that could be called dirty hands. Imagine a political 
leader who is faced with a situation in which she has to curtail the liberty of some people in 
order to promote equality. She might come to the reasonable judgement that her foremost 
duty is to protect her citizens’ equality and that doing so would also maximise overall 
happiness or well-being, and yet, she would still rightfully feel guilty about having to violate 
some people’s liberty to do so. In such a situation our deontological commitments and 
utilitarian reasons point toward the same course of action, and yet we would rightly 
experience a moral remainder. The underlying conflict in dirty hands should therefore not 
be understood as a clash between deontological and consequentialist reasoning. 
There is yet another common conception of dirty hands. Nagel conceives of the issue less in 
terms of conflicting moral theories and more in terms of an agent’s obligations qua private 
individual and qua public office holder. Even if both moral codes should be ultimately 
derived from the same source, he argues, the principles emphasised in private and public 
morality are different and can therefore result in a clash leading to dirty hands. Public action 
involves both “a heightened concern for results and a stricter requirement of impartiality. It 
warrants methods usually excluded for private individuals, and sometimes it licenses 
ruthlessness” (1993, p. 82). Dirty hands conflicts then result from a clash between our private 
principles and commitments, and public standards of impartiality and a focus on the 
consequences of our actions. If an agent wants to fulfil the requirements of her public role, 
she is required to choose the latter and forgo the former. We ought to reject this 
understanding because it does not capture cases that strike us as instances of dirty hands. 
Imagine the following example suggested by Coady (2009, p. 85): a group of concentration 
camp prisoners have managed to escape and are hiding. One of the group is a mother with 
a young child. The officers pursuing them are coming closer and the child will not stop 
crying. The only way to prevent all of them from being found and, most likely, being shot 
immediately will be to smother the child. While there might be good reasons to think that 
  
24 
  
dirty hands are particularly prevalent in the public sphere because of the heightened concern 
for impartiality and the consequences of one’s actions, there is no reason to limit dirty hands 
cases to this realm. De Wijze and Goodwin note that “it is important not to slip into a 
commonly held error that simply because cases of [dirty hands] occur more frequently and 
dramatically in politics (and, more generally, in public life) this means that this clash between 
public and private values is the defining feature of the DHs problem” (2009, p. 531). Another 
counterexample given in the literature is Jim and the Indians (de Wijze & Goodwin, 2009, p. 
531). These are conflicts that have, in essence, the same characteristics as the ticking bomb 
scenario and it is therefore hard to see why these should be separated from the class of dirty 
hands problems. The conflict inherent in dirty hands should therefore not be understood as 
a clash between the requirements of an agent qua private individual and qua public official.  
Even if dirty hands are not necessarily due to the divide between public and private duties, 
there is a reason why much of the literature centres on political cases. Walzer supplies us 
with two reasons for why the political sphere is particularly susceptible to dirty hands cases 
arising. Firstly, politics is a realm that brings power and glory to leaders and people are willing 
to go to great lengths to claim these benefits. Many will be ready to use morally dubious 
means in the process and once they have achieved a position of political leadership the power 
they have over the lives of others can further corrupt them and their actions. Once some 
agents start behaving in these ways this will likely force others into situations in which they 
will have to employ similar means. Even a politician who wants to be morally good will 
therefore be forced to engage in the morally dubious behaviour of these others and get her 
hands dirty in order to make it in politics. Secondly, Walzer argues, dirty hands problems in 
politics are particularly pressing because politicians are able to use “violence and the threat 
of violence” (1973, p. 163). In the pursuit of the interests of her citizens a political leader will 
sometimes be forced to put the lives of people at risk. Trying to protect and further the 
interests of her citizens will therefore make the politician face additional, and particularly 
violent, dirty hands problems. The result is that any political leader, no matter how good 
their character or intentions, will have to get their hands dirty throughout their career. He 
therefore agrees with the Machiavellian credo that politicians will have “to learn how not to 
be good” (Walzer, 1973, p. 168). While I think that there are good reasons then to subscribe 
to an understanding of dirty hands as a clash of plural and conflicting values, this does not 
preclude an acknowledgement that dirty hands cases will be particularly frequent and pressing 
in politics. 
So far I have given a brief indication of how we ought to understand the nature of moral 
conflicts, i.e. as a clash of plural and conflicting values, and argued that dirty hands are best 
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understood as an instance of such conflicts. In the next section I will introduce the standard 
view of dirty hands, which argues that the moral values involved in dirty-handed moral 
conflicts are absolute in nature. This view relies on a conception of rational moral judgement 
as sometimes being messy, contradictory, and not uniquely action-guiding. This has led some 
critics to argue that the notion of dirty hands is irrational, which stems from their view that 
the standard for rationality in moral judgement is one of coherence. Moral judgement ought 
to be coherent, should always yield action-guiding results and ought to exclude the possibility 
of conflicts between absolute moral values. Even on this conception, though, we could make 
sense of dirty hands conflicts. To show this I will introduce an alternative reading of the 
nature of the values involved in dirty-handed moral conflicts, namely that they are pro tanto 
rather than absolute. What this chapter is then intended to show is that, independent of one’s 
wider conception of rational moral judgement, one can make sense of the notion of dirty 
hands. 
2.4. The Standard View of Dirty Hands 
The standard view of dirty hands first laid out by Walzer describes, as mentioned before, the 
problem of how we can “get our hands dirty by doing what we ought to do” (1973, p. 164). 
His solution is that in these scenarios where a moral rule is overridden because it is “the best 
thing to do on the whole in the circumstances” (1973, p. 171), this rule is not therefore 
cancelled or annulled; on the contrary it still stands and adds a degree of wrongness – a 
remainder of what we had to forgo - to the otherwise rightness of the act. In a similar vein, 
Stuart Hampshire argues that dirty hands are the kinds of situations in which we face a 
conflict “between moral claims which, considered a priori, seem absolute and without 
exception and which in fact are irreconcilable in the situation. Such situations of conflict 
between absolute moral claims will occasionally occur and are not to be avoided” (1978, pp. 
40-41). Both of them start from a conception of morality in which absolute requirements 
can clash.3 
To illustrate what is at stake in these conflicts and what I mean by saying that in these 
situations there is an added degree of wrongness and a remainder, I first want to introduce 
in more detail the conceptual framework argued for by Stocker which I briefly sketched out 
                                            
3 While Hampshire makes this position very explicit, Walzer’s stance on this issue is not entirely clear. He 
explicitly rejects the view that deontological commitments ought to be conceived as mere “guidelines” (1973, 
p. 170) but also argues that dirty hands arise “from an effort to refuse absolutism” (1973, p. 162). I think that 
this leaves us with a view in which Walzer acknowledges the absolute force of deontological commitments 
while at the same allowing that these can clash with the equally absolute requirements of consequentialist 
reasoning in emergency situations and as such refusing the idea of a form of Kantian absolutism in which 
absolute requirements can never come into conflict with one another. This does not, however, imply that these 
values are not absolute. 
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in the previous section. He identifies what he thinks is a major oversight of most moral 
theories; by concentrating exclusively on action-guiding considerations when assessing the 
rightness or wrongness of an act, they overlook what in those cases are ultimately non-action-
guiding reasons and how they affect both the agent and the moral description of the act 
taken, even if they do not affect the overall course of action that is chosen. To illustrate this 
line of thought, let us briefly return to our ticking bomb case in which a politician is asked 
to authorise the torture of a captured suspect to save the lives of hundreds of innocent 
citizens. It is wrong to torture people and it is also wrong to let hundreds of innocent people 
die when one could prevent it. In this hypothetical scenario, however, these two requirements 
are mutually exclusive; what we are faced with, according to Stocker, are “impossible oughts” 
(1990, p. 13). There are two moral requirements that the politician ought to follow, but she 
can, in this instance, only do one or the other but not both. Let us assume that she now 
decides, after careful deliberation, that it would be the lesser evil to torture the suspect. The 
wrongness of letting innocent people die if she could prevent it then turns into the “action-
guiding” (1990, p. 11) consideration, while the wrongness of torturing people in this case 
becomes the “non-action-guiding” (1990, p. 13) reason. The former is the reason that pushes 
her to take a certain course of action, while the other one, even though accepted as a good 
moral reason, is not acted upon. How does this help us to explain the source of the added 
wrongness and remainder of this action? It is at this point, Stocker argues, where most moral 
theories stop their reasoning. One course of action has been identified as the lesser evil and 
is therefore the right thing to do; end of story. As long as the politician has chosen the lesser 
of two evils she should wholeheartedly commit to it and embrace her action as the morally 
right one. This, however, overlooks what now happens with the non-action-guiding feature; 
because she sees the wrongness of torturing people as a genuine moral demand she “double-
count[s]” it. “The dirty feature is taken into account once in determining the overall value of 
the act and again on its own.” (1990, p. 12) While she has identified the lesser evil in the 
situation, she in this way gives due weight to something she takes to be a genuine moral 
requirement; she is taking the wrongness of torture seriously and it becomes a remainder that 
attaches to her evaluation of the course of action taken. This remainder is then the source of 
a strong negative emotional response; she feels the weight of having to act against a moral 
reason in order to act in accordance with another. Such an approach emphasises that she 
ought to react with due consideration to every feature of the situation, whether she acted 
upon it or not. This focus on the non-action-guiding side, for Stocker, better reflects the 
complexity of our moral experience than a theory that concentrates simply on “action-
guidingness”.  
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Situations in which it can be wrong to do what is right and in which we can dirty our hands 
by doing what we ought to do are described by writers such as Walzer, Stocker, and 
Hampshire4 as situations in which we are faced with a clash between absolute requirements. 
What would an understanding of moral judgement that allows for this to be rational have to 
look like? How could it allow for something to be right and wrong at the same time? As an 
example of a theory that allows for this let us turn to Stuart Hampshire.5 He identifies a 
prevalent tradition which “associates rationality in moral judgement with coherence, which 
in turn implies an absence of irresoluble conflicts between moral claims” (1978, p. 34).  Once 
we have come up with a complete and consistent system of moral thought, this supports the 
validity of our moral claims within that system. This in turn helps us to clear up borderline 
cases in which our intuitions diverge. As such, this understanding of rational moral 
judgement can explain why morally conflicting claims might arise but also gives us the tools 
to resolve them. Under this view, a clash of absolute requirements would be irrational.6 
Instead, Hampshire proposes that our moral judgement 
Cannot be rounded off and made complete and tidy; partly because so 
much of that is of value in a human life depends on uncontrollable accident, 
partly because we still know so little about the determinates of behaviour 
and about human nature generally, partly because individuals vary so greatly 
in their dispositions and interests, partly because new ways of life should 
always be expected to arise in association with new knowledge and with 
new social forms. There is one further reason, we expect also leaps of 
imagination, moments of insight, very rarely, and in unusual men, which 
will lead to transformations of experience and to new moral ambitions and 
to new enjoyments of living. (1978, p. 53) 
A view of rational moral judgement defined as coherence would not be able to allow for this 
because such a system will necessarily have to place “a prepared grid upon conduct and upon 
a person […] and thereafter one only tends to see the pieces of his conduct and life as they 
are divided by lines on the grid” (1978, p. 40). When the features affecting our moral 
deliberation are so varied, we cannot approach them looking only for what we are already 
expecting and only attending to those features that fit our preconceived ideas and the system 
of moral rules that we have established. Hampshire recalls lecturing on moral theory and 
introducing a true story about a difficult decision that occurred during wartime regarding the 
interrogation of a spy.  
                                            
4 Additional writers who describe the nature of dirty hands like this include, for example, de Wijze (2007), 
Christopher Gowans (1994), Bernard Williams (1978), and Martin Hollis (1982). 
5 Note that Hampshire makes the following claims about rationality as appropriate for practical reasoning, while 
allowing that rationality for other kinds of reasoning may legitimately have different standards (1978, p. 23). 
6 I will explain the reason for this in the next section. 
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The theoretical interest in the story-telling was always in the selection of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation which ought to be included in 
the story if the complexity of the original moral problem was to be fully 
reproduced. I noticed that on different occasions, and without any clear 
intention, I tended to stress different features in the situation as relevant to 
the problem, and that I did not always even include the same elements of 
the situation, as belonging to the story. […] I described the episode in 
different words on different occasions, always under the necessity of 
omitting some of the circumstances which another person might 
reasonably consider relevant to the decision. (1978, pp. 39-40) 
The problem with any view of morality that places a strong emphasis on rational moral 
judgement defined as coherence is that it will not be able to provide a grid refined enough 
to account sufficiently for the inexhaustible features of a given situation.  The coherence of 
our moral judgements therefore does not necessarily support their validity because we have 
most likely bought such coherence at the price of missing out on some of the potentially 
morally relevant features of the situation. 
Under Hampshire’s conception of morality, clashes of absolute moral requirements do not 
necessarily have to be cases of irrationality. Dirty hands, as they seem to be described by 
Walzer, Stocker, and Hampshire therefore rely on a picture of rational moral judgement that 
depicts it as messy, sometimes contradictory, and not always uniquely action-guiding. Under 
such a conception of rational moral judgement – let us call this from now on the “messy 
view” – there is no obvious problem in the claim that it can be wrong to do what is right and 
that we can dirty our hands by doing what we ought to do; these are simply situations in 
which our moral system is justifiably contradictory. The idea of dirty hands is a lot more 
problematic, however, for people who do not subscribe to this view of rational moral 
judgement but instead argue that rational moral judgement has to be coherent and uniquely 
action-guiding – let us call this from now on the “coherence view”. In the following I want 
to lay out why thinkers from this camp have questioned the rationality of dirty hands. With 
their objections made clear, I then want to proceed to offer a solution that will make sense 
of dirty hands under their conception of rational moral judgement as well.  
The existence of genuine dirty hands conflicts has been questioned because of the way in 
which it is conceptualised by the standard view. How, after all, could absolute moral values 
conflict in a coherent ethical system? It might be difficult, if not impossible, for us to see 
what is the right and wrong thing to do in a given situation, but that does not mean that there 
is not always a uniquely right and wrong option available to the agent. If we had a 
comprehensive understanding of morality and full knowledge of all of the morally relevant 
features of the situation we could not end up with any unresolved conflicts in our moral 
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thinking. There are then no genuine moral conflicts or dirty hands problems, and talk of such 
unhelpfully makes moral judgement appear irrational in such situations (Coady, 2009, pp. 79-
84; Nielsen, 2007, pp. 20-22; Yeo, 2000, pp. 159-161). 
The problem of dirty hands, Stocker claims, is a form of moral conflict in which the agent, 
through no fault of hers, has to do something “justified, even obligatory, but nonetheless 
wrong” (1990, p. 9). In a similar vein de Wijze argues that the essence of the problem is that 
“in all dirty hands scenarios the agent knows that by acting as she did [i.e. bringing about the 
lesser of two evils], she did wrong, violating a moral principle, leaving her feeling remorse or 
‘agent-regret’” (2007, p. 11). Leaving the issue of emotions aside for the moment, under the 
consistency view this way of looking at the problem portrays dirty hands as being irrational 
and is therefore a ground for doubting the feasibility of dirty hands on such an account. To 
understand why this is the case, we need to take a closer look at what exactly could be meant 
by the terms “right” and “wrong” that are used without being further defined. My project 
here is not to re-phrase “right” and “wrong” in terms that are exactly synonymous; rather, I 
will try to capture the essence of what is being implied by these notions in the context of 
dirty hands. Note that I will be looking at the word “right” rather than the term “justified” 
used in Stocker’s definition, because I think that for the purpose of this kind of conflict, 
whatever is morally right can be justified. Right, however, seems to be a more general notion 
that will apply to many more definitions of dirty hands beside Stocker’s.  
Let us begin with the word “wrong”. When we commonly refer to something as being wrong, 
what we seem to imply is the notion of impermissibility.7 When I, for instance, tell you that 
it is wrong to rob a bank, the message I am in effect trying to give you, is that you should 
not rob a bank. You cannot act in such a way because it is morally (and legally in this case) 
impermissible. While this does not appear to me to be a very controversial point, the issue 
of what “right” commonly designates is slightly more complicated. Take the following two 
examples that might be uttered in everyday speech: 1) Saving a drowning child at the minor 
cost of getting my clothes wet is right; and 2) Giving some of my money to charity is right. 
In the first example, “right” could be seen to imply the notion of “obligatory”. When it is in 
your power to save a child at little or no cost to yourself you have to do so. Giving money 
to charity, however, does not seem to be straightforwardly obligatory. I might think that 
there are far better ways to exercise any form of duty that I owe to others by, for example, 
spending my time working for local community projects. What seems to be meant by saying 
that giving to charity is “right” is the fact that doing so is “at least permissible”, but it does 
                                            
7 For a more in-depth analysis of (im-)permissibility see (Lawlor, 2009). 
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not necessarily have to imply the stronger claim of having an obligation to do so. As 
“rightness” is ambiguous in this sense I will, in the following, refer to rightness as meaning 
“at least permissible”, without making the stronger claim of having an obligation.8 This 
meaning will suffice to bring out the irrational nature of the above claims about dirty hands 
on the coherence view of rational moral judgement. Let us now go back to the initial 
definition given by Stocker that dirty hands are “justified, even obligatory, but nonetheless 
wrong”.9  
Using rightness to denote an act being “at least permissible” and wrongness to denote an act 
being “impermissible”, Michael Stocker’s definition then reads: dirty hands are at least 
permissible, even obligatory, but nonetheless impermissible. Stephen de Wijze’s description 
similarly implies that doing the lesser evil, which is an at least permissible act, is at the same 
time also an impermissible act. While these definitions are short and snappy they make the 
problem unnecessarily irrational on the coherence view of rational moral judgement. What 
is therefore required for adherents of the consistency view is a re-phrased definition of dirty 
hands that captures Stocker’s intuition that, “even though dirty hands are morally 
problematic, they are conceptually unproblematic” (1990, p. 13).  
2.5. An Alternative View of Dirty Hands 
What does it mean for something to be right, i.e. at least permissible, or wrong, i.e. 
impermissible? There appear to be two main possibilities, either the two terms refer to an 
all-things-considered permissibility or impermissibility, or they designate a pro tanto 
permissibility or impermissibility respectively. As seen above, the all-things-considered or 
absolute understanding has irrational results on the coherence view of rational moral 
judgement. However, I will argue that we can still make sense of dirty hands on this view if 
we understand the clashing values involved as pro tanto rather than absolute in nature. In 
the case of a pro tanto (im-)permissible action its permissibility or impermissibility can be 
outweighed depending on other factors that are part of the situation in which it is considered. 
                                            
8 Rob Lawlor suggests that “right” and “wrong” are often used in ordinary language to denote “good” and 
“bad”. While this might be true of its common sense use, I want to resist this move on a conceptual level. 
Lawlor seems to think that a reading of wrongness as badness is the clue to understanding what someone is 
trying to express when uttering the words “whatever I do will be wrong”; which, if wrong was to be understood 
in terms of impermissibility, would lead to the irrationality I will shortly be describing. Instead, he argues, it 
makes perfect sense to describe people as saying “Whatever I will do will be bad” (2009, pp. 208-213). This, I 
think, does not get to the root of the problem and the aim of this chapter is to show that with a careful 
interpretation of what we actually mean when uttering these words, we can keep up the distinction between 
right and good, and wrong and bad, while at the same time being able to account for moral conflict on the 
consistency view.  
9 The fact that he described them as “justified, even obligatory” seems to resonate with my reading of rightness 
defined as “at-least permissibility”. Dirtying one’s hands is at least permissible and can therefore be justified; it 
can also be obligatory, but does not necessarily have to be. 
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Let us briefly return to our ticking-bomb case. According to the revised understanding of 
value it is generally thought to be pro tanto impermissible to torture people; it is also generally 
thought to be pro tanto impermissible to let hundreds of innocent people die when one 
could prevent it. In this hypothetical scenario, however, these two requirements are mutually 
exclusive. Let us assume that I now decide after careful deliberation that it will be the lesser 
evil to torture the suspect. The pro tanto impermissibility of letting innocent people die if I 
could prevent it then turns into the “action-guiding” consideration, while the pro tanto 
impermissibility of torturing people in this case becomes the “non-action-guiding” reason. 
Torture is a pro tanto, but in this scenario not the all-things-considered, wrong. The former 
is the reason that pushes me to take a certain course of action, while the other one, even 
though accepted as a good moral reason, is not acted upon. 
Bearing this framework in mind, we can now have a closer look at the way in which pro tanto 
reasons work. Frank Jackson, in his discussion of Susan Hurley’s (1989) account of pro tanto 
reasons and moral conflict, claims that “pro tanto reasons are like forces”. He writes that:  
A force F 1 acting on a particle can be such that by itself it would accelerate 
the particle towards North. At the same time there may be another force F 
2 which by itself would accelerate the particle towards South. Perhaps F 1 
is greater than F 2 so that there is a resultant force towards North. 
Nevertheless, F 2 still exists; it explains why the particle does not accelerate 
more briskly towards North. The overwhelmed force is still there. Similarly, 
when pro tanto reasons clash, the overwhelmed reason survives. [It] 
survives as a morally relevant feature of the situation […]. (1992, p. 478) 
When we take the source of the requirement to be a genuine moral reason, it does not vanish 
when not acted upon; instead we should imagine it to exert a pull, similar to that of a physical 
force, towards the course of action not taken. This pull is then the remainder that attaches 
to our action and that is the base for us feeling a negative emotional response. When we 
forgo something of importance in a moral conflict we expect to feel, in one form or another, 
bad about violating something that is still dear to us. David Ross seems to agree with this 
picture when he lays out his deontological theory based on prima facie10 moral reasons; 
“when we think ourselves justified in breaking […] a promise in order to relieve someone’s 
distress, we do not for a moment cease to recognize a [pro tanto] duty to keep our promise, 
and this leads us to feel [...] compunction for behaving as we do” (2009, p. 28). When we 
                                            
10 The use of “prima facie” would suggest that what Ross is describing are moral obligations that only appear 
to be good moral reasons at first sight; his description of moral obligations, however, suggests that “pro tanto” 
would have been a more suitable label to give to the kinds of moral reasons he is interested in. This reading is 
supported by Shelly Kagan who notes that “in distinguishing between pro tanto and prima facie reasons I 
depart from the unfortunate terminology proposed by Ross, which has invited confusion and 
misunderstanding. I take it that – despite his misleading label – it is actually pro tanto reasons that Ross has in 
mind in his discussion of what he calls prima facie duties” (1991, p. 17). As such Ross’s quote should extend 
to my argument without problems.  
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take seriously Stocker’s argument for the influence exerted on us by non-action-guiding 
considerations11, on this revised view of value we can create a picture of pro tanto reasons 
that allows us to account for genuine moral conflict under the coherence view of rational 
moral judgement.  
We are now able to draw some conclusions about dirty hands in accordance with this 
understanding of moral conflict under the coherence view of rational moral judgement. The 
reason why dirty hands are conceptually unproblematic but morally problematic is because, 
like other kinds of moral conflict, one and the same evaluation includes two reasons that pull 
in opposite directions. In the specific case of dirty hands we start the evaluation with 
choosing the all-things-considered lesser of two evils which makes the overall action at least 
permissible. At the same time, however, we engage with the reason that has not been acted 
on but that nonetheless pulls us in the opposing direction. The option not chosen represents 
what the agent takes to be a strong moral reason even though it was overridden in this 
particular scenario. It is this second part of the evaluation that throws a shadow over what is 
an otherwise overall at least permissible action. This is the source of a remainder that makes 
the agent rationally experience a strong negative emotional response. There is no logical 
incoherence in holding that one and the same act can be analysed and evaluated along 
different dimensions; yet it shows why we think that situations of dirty hands are morally 
very challenging in the sense that they result in the agent experiencing strong negative 
emotions even though she did the lesser of two evils.  
What I have hoped to show is that regardless of the conception of rational moral judgement 
one might have, whether it is one in which moral judgement is messy, contradictory, and not 
always uniquely action-guiding; or one in which moral judgement has to be on the whole a 
coherent and complete system, we can make sense of moral conflicts, the problem of dirty 
hands being an example of one such conflict.  What we will have to engage with now are 
different kinds of moral conflict and what sets dirty hands apart from these other sorts of 
conflicts, regardless of the conception of the problem one subscribes to. 
2.6. What Makes a Moral Conflict a Case of Dirty Hands? 
So far I have defined moral conflicts in section 2.2. as arising whenever (1) an act A has value 
x, (2) another act B has either (i) value y, or (ii) has value x but is in some way intrinsically 
                                            
11 One might wonder now whether, given the way in which I have described pro tanto reasons as forces, 
representing our decision as having an action-guiding and a non-action-guiding component is the best use of 
language. For those sceptical of these notions, I think they could be easily exchanged for something like a 
“primary” as opposed to a “secondary” consideration, where the former pulls us more strongly in its direction 
while the other pushes us slightly away. 
  
33 
  
distinct from A, and (3) it is possible to perform act A and act B separately but not jointly. 
In the following I want to take a closer look at the kinds of remainder and rational emotional 
responses that different moral conflicts create. This will be crucial in trying to understand 
what makes some moral conflicts, but not others, cases of dirty hands. I use the term 
“rational emotional response” here to ensure that we exclude any excessive or exaggerated 
feelings; for instance, you might experience slight regret for having chosen chocolate instead 
of vanilla ice cream for dessert, but it does not seem rational to have a strong feeling of 
remorse for the following week because of that choice.  
Imagine you are on the way to meet a friend for coffee. The day has been set for a long time, 
you have both been looking forward to seeing each other, and you promised that you would 
not miss it under any circumstances. On the way to the café you witness a traffic accident. 
You rush over because both parties involved seem to have been seriously injured. You call 
an ambulance and you decide to stay around to ensure that everyone is going to be okay. 
This, unfortunately means that you will not make it to the café to meet your friend; you will 
have to break the promise that you gave to her. This scenario clearly fits the account of moral 
conflict above. It also seems reasonable to think that having to break your promise will act 
as a moral remainder so that you will experience some form of negative emotional response 
to your decision. Even though staying at the scene of the accident is clearly the lesser of two 
evils, you still feel, most likely, regret12 for having to break your promise and for wasting your 
friend’s time. I propose regret as an emotional response because you will probably think 
along the lines of: “I wish things would have been otherwise. If only I did not have to choose 
between staying at the scene of the accident and seeing my friend”. What this scenario is 
supposed to show is that all forms of moral conflict will elicit some form of remainder and 
negative emotional response. Given this, dirty hands are not unique in the sense that they 
are those cases that give grounds for moral remainders; instead it is the kind of moral 
remainder that they cause that makes them unique. 
To see this, compare the scenario of the accident and the promise with our ticking bomb 
case of choosing between torturing a suspect and risking the lives of hundreds of innocent 
citizens. Again, it clearly fits the schema of moral conflict that we have developed so far. 
Imagine that our politician in question has weighed up all the relevant factors and decides 
that torturing is the lesser evil. Like in the case above this generates a moral remainder and 
some form of negative emotional response. The response appropriate to the underlying 
conflict, however, is not mere regret, but what I will call, following de Wijze (2004), tragic-
                                            
12 I will go into more detail about this in chapter four. 
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remorse. While I will define this emotion in more detail in section 4.3., at this point it is 
sufficient to note that the crucial element of this emotion is a form of anguish and moral 
pollution on the side of the agent. Even though the politician chose the all-things-considered 
lesser evil, she feels anguished about having to injure another human being seriously and that 
she chose to do so sticks with her; it pollutes her in a sense. What, then, is the difference 
between these two cases because of which the remainder and appropriate emotional response 
to the underlying conflict vary? The answer to this lies in the strength of the commitment 
that an agent has, or better should have, to the values that she is violating in a given moral 
conflict. I say “or better should have” because there are two kinds of difference to consider 
here; one is subjective and the other objective. The agent might be able to assess subjectively 
that for her there is a quantitative difference in her commitment to the values of keeping a 
promise to go for coffee, and not torturing a fellow human being. It is another thing entirely 
for us to assess objectively from the outside whether the agent ought to have a quantitative 
difference in her commitments to these values. I think that it is this objective assessment that 
will tell us whether we are faced with a mere moral conflict or a dirty hands situation. For 
instance, a promise to meet up with a friend for coffee is something that we should value, 
but not something that we should be committed to so deeply that, in case we have to break 
it, it ought to anguish us and make us feel as if we had abandoned one of our most 
fundamental moral commitments. Torturing another human being, however, ought to have 
exactly this effect on us. What sets dirty hands apart from other forms of moral conflicts is 
that they force us to abandon some of what ought to be our most deeply held moral 
commitments. This is why I think that the accident and promise conflict should not be 
described as a case of dirty hands, while the ticking-bomb scenario should be. While all 
conflicts have remainders, not all of them have the kind of significant remainder that signals 
a case of dirty hands. This account leaves us with a considerable grey area in which there will 
be disagreement on whether we are faced with a mere moral conflict or with dirty hands. 
People will inevitably disagree what exactly those values are that should make up our most 
deeply held moral commitments. I think that this is, far from being a disadvantage, an 
advantage of my account because this seems to be able to make sense of the way we talk 
about moral conflict in everyday life. We might call a certain action pure or clean when it has 
no moral residue attached to it, but just because a decision is not entirely pure or clean does 
not imply that we would want to call it outright dirty. The same then goes for assessing moral 
conflicts: some of them might be exhibiting a small amount of the “dirt” in dirty hands, while 
others will do so to a greater extent. The fact that my account can make sense of these 
differences should count in its favour. 
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Having described how dirty hands are set apart from ordinary moral conflicts because they 
involve the violation of some of our core moral commitments, I can now turn to a different 
feature that I think has been wrongly claimed to distinguish dirty hands. This view is 
concerned with the circumstances which give rise to the situation in which the agent finds 
herself. Stocker claims that dirty hands, “are violations of moral autonomy and selfhood – 
and this in a particular vicious way. The agent is immorally coerced to take part in, perhaps 
even to help implement, an immoral project” (1990, p. 20). The agent is made part of or 
implicated in the immoral plans and behaviours of others and it is this knowledge of being 
used as a mere means that can make dirty hands choices all the more tragic and agonising. 
This way of looking at the problem seems to be confused, however. Imagine that you own 
two large dogs who have been your companions for several years and to whom you feel a 
strong obligation. During a thunderstorm lightning strikes your house causing it to catch fire. 
Both of the dogs are scared and confused and are refusing to follow you out of the house. 
Because of their size you can only carry one of them at a time. By the time you have rescued 
one of them, however, the fire will have spread so much that you will not be able to go back 
and rescue the second. Would it make a difference for you whether the fire was caused by 
lightning that was no one’s fault or by an evil arsonist? Would this change your decision on 
which dog to save? Would you feel a more significant remainder? The answer to all of these 
questions, I think, will be no. While I do not want to argue that there can never be a 
connection between the significance of the remainder and the circumstances that lead to the 
agent being faced with a moral conflict, such a connection is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to make something a case of dirty hands. For this reason, I think we should reject Stocker’s 
view and refrain from adding the feature of being part of another’s immoral projects to the 
definition of dirty hands. I do not think that the origin of the circumstances that led to the 
moral conflict necessarily make a difference to what we call a regular moral conflict and what 
we call a case of dirty hands. 
Now that we have clarified what is, and what is not, at stake when trying to set dirty hands 
apart from other kinds of moral conflict, it will be helpful to consider some cases and to 
stipulate whether these fall under the heading of dirty hands as I have defined it so far. This 
is not to say that the criteria that I have drawn up will always provide us with a clear-cut 
distinction. There might be a considerable grey area and borderline cases because I have 
defined dirty hands as being quantitatively different from other moral conflicts; they are a 
pernicious form of moral conflict and I do not think that there will be a specific cut-off point 
along a scale of gravity at which moral conflicts turn into dirty hands. For pragmatic reasons 
about the nature of my project here I will not have to worry too much about this, though. I 
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will be exclusively concerned with the kind of tragic choices that politicians have to make, 
and the vast majority of cases will violate values that we can assume ought to be at the core 
of the moral commitments for any agent.  
Bearing this in mind, let us turn to some examples offered by de Wijze (2007, p. 16)13: 
(1) A captain of a ship has to jettison goods in a storm to rescue the ship and its crew. 
While this might be a moral conflict if the captain had an obligation to her vendors to 
transport the goods safely, this should probably not be one of her most fundamental moral 
commitments. So this is probably not best described as a case of dirty hands. 
(2) University authorities prevent a speaker from holding a meeting on campus as they 
fear that the presence of this person would seriously undermine the peace and 
security of the campus. 
I think that this could be considered a case of dirty hands, given that values such as freedom 
of speech and peace and security are most likely among the more fundamental moral values 
that people ought to hold. 
(3) Sophie has to choose which of her two young children has to die. If she does not 
choose, both will be killed for certain. 
This is a clear example of dirty hands, though it might be interesting to note that one could 
reasonably think that there might be no such thing as a lesser evil in this situation. As such 
it is a potential example of moral conflict in which the two requirements tie and no winner 
is discernible; there is no lesser evil in killing one of your children instead of the other, as 
long as you choose one child and do not refuse to comply so that both will be killed. 
(4) You know that your best friend is cheating on his wife, but to save their marriage 
you decide not to tell her. 
Remember that I allowed for there to be a considerable grey area between ordinary moral 
conflicts and dirty hands. I think that this case might be an example of this. Whether this is 
a situation of dirty hands for the agent will crucially depend on the value that she objectively 
ought to put on honesty and friendship. For my purposes I will not have to commit on 
whether I think that this is a case of dirty hands, and I would not want to do so because I 
think that this will rely on a deeper analysis of the values at stake. 
                                            
13 My examination of the second and fourth case are different to de Wijze’s though, as he argues that the main 
difference between regular moral conflicts and dirty hands is the immorality of the circumstances that created 
the conflict in the first place. I have rejected this criterion earlier. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
I started the chapter by providing an account of the nature of moral conflict. Moral conflicts 
arise whenever (1) an act A has value x, (2) another act B has either (i) value y, or (ii) has 
value x but is in some way intrinsically distinct from A, and (3) it is possible to perform act 
A and act B separately but not jointly. Following from this I argued that we ought to 
understand dirty hands problems as a kind of moral conflict in which plural and competing 
values clash. Standard accounts of dirty hands conceive of the values involved in this conflict 
as absolute, which does not constitute a problem for them because they do not see rational 
moral judgement as having to be coherent and always uniquely action-guiding. This picture 
of rational moral judgement is not shared by all, though, and proponents of the coherence 
view argue that rational moral judgement necessarily has to be coherent and always uniquely 
action-guiding, so that the idea of clashes of absolute values becomes simply irrational. I have 
argued that this does not mean that for adherents of this view it will be impossible to make 
sense of the problem of dirty hands, though. Alternatively, we can make sense of the problem 
if the conflict is not between absolute but pro tanto values. While I am more sympathetic to 
the standard and messy view of rational moral judgement, the idea is that independent of 
one’s preconceptions of moral judgement, one can make sense of the rationality of dirty 
hands. Finally, I discussed how we ought to distinguish dirty hands from ordinary moral 
conflicts. Dirty hands are cases in which the agent has to violate one of her core moral 
commitments and as a result it is appropriate for her to experience a particularly grave moral 
remainder and corresponding negative emotional response. Before moving on to discuss 
what exactly the role of the remainder and emotional response in dirty hands is, in the next 
chapter I want to clarify an issue that has been overlooked by the dirty hands literature so 
far. The question any account of dirty hands should provide an answer to is whether, once 
we are faced with a dirty hands scenario, it would be possible for us to keep our hands clean 
in some way. 
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3. Can Our Hands Stay Clean? 
3.1. Introduction 
Dirty hands problems are situations where an agent is confronted by a conflict in which they 
have to violate one of their core moral commitments. Should you torture a terrorist to find 
out the location of hidden bombs? Should you agree to free criminals in order to save 
hostages? Should you silence a journalist in order to prevent a riot? The dirty hands literature 
is largely in agreement that politicians who choose to torture, circumvent justice, or violate 
someone’s civil liberties get their hands dirty. It is interesting to note, though, that very little 
has been said in the dirty hands literature about what happens should they choose not to kill, 
torture, or deceive. Do they still get their hands dirty or can they escape from the situation 
unstained? On this question, there are then two possible stances that could be taken. I will 
call a view claiming that we can emerge with our hands clean when confronted with a dirty 
hands situation the “asymmetry view”. It is asymmetrical because it holds that choosing one 
side leads to dirty hands, while by choosing the other we can keep our hands clean. A position 
that argues that, in such a scenario, we will inevitably get our hands dirty I will call the 
“symmetry view”. 
I begin by arguing that the dirty hands literature has overlooked a crucial issue in not 
discussing this. Many writers seem to have taken an inexplicit or unjustified stance on this 
issue. Others have expressly bracketed the question and excluded it from their analysis. 
Others inadvertently make contradictory claims on the matter. This oversight is of great 
significance, because it contributes to existing confusions about how best to define dirty 
hands. Additionally, it prevents the concept of dirty hands being properly applied to other 
issues, such as the responsibility and accountability of politicians. The first part of this 
chapter will survey these different claims. I will then argue that we ought to prefer a 
symmetrical understanding because it gives a more convincing account of what constitutes 
the dirt in dirty hands and more accurately captures our complex moral decision-making 
when faced with dirty hands scenarios. 
Clearing up the confusion regarding symmetry and asymmetry is a crucial step toward an 
improved understanding of the phenomenon of dirty hands. The conclusion will have a 
direct effect on our evaluation of both what it means to have dirty hands and the agent who 
is responsible for them. Finally, I will consider the implications of my discussion for other 
questions relating to the wider dirty hands debate. 
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3.2. Symmetry and Asymmetry in the Dirty Hands Literature 
This section will survey the different, often implicit, positions various authors have taken on 
the symmetry of dirty hands problems: whether we can emerge from such situations with 
clean hands, or whether our hands will be dirty no matter what we do. Let us start with those 
seemingly endorsing the asymmetrical reading. Walzer repeatedly claims that when a political 
actor is faced with a ticking bomb scenario he could “refuse to dirty his hands” (1973, p. 
165) and “[remain] innocent” (1973, p. 161). Additionally, Walzer states that “here is the 
moral politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a moral man and 
nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else, he would 
pretend that they were clean” (1973, p. 168). Someone who acts like a morally good private 
person would choose the option that was not dirty. A non-dirty option must therefore be 
available, even if, according to Walzer, a good politician would not choose it. Demetris 
Tillyris appears to adopt a similar stance when he states that “the costs of refusing to get 
dirty are likely to increase with time” (2015, p. 67) (i.e. the cost of losing office). If we can 
refuse to get dirty, this clearly leaves open the possibility of emerging untarnished when faced 
with a dirty hands problem. Bellamy also seemingly embraces the asymmetry view when he 
notes that politicians could “keep their own hands clean but at the expense of leaving the 
rest of us in a dirty situation” (2010, p. 417). He argues that when one person refuses to dirty 
their hands, it is likely that this will force someone else into a dirty hands situation. He objects 
to this because, given that politicians are supposed to act in accordance with the public good, 
“preserving the moral integrity of a saint in public life seems not just irresponsible but even 
immoral” (2010, p. 417). While he argues that keeping one’s moral integrity would be 
irresponsible and immoral, he does not state that it would be impossible. Jeremy Waldron 
also appears to allow for the option that an agent could keep her hands clean. When he 
discusses the case of the Clay Cross Eleven, a group of Labour councillors who refused to 
adhere to a Conservative government’s policy they thought unjust, he says that “they refused 
to dirty their hands” (2018, p. 225). Finally, Suzanne Dovi talks about political actors who 
“refuse to compromise their moral integrity” (2005, p. 129), “live according to moral 
principles, refusing to compromise them even in the face of great hardships” (2005, p. 133), 
and so “make vivid what political actors with dirty hands should feel guilty about” (2005, p. 
134). She implies that the agent, when faced with a dirty hands problem, can and sometimes 
should choose to remain with her hands clean by adhering to her moral principles.  
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On the opposing side, various writers embrace a symmetrical view of dirty hands. Karl 
Klockars states that in a Dirty Harry scenario14 “the choice must always be between at least 
two wrongs and in choosing to do either wrong, the policeman inevitably taints or tarnishes 
himself” (1980, p. 37). Similarly, Martin Hollis argues that “once a dilemma has been posed 
for a person in office […] it is too late for clean hands, whatever he does” (1982, p. 394). He 
later reiterates this stating the following about a political leader: “his dilemma was that of 
inescapable responsibility under partial constraint and his hands were dirty before he even 
began to resolve it” (1982, p. 397). As soon as an agent is faced with such a situation his 
hands will be dirty no matter how he tries to resolve it, because he is constrained to choose 
between two morally objectionable courses of action. Stuart Hampshire also appears to 
support this view. He states that politicians “should at all times be prepared for the 
occurrence of an uncontrollable conflict of duties in situations which seem to exclude the 
possibility of a decent outcome, and in which all lines of action seem dishonourable or 
blameworthy” (1991, p. 170). On a similar note, Christopher Gowans defends the claim that 
in life, “moral innocence would be virtually impossible to attain, regardless of how pure of 
heart we may be” because whenever we encounter a dirty hands situation “we will do 
something morally wrong no matter what”  (1994, p. 220). De Wijze also appears to hold a 
symmetrical understanding when he claims that if an agent “chooses to act in accordance 
with the obligation and duties required of office-bearers (or indeed refuses to act), then she 
will get her hands dirty” (2007, p. 4). Michael Yeo, similarly, states that “no matter what 
choice the agent makes – including not choosing – someone will be seriously harmed or 
wronged, or some principle held dear will be otherwise negated. The agent’s hands will be 
dirty whichever course is taken” (2000, p. 157). Lastly, Kai Nielsen likewise argues that  
to try to wash one’s hands, Pontius Pilate-like, of a dirty hands situation – 
to say ‘it is none of my business my hands are clean’, where some choice 
on our part might make a difference – is impossible. We do not escape 
responsibility by so acting. Failing to act in such a circumstance is in itself 
an action. By so refraining, we dirty our hands just as much as, and perhaps 
more than, a person who acts resolutely to achieve the lesser evil, though 
in doing so he does horrible things (2007, p. 21).  
Nielsen even goes as far as saying that the person who refuses to intervene, e.g. by ordering 
the torture, may in some circumstances have dirtier hands.  
There are also writers whom we earlier placed on the asymmetrical side of the debate who, 
later on in the same papers, use the language of symmetry. Bellamy claims that “whatever 
                                            
14 Dirty Harry scenarios, as described by Klockars, are cases of dirty hands experienced by the police. This term 
simply signals that certain kinds of dirty hands choices are more likely to arise in a policing context than 
elsewhere. 
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the choice, [the agent] cannot wash his hands or keep them clean” (2010, p. 419). This 
appears to contradict his earlier claims on the options available to an agent facing a dirty 
hands situation. The same problem can be found in the paper by Tillyris. Earlier he implied 
that agents could, even if they should not, choose to keep their hands clean. While he initially 
uses language that suggests asymmetry, later in his paper he endorses the above quote from 
Hollis: “once a dilemma has been posed for a person in office, integrity does not demand 
that he keep his hands clean by stepping aside. It is too late for clean hands, whatever he 
does” (Hollis, 1982, p. 394). This would seem to favour the symmetry view. A closer look at 
their papers suggests that both authors inadvertently make asymmetrical claims when 
bringing forward their criticism of the views of others (Bellamy, 2010, p. 417; Tillyris, 2015, 
p. 67) and use the language of symmetry when putting forward their own accounts (Bellamy, 
2010, p. 419; Tillyris, 2015, p. 68). 
Finally, there is a small category of authors who recognise the distinction between symmetry 
and asymmetry. Stocker, discussing Walzer’s ticking bomb scenario, explicitly states that he 
declines to tackle the following questions: “is the non-doing of an act of dirty hands the 
doing of another act of dirty hands?”, “what are the relations between dirty hands and the 
doctrine of double effect?”, and “what are the relations between dirty hands and the 
distinction between doing and not doing?” (1990, p. 12). Similarly, Neil Levy hints at the 
reasons we might have for embracing a symmetrical or asymmetrical understanding of dirty 
hands but does not engage in any in-depth argument on this matter. Discussing an agent 
facing a dirty hands scenario, he writes, “unless we are impressed by the doctrine of double-
effect, or some act/omission distinction, we can clearly see that she can no longer avoid an 
action that is wrong, categorically wrong” (2007, p. 45). Both Stocker and Levy have 
identified that there are two potential views of dirty hands that we could take. They then 
make the further claim that these different conceptions rest on our understanding of the 
action/omission, doing/allowing, and intending/foreseeing distinctions. While they note the 
distinction and its potential importance, they do not engage in any in-depth debate about it. 
The only sustained discussion of the issue of symmetry can be found in Christopher J. 
Finlay’s Humean account of dirty hands (2011, pp. 436-439). He argues that we can make 
two claims about dirty hands scenarios. Firstly, “that where we imagine the politician 
choosing to uphold the law [i.e. to uphold the ban on torture], it gives rise to a case of ‘dirty 
hands’” and secondly, “that if we imagine the politician authorizing torture […], then his 
decision may be seen as an attempt to keep his hands clean” (2011, p. 436). This is a flipped 
version of the asymmetry view which holds that we keep our hands clean when we order the 
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torture and dirty them when we refuse to do so. In the following section I will examine the 
different grounds we might have for supporting either the symmetry or asymmetry view. 
3.3. The “Dirt” in Dirty Hands 
The distinction between symmetry and asymmetry hinges on different understandings of 
what constitutes the “dirt” in dirty hands. I want to suggest that a symmetrical view is based 
on a more plausible conception of what it means for an action to be dirty. When an agent is 
faced with a dirty hands problem, both actions will carry a particular kind of remainder. 
Following from what I have argued in the previous chapter, this is best understood as the 
result of a violation of one of our core moral commitments. Whatever option the agent 
chooses, she will betray or violate something of great importance, and this will inevitably 
taint her. This is not to say, however, that the symmetry view could not be spelled out in 
terms suitable to other understandings of dirty hands. If they are understood as a clash 
between deontology and consequentialism or a clash between private and public ethics, then 
whichever moral code or source of obligation we forgo, we will inevitably get our hands dirty 
according to the symmetry view. In the ticking bomb scenario the politician is torn between 
violating her commitment not to torture and violating her commitment to protect the citizens 
she represents. Both options create remainders of varying strength, so constitute more or 
less dirt, but both result in the agent dirtying her hands.15 It would then be impossible for 
the agent to avoid getting her hands dirty whichever option she chooses. 
Before getting into more detail about how best to characterise the asymmetry view, it will be 
helpful to clear up two potential sources of confusion. Firstly, one might object to my 
characterisation of the above accounts as asymmetrical. If an asymmetrical account holds 
that there is a possibility of keeping one’s hands clean, would that not deny the inherent 
conflictual nature of dirty hands situations? In fact, all of the accounts that I have 
characterised as asymmetrical do acknowledge this conflict at the heart of the dirty hands 
problem. Take the case of Walzer for example: if one acts like a good politician one forgoes 
what a good person would do, and if one acts like a good person one forgoes what a good 
politician would do. So there is clearly a conflict here. Therefore, these accounts could not 
be asymmetrical and my characterisation of them would be wrong. This objection, however, 
                                            
15 This point suggests a further possible discussion concerning symmetry and asymmetry: Currently, symmetry 
is defined as the claim that an agent will dirty her hands either way. Within this view, dirty hands could be 
symmetrical if the agent’s hands would be equally dirty whichever option she chooses and asymmetrical if her 
hands would be dirtier from one option than from the other. If one took the latter view on this second-order 
question, then positions of first-order symmetry and asymmetry could be closer than first thought. While this 
is an interesting consideration, I will concentrate on bringing clarity to the first-order question for the purposes 
of this thesis. The role that gradability might have to play in dirty hands was helpfully suggested to me by Rob 
Lawlor. 
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misunderstands what is at stake in the symmetry debate. Saying that an account is 
asymmetrical is not supposed to show that it denies the existence of the conflictual nature of 
dirty hands situations. Instead, what I am arguing is that the asymmetrical position differs in 
that it holds that the agent gets her hands dirty only on one horn of the conflict (e.g. choosing 
to act like a good politician) but keeps them clean on the other (e.g. choosing to act like a 
good man). Choosing one horn of the conflict therefore does not automatically equate to 
getting one’s hands dirty. The aim here is to assess critically why different authors think that, 
despite the conflictual nature of dirty hands situations, one horn of the conflict could be said 
to leave the agent with her hands clean. The existence of a conflict at the root of dirty hands 
situations is not what is in question, instead it is the correct conceptualisation of both horns 
of the conflict that is at stake. 
Secondly one might wish to object to this view from the outset for the reason that it cannot 
make sense of cases such as Sophie’s Choice, which I briefly mentioned at the end of the 
previous chapter. Sophie arrives with her two children at a Nazi concentration camp where 
an evil doctor presents her with the following choice: she must choose one of her children 
to be killed in order for the other one to be spared. Should she refuse to choose, both will 
be killed immediately. In such a situation there may simply be no better or worse option and 
clean hands would be impossible. Assuming that one of Sophie’s core moral commitments 
is to ensure the welfare of both of her children, there is no way in which this choice will leave 
her unstained. The asymmetrical view of dirty hands therefore cannot hold that we can 
always emerge with our hands clean from dirty hands situations. Instead, the argument has 
to be the weaker claim that sometimes, but not always, clean hands are possible. While this 
criticism changes the claim the asymmetrical view makes, it does not provide a reason to 
reject it outright. According to a symmetrical understanding there are no cases of dirty hands 
in which the agent could keep her hands clean, whereas on an asymmetrical understanding 
the agent can keep her hands clean in some, even if not in all, dirty hands situations. 
So what can the asymmetry view tell us about the dirt in dirty hands? Stocker and Levy think 
that the different understandings of dirt rely on a distinction between acting and omitting, 
doing and allowing, or intending and foreseeing. On the asymmetrical reading, once you are 
faced with a situation in which you are forced to choose, giving the order to torture results 
in dirty hands and not ordering it leaves one’s hands clean, so the thought might go that this 
difference must be the result of a distinction between what we do and what we omit (or 
something similar); if we act we dirty our hands, but if we do not act we can keep our hands 
clean. We might think that such an understanding would make sense in light of how Walzer 
sets up the ticking bomb scenario. Walzer says that, given the circumstances, ordering the 
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torture might be the lesser of two evils. This means that he implicitly stipulates not ordering 
the torture to be the greater evil. After all, the politician has a duty to protect her citizens and 
not doing everything in her power to prevent the death of innocents that it was in her ability 
to prevent would be a serious moral failure. For Walzer the politician would be responsible 
whether she orders the tortures or refrains from doing so, and yet, the politician will keep 
her hands clean should she choose the latter. This leaves us with a situation in which the not-
doing of an action is the greater evil and the politician can be responsible for it and yet will 
not be dirtying her hands through it. One understanding of the asymmetry view is therefore 
that we can only get our hands dirty through our actions and what we do, but not our 
omissions and what we merely allow.  
From Walzer’s description of dirty hands as a clash between deontology and 
consequentialism we could find a second version of what constitutes the dirt in dirty hands 
situations, namely a violation of a deontological constraint such as, for example, the violation 
of a person’s rights. Some actions violate people’s rights while others do not and only the 
former create the right kind of remainder for an action to be called dirty. Torture involves 
the violation of a person’s rights. Letting people die, however, when the only way to save 
them would involve the torture of someone else, it might be said, does not involve the 
violation of people’s rights. Imagine, for example, a doctor who has five patients who all 
need different organ transplants in order to live, and a sixth who happens to have healthy 
and matching organs for all of them. Clearly the five do not have a right to be saved if that 
involves killing the sixth. Another plausible version of the asymmetry view might therefore 
be that the dirt in dirty hands is the violation of people’s rights of non-interference; but it is 
not a rights violation to fail to rescue or benefit people when doing so would violate the 
rights of a third party. In the ticking bomb scenario, not ordering the torture may be the 
greater evil, but as it cannot be said to violate the rights of citizens, the politician’s hands 
remain clean. 
In the language used by both Walzer and Tillyris, we can find yet another version of what 
constitutes the dirt in dirty hands on the asymmetry view. This conception relies on two 
premises; firstly, what makes dirty hands dirty is that they constitute an attack on the agent’s 
innocence. Secondly, by not acting in accordance with the demands of – in Hampshire’s 
words – experience, our innocence can stay intact and our hands remain clean. A good 
starting point to understand what is meant by the agent’s innocence is to examine 
Hampshire’s discussion of that term16, to which Tillyris makes explicit reference. Hampshire 
                                            
16 It is worthwhile stressing that Hampshire himself does not draw these conclusions and in fact appears to 
hold the symmetry view. 
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examines the notion of innocence in a political context by discussing Machiavelli’s account 
of politics and morality. He acknowledges that in political life emergency situations will 
inevitably arise in which a leader has to use means usually thought to be morally 
reprehensible. Machiavelli opposes the demands on a good political leader to the demands 
on individuals wishing to pursue a morally admirable private life, where both ways of life are 
mutually exclusive. The virtues of the latter, such as loyalty, friendship, and fairness stand in 
contrast to political virtús such as courage, prowess, and the single-minded pursuit of power 
that lead to glory for oneself and one’s city (Machiavelli, 2003a, pp. 23-28;35;50-51). 
Someone acting in line with the virtues leads, according to Hampshire, a life of innocence, 
while one who acts in line with Machiavellian virtú leads a life of experience. Political leaders, 
in order to be successful and effective, need to be able to leave innocence behind and turn 
to a life of experience. Hampshire goes on to describe innocence by comparing it to the life 
of early Quakers; “their conception of the good was a vision of simplicity, whiteness, 
straightness, uprightness, cleanness, of sweeping away anything contaminated or corrupted 
or squalid” (1991, p. 173). From this we could construct a version of the asymmetry view on 
which our hands become dirty when we abandon the virtues constituting innocence and turn 
toward the virtús of experience. Should we, however, choose to prioritise the former over 
the latter, our hands can remain clean. While Tillyris and Hampshire focus on political 
innocence, we can see in Walzer a way to construct innocence more generally. He writes that, 
should the politician choose the utilitarian side of the conflict, “the innocent man, afterwards, 
is no longer innocent” while, on the other side, “he remains innocent” if he were to choose 
“the absolutist side” (1973, p. 161). Innocence for him is a resolute adherence to absolutist 
moral principles (not unlike Hampshire’s vision of the early Quakers), whereas innocence is 
abandoned and our hands dirtied when we act according to consequentialist reasoning (not 
unlike Hampshire’s or Machiavelli’s vision of the moral importance of political 
effectiveness). On this account, dirty hands would therefore be asymmetrical, because agents 
can choose innocence and an adherence to absolutism over experience and reasoning in 
consequentialist terms. 
While Walzer and Tillyris talk about the agent’s innocence, Bellamy and Dovi use the 
language of integrity. Waldron does not actively use the word integrity, but his view seems 
to fall into this camp as well.17 There is therefore yet another version of what constitutes dirt 
on the asymmetry view. Similar to the innocence version, it can be constructed as the 
                                            
17 To dirty one’s hands, according to Waldron, is to commit a wrong action that violates one’s own moral 
standards. In the case of the Clay Cross Eleven, for example, adhering to what they perceived as unjust 
legislation would have involved getting their hands dirty. By refusing to uphold the law and standing up for 
their moral convictions, however, the Clay Cross Eleven kept their hands clean. 
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following two premises; firstly, what makes dirty hands dirty is that they constitute an attack 
on the agent’s personal integrity. Secondly, by not acting in accordance with the demands of 
impartial morality, our integrity can stay intact and our hands remain clean. We can find this 
view in Dovi’s description of dirty hands as a clash between the agent’s moral integrity and 
some overriding moral end. Bellamy also alludes to such a clash between integrity and 
morality, and traces this view to Susan Mendus. It will be helpful to take a closer look at 
Mendus’s discussion on integrity in order to understand this version of the asymmetry view. 
Integrity for her “is a matter of acting on those commitments which are very important to 
me and which serve, in part, to define who I am” (2009, pp. 31-32). This is a distinctly 
personal notion of integrity that does not require that the commitments one chooses adhere 
with social or conventional morality. On such a view, an individual can possess integrity and 
yet be morally bad (e.g. Heinrich Himmler could be an exemplar of someone with personal 
integrity). The result of defining personal integrity in this way, argues Mendus, is that it can 
come into conflict with morality. She considers the following example by Bernard Williams: 
George who just finished a PhD in Chemistry is desperately looking for a job to support his 
family. A friend of his knows of his problems and offers him a job in a lab that does research 
into biological and chemical weapons. George is deeply opposed to using such measures in 
warfare and is now torn about whether to accept the position or not. When he tells his friend 
about his qualms, his friend says that the reason he wants George to take the job is because 
otherwise it will be given to another person about whose excessive zeal he feels rather 
worried (Williams, 1973, pp. 97-98).  
Mendus argues that in such a case there exists a tension between integrity “understood as a 
matter of sticking by what one believes to be ethically necessary” and morality “understood 
as acting impartially towards all who are affected by one’s actions” (2009, p. 29). According 
to her understanding, if George wants to preserve his integrity he will have to refuse to 
engage in what he perceives to be an evil and immoral pursuit. Morality, conversely, would 
favour him accepting the job because it would benefit both his family through the financial 
support this would offer, and society at large because he would approach the job more 
cautiously than the over-zealous candidate. She argues that a similar analysis can be made in 
response to Walzer’s ticking bomb example. She says that “here then is a case in which 
politics undermines, or at least threatens to undermine integrity” (2009, p. 39). To keep her 
integrity she would have to refuse to order the torture and to engage in what she perceives 
to be evil. Morality, on the other hand, would urge her to consider the fates of the hundreds 
of innocent people who could be killed unless she orders the torture. For Mendus, we have 
a choice between acting in accordance with impartial morality and thus dirtying our hands, 
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and keeping our integrity intact and our hands clean but allowing the greater evil to occur. 
Here, the “dirt” in dirty hands is a stain on one’s integrity, which occurs when we violate our 
commitments to valued principles such as never to kill, torture, or deceive. The conclusion 
then is that, if there is an option for personal integrity to stay intact, the agent can emerge 
from a dirty hands situation with her hands clean.  
Finally, as mentioned briefly in the previous section, we can also construct a flipped version 
of the asymmetry view in which one’s hands stay clean by ordering the torture and get dirtied 
by refusing to order it. Finlay starts from the Humean assumption that, when confronted 
with a scenario such as the ticking bomb, we start by experiencing certain moral sentiments 
and try to arrive at a general moral judgement or rule based on those sentiments. Finlay 
suggests that on such a theory, “natural moral sensibilities dictate approval for stronger 
feelings of benevolent concern and a correspondingly intensified sense of duty of care” for 
potential victims and conversely, “our moral sympathies are diminished for those we see 
engaged in acts of cruelty or violence” (2011, p. 425). The result is that we would have 
heightened compassion for the innocent citizens threatened by the bomb and diminished 
compassion for the terrorist. We would therefore approve of the agent who orders the 
torture. For Finlay, “a properly balanced measure of compassion as a motive tending towards 
the safety of the innocent should outweigh in quantitative valency any sympathetic concern 
that might remain for a terrorist determined to let the bomb detonate” (2011, p. 427). 
Through her actions the terrorist has forgone her right to our compassion or benevolence. 
Within the confines of the ticking bomb scenario, Finlay concludes, torture could be seen as 
a distinctively moral course of action. He goes on to argue that there are good prudential and 
institutional reasons to uphold a universal ban on torture, though. He is worried that allowing 
exceptions to this ban would turn into a slippery slope and weaken the overall integrity of 
democratic values and institutions. Returning to Hume, Finlay goes on to argue that in ticking 
bomb scenarios the agent is confronted with a choice between natural and artificial virtues. 
The former represent our moral concern and compassion for the innocent victims while the 
latter represent the institutional ban on torture. The final step in his argument is to say that 
we get our hands dirty by violating a natural virtue but can keep them clean if all that we are 
violating is an artificial virtue. If the politician decides not to torture, “then we may say that 
he allows artificial virtue to override natural virtue. In doing so, he has to betray the innocent 
civilians targeted by the terrorist’s bomb, suppressing the natural urges of compassion and 
the moral duties these generate. This is how he dirties his hands” (2011, p. 437). If the 
politician refuses to torture and upholds the legal ban she will get her hands dirty, but if she 
chooses to torture she can keep her hands clean. For Finlay, the latter situation is more akin 
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to a case of civil disobedience in which a law is violated for moral reasons so that “a Humean 
view would interpret the choice as being between an action involving dirty hands and one 
resembling civil disobedience” (2011, p. 439). 
On the symmetry view the dirt in dirty hands is the violation of a moral value. On the 
asymmetry view, however, something can be dirty in virtue of being an action, doing, or 
intending, or the result of violating a deontological constraint such as committing a rights 
violation, the result of choosing the demands of impartial morality or a life of experience 
over integrity or innocence or, on the flipped view, the result of choosing artificial over 
natural virtue. 
3.4. Defending Symmetry 
So should we adopt a symmetrical or asymmetrical understanding of dirty hands? I will argue 
that we should choose the former because of the costliness of adopting the latter.  
Remember that on the asymmetry view, if the agent decides to order the torture she will get 
her hands dirty, but should she decide not to do so, she will keep her hands clean (or vice 
versa on the flipped version). Holding any version of the asymmetry view, however, appears 
to stand in stark contrast to one of the core insights resulting from discussions of the 
problem of dirty hands. In the previous chapter I introduced Stocker’s account of dirty hands 
which highlighted that many moral theories are exclusively concerned with action-guidance 
at the expense of making sense of our complex experience of moral decision-making. If, for 
example, the agent decides not to order the torture, then her regard for the ban on torture is 
the action-guiding principle, while any value attached to protecting the lives of innocent 
citizens would be the non-action-guiding principle. The only way to think that by not 
ordering the torture keeping one’s hands clean were possible, is to focus entirely on the 
action-guiding considerations present in the case. Only if I think that, for example under the 
integrity view, upholding my core commitments exhausts the morally relevant features of my 
decision can I think that my hands could be clean. This, however, overlooks what should 
happen with the non-action-guiding moral considerations, in this case the value of saving 
innocent lives. We see the value we have not acted upon as a genuine moral demand and so 
we “double-count” (Stocker, 1990, p. 12) it. We weigh up the ban on torture against the 
potential of innocent lives being lost and decide to act in accordance with the former. The 
latter value is not thereby cancelled or annulled and should still be given weight, even if it 
was not acted upon. While we have identified the lesser evil in the situation we, in this way, 
give due weight to something we take to be a genuine moral requirement; we are taking the 
wrongness of our action seriously and it becomes a remainder that attaches to our evaluation 
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of the action taken. As soon as the agent takes the non-action-guiding features of the 
situation to be morally relevant she will be forced to acknowledge that holding onto her core 
commitments came at a considerable moral price. This moral cost will inevitably leave a 
moral residue and get her hands dirty. 
For the agent to think that her hands could remain clean when faced with a dirty hands 
scenario would require some act of moral compartmentalisation in which she detaches her 
conscious decision to choose one course of action over another (e.g. not torturing) from the 
consequences of that decision (e.g. the death of innocents). Such views draw a sharp divide 
between the agent’s actions and adherence to principles, and the outcomes of those actions. 
Such a divide is both unlikely and undesirable. Take for instance the innocence version of 
the asymmetry view. While it is true that your choice meant you did not order the torture of 
anyone, this decision also critically endangered the lives of hundreds of citizens or even failed 
to prevent their deaths. The knowledge that external circumstances have forced you into a 
position where you have to make such choices should be enough to attack your innocence. 
It does not matter how good your intentions are and whatever option you choose will 
inevitably have grievous consequences. This knowledge is incompatible with innocence as 
described by Hampshire of “a vision of simplicity, whiteness, straightness, uprightness, 
cleanness, of sweeping away anything contaminated or corrupted or squalid” (1991, p. 173). 
If the agent is unable to keep her innocence she would also no longer be able to keep her 
hands clean on this understanding of the asymmetry view. 
A similar issue can be found on the integrity version of the asymmetry view when we consider 
the ticking bomb scenario. While your action certainly adheres to your personal deontological 
principles, it does so at the cost of ignoring the commitments and obligations you have as a 
politician, thus drawing an artificial line between you as a private and as a public person. You 
have many different roles that constantly overlap in your life and it is unclear how you could 
abstract from that and construct a notion of integrity concerned only with a single subset of 
these. The idea behind this must be something like the thought that somehow the private 
individual behind the politician can keep her hands clean. As Bellamy argues, this “position 
turns on abstracting to a universal moral code behind any special circumstances, and to a 
universal moral individual behind any social role” (2010, p. 418). However, it is not obvious 
that either abstraction is possible. Imagine a situation in which an agent’s roles of being a 
good politician and being a good friend clash; for example, the agent’s work commitments 
keep interfering with his ability to spend time with his close ones. Bellamy argues that “there 
is no point beyond the two roles to which he could retreat to ask what is universally required” 
(2010, p. 418). In such a situation it simply makes no sense to ask what a good person would 
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do. We should therefore abandon the idea that integrity can be defined as adherence to the 
moral commitments of some private or universal individual and instead acknowledge that 
the constraints of integrity will emerge from the interplay of the social roles we occupy. 
Integrity, on this broader conception, could not stay intact by adhering to some deontological 
constraint when this results in the violation of another moral value and therefore our hands 
could not stay clean on such a version of the asymmetry view. 
What about notions of asymmetry that rely on the action/omission distinction or the like? 
In cases of dirty hands, I think that these distinctions do not accurately capture the way in 
which the agent becomes implicated in the harmful consequences of a dirty hands scenario, 
even if they choose not to actively harm anyone themselves. While it was not your action 
that caused these negative consequences, your conscious decision not to act meant that you 
failed to prevent them, even though you were capable of doing so. This makes you complicit 
in the negative consequences and it is not clear why this should not be enough to get your 
hands dirty. The rights version of the asymmetry view especially might reply that there still 
is an important distinction because you did not actually violate anyone’s rights in this 
situation and as such you can keep your hands clean after all. To argue that no one’s rights 
were violated by not ordering the torture implies a view on which negative rights of non-
interference always trump positive rights of assistance. It is unclear, however, why this ought 
to be the case. Imagine that, on a walk through the countryside, you come across someone 
injured and in desperate need of food and water. The only way to help them is by breaking 
into a nearby cabin and stealing supplies. In such a case, arguably, an infraction of one 
person’s rights could be morally justified by the way it would assist someone else. If we 
concede that negative rights should not always trump positive rights then rights could have 
been violated by not ordering the torture and the agent could therefore no longer keep her 
hands clean on this version of the asymmetry view. 
Finally, let us consider the flipped version in which we can keep our hands clean by ordering 
the torture and dirty them by upholding the ban against torture. The former option, 
according to this view, is an act of civil disobedience in which we violate a law for moral 
reasons, whereas the latter is an instance of dirty hands in which we violate morality for legal 
reasons. Finlay’s interpretation of Hume implied that only the violation of natural virtues 
(e.g. benevolence, compassion), as opposed to artificial virtues (e.g. justice, conformity to 
law), can generate dirty hands. This, however, seems to be an odd conception. Hume 
distinguishes between natural and artificial virtues to demarcate a difference between those 
virtues that arise simply in virtue of human nature and those that arise as a result of people 
living together in society. Every act based on natural virtue will be beneficial, whereas only 
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the overall tendency of actions based on artificial virtue will be beneficial; particular instances 
of acting based on artificial virtues may actually be harmful. This, however, does not mean 
that artificial virtues do not place genuine moral demands on us. There are very weighty 
reasons for us to respect justice and uphold our legal system. They ensure that we can live 
together in a society and fairly adjudicate conflicts amongst people. We care about bringing 
justice to people and upholding the rule of law in our country, and when either of these are 
broken we generally think that something of moral importance has been violated. Finlay 
himself describes dirty hands, following de Wijze, as a violation of a cherished value. Only 
by saying that upholding justice or the rule of law does not involve such an important moral 
value could he, by his own standards, argue that violating them would not be an instance of 
dirty hands. We do not, however, only care about justice and the law for prudential reasons; 
we care about them as important moral values. His view therefore would have to rely on an 
unappealing understanding of why we care about artificial virtues. 
The problem overall is not that these different understandings of the asymmetry view are 
not possible to hold in principle, but rather that they come at a significant cost. If we take 
into consideration not only the action-guiding value, but also the important moral value that 
we have forgone in a dirty hands situation, the asymmetry view results in rather unpromising 
understandings of innocence, integrity, conscious action, rights, and artificial virtues. The 
onus here is on the defenders of the asymmetry view to show why we should hold any of 
these conceptions and how they more accurately reflect on the nature of dirty hands 
situations. Even if any of the asymmetry views could give us a satisfying answer to this, there 
is yet another problem for these accounts. If we need to take into account the full moral 
weight of the non-action-guiding principle, what emotional response should an agent 
experience after having chosen, for example in the ticking bomb scenario, not to order the 
torture? 
According to the asymmetry view she might reasonably feel proud for having adhered to her 
moral principles. She stood by her commitments when doing so was extremely difficult and 
she deserves praise for this. She did something laudable in making that choice because she 
preserved something of distinct and important value. This, however, seems an odd 
assessment of the situation and her decision. In a situation in which the lives of hundreds of 
people are at stake that it is her job to protect, her character and her personal convictions do 
not seem important. In fact, she has misunderstood the situation if she failed to save them. 
This conflict is reflected by Max Weber’s distinction between the “ethic of principled 
conviction” and the “ethic of responsibility” (2010, p. 359). The former is an absolutist 
approach to moral action in which, as long as the agent strictly adheres to her moral rules, 
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she cannot be responsible for any negative consequences that may flow from her actions. 
The latter ethic, on the other hand, is based on an acknowledgement that “the achievement 
of ‘good’ ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally suspect or at least 
morally dangerous means” (2010, p. 360). On this view the agent is fully responsible for the 
negative consequences of her actions, even if she adhered to the moral rules she holds dear. 
A result of the asymmetry view is that, because there is an option in which the agent would 
not get her hands dirty, this option would be in some sense praiseworthy because the agent 
would have kept her hands clean even if to do so she chose the greater evil. On the symmetry 
view, on the other hand, the agent simply ought to choose the lesser evil. What counts is that 
the agent has assessed what ought to be done all things considered based on the obligations 
she has to others and the consequences of her actions, and not based on a concern for the 
cleanliness of her own hands. An asymmetrical view would encourage a self-centredness 
incompatible with grasping what is morally at stake in dirty hands situations. We should 
therefore prefer a symmetrical understanding that captures more accurately the appropriate 
emotional response and our assessment of the agent’s actions in a dirty hands situation based 
on the moral weight attaching to the non-action-guiding principles present.18 
None of the arguments in this section are intended to constitute a decisive win for the 
symmetry view. Instead they are supposed to show some of the costs involved in adopting 
an asymmetrical understanding. Defenders would have to show why their view can make 
sense of our complex moral decision-making process and the emotions and reactive attitudes 
that are fitting as a response to a dirty hands situation. They also would have to show that 
the criteria for cleanliness they use align with how we would normally employ these concepts. 
I think that these costs are rather unappealing and that we should therefore side with a 
symmetrical understanding of dirty hands. Ultimately, the debate between symmetry and 
asymmetry may hinge on some of our most fundamental intuitions about the possibility of 
leading a moral life. Many things in our lives are beyond our control and we will often face 
misfortunes. The hope may therefore be that at least the option of leading a morally good 
life would be immune to bad luck. If only we do the best that we can to hold on to our 
principles, then we must be able to keep our hands clean. Otherwise we would end up with 
a rather dreary picture of ourselves and the world around us. The idea of symmetry, however, 
threatens this hope because it argues that once we are faced with a dirty hands situations 
there is no way for us to emerge from it with our hands clean. Accepting symmetry therefore 
entails accepting a tragic view of our lives in which we are not beyond the reach of bad moral 
                                            
18 I will go into more detail about the particular emotional response appropriate to the conflict inherent in dirty 
hands situations in the next chapter. 
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luck. It does not matter how hard we try and despite our best efforts we will sometimes have 
to engage in evil and get our hands dirty. While we are unlikely to settle this debate any time 
soon, I have given some suggestions as to why we should prefer a symmetrical understanding 
of dirty hands. What makes something dirty is the remainder caused by a violation of a moral 
value, and whatever option the agent chooses she will inevitably become tainted. 
3.5. Conclusion 
My argument in this chapter has been twofold. I started by arguing that the dirty hands 
literature has overlooked an important question in the definition of dirty hands; namely 
whether we dirty our hands no matter what we do, or whether we can possibly keep our 
hands clean. I showed that a variety of papers on dirty hands have made implicit assumptions 
about the symmetry question, but have failed to defend them. I then discussed different 
versions of the asymmetrical understanding that hold that dirty hands can be avoided and 
that our hands can, at least in principle, stay clean. According to the symmetrical view, 
however, our hands become dirty when we violate or betray a moral value, and choosing 
between two evils in a dirty hands situation will always inevitably involve such a violation. 
Our hands can therefore never stay clean. I have argued that we have good reasons to support 
a symmetrical reading of dirty hands because adopting an asymmetrical reading comes at a 
cost that we should try to avoid. 
Clearing up this issue has results beyond merely improving the way in which we define dirty 
hands. The stance we take on the symmetry or asymmetry view has to be considered when 
ascribing responsibility to the agent for her actions. If whatever she does she will be doing 
something dirty this might lead us to think, all other things being equal, that her responsibility 
for the wrongdoing and our ability to blame her is diminished; after all, there is no way she 
could have avoided getting dirty.19 In chapter six I will argue why this is not the case and that 
agents can be held morally responsible for getting their hands dirty even if avoiding 
wrongdoing was impossible. On the other hand, we might think that when we call an action 
dirty, this has particular implications for the third-person reactive attitudes that will be 
appropriate in such a case. In chapter six I briefly suggest that both praise and blame are a 
justified response to an agent dirtying her hands. If the agent gets her hands dirty by not 
ordering the torture, just like she would have if she had ordered the torture, this would imply 
that we can rightfully blame her for risking the lives of her citizens. This in turn might also 
affect whether or when we think we should hold dirty-handed agents accountable for their 
                                            
19 An argument along these lines can be found in Levy (2007). 
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decisions.20 Although discussing whether or not, and if so how, dirty-handed agents can be 
held accountable would be beyond the limits of this project, I raise some of the issues 
regarding this in the conclusion. 
Having clarified this overlooked issue in the dirty hands literature, I can now go on to give 
an account of the nature and role of emotions involved in dirty hands decisions. 
 
                                            
20 For discussions on the issue of dirty hands and punishment see Stephen Garrett (1996), Levy (2007), Tamar 
Meisels (2008), and de Wijze (2013). 
  
55 
  
4. Emotions and Dirty Hands 
4.1. Introduction 
So far I have frequently referred to emotions in my account of dirty hands without exactly 
explaining what role they play and what kind of emotion I am talking about. While the issue 
of emotions has been taken up repeatedly in the dirty hands literature, there are a variety of 
claims made regarding this topic which, I think, require some disambiguation. We should 
distinguish between three kinds of points often made about emotions in the dirty hands 
context. I will deal with each of these in turn throughout the chapter. 
The first one states that our de facto experience of negative emotions in supposed situations 
of conflict speaks in favour of the explanation that dirty hands theories give of these choice 
scenarios (Stocker, 1990, p. 125; Gowans, 1994, pp. 88-116; de Wijze, 2004, p. 458). This 
ultimately is a point about the fact that there is something rational about our emotions and 
that they can therefore tell us something about our moral reality – a reality that is best 
explained by the phenomenon of dirty hands. I show that emotions play a crucial role in 
rational thinking and deliberation and that they have determinate standards of 
appropriateness which tell us whether it is fitting to experience a certain emotional response 
to a given scenario. 
The second point often made follows from the previous one; it asks what, given that there 
is something rational about experiencing a certain emotion in such situations of conflict, is 
this negative emotion supposed to be? What emotion is an appropriate response to the 
conflict inherent in dirty hands decisions? This debate has focussed on the notions of regret, 
agent-regret, remorse, and tragic-remorse (Williams, 1976; Baron, 1988; Stocker, 1990, p. 15; 
Cunningham, 1992, p. 242; Bagnoli, 2000; de Wijze, 2004). I will argue that the notions of 
regret and agent-regret have been wrongly identified as the appropriate response to the 
conflict inherent in dirty hands situations, and instead advocate de Wijze’s (2004) notion of 
“tragic-remorse” as the fitting response to getting one’s hand dirty. 
The final point that is made about emotions in dirty hands is concerned with the specific 
function that this rational negative emotional response is said to play in both the reasoning 
and the character of the agent (Stocker, 1990, p. 31; 113; Cunningham, 1992, p. 245; de Wijze, 
2004, p. 458). The function that this emotion fulfils will determine when it is appropriate for 
the agent to experience it, and also our assessment of the agent herself; i.e. if a certain 
negative emotional response is an integral part of deliberating well and properly 
understanding what moral values are at stake, this can have an effect on our judgement of 
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that agent’s character. I will argue that experiencing tragic-remorse in response to a dirty 
hands scenario ensures a commitment to the forgone value, contributes to the agent’s 
deliberation, and makes her behaviour intelligible to others. 
4.2. The Rationality of Emotions 
The first way in which emotions have been linked to dirty hands roughly goes the following 
way: in supposed dirty hands situations agents do seem to experience a certain negative 
emotional response. Additionally, were they not to do so, we would feel that there is 
something vital missing in their understanding of what they have done. This is supposed to 
speak in favour of dirty hands reasoning because it accounts for there being something wrong 
(i.e. the grounds for experiencing a negative emotional response) in doing what is nonetheless 
overall justified. For emotions to have such explanatory power, however, there has to be 
something rational about emotions because they can only tell us something about our moral 
reality if they are not arbitrary but instead have determinate criteria of appropriateness. In 
the following I will therefore indicate why I think there are good reasons to believe that there 
is something rational about emotions. I will then argue that what it means for an emotion to 
be rational is for it to be appropriate in a given situation. This will lead me to analyse in some 
more detail what appropriateness entails and what kind of appropriateness is required for 
emotions to be rational in a dirty hands situation.  
The majority of thinkers that I will be drawing on in this section are probably best described 
as advocating a perceptualist account of emotions (de Sousa, 1980; Greenspan, 1980). 
Roughly speaking their position is situated between accounts regarding emotions as mere 
feelings (Prinz, 2005), and cognitivist accounts holding that emotions are the expression of 
certain judgements (Solomon, 1980). Perceptualists tend to think that emotions are more 
than mere feelings, and are instead based on a cognitivist representation of the actual world, 
and can be evaluated regarding their fittingness to the external object that they are a reaction 
to. At the same time, however, they reject the stronger cognitivist claim that these 
representations need to have any conceptual or propositional content, and concentrate 
instead on the more phenomenal character of emotions.  
I reject emotions as feelings accounts on several points; firstly by equating emotions with 
feelings and sensations, it becomes difficult to distinguish different emotions from one 
another. Imagine experiencing a feeling of anxiety. We can easily see how this feeling could 
accompany emotions as diverse as anger, fear, and euphoria. Feelings accounts therefore do 
not seem to be able to tell us the entire story about emotions. Another problem with these 
accounts is that by assimilating emotions to feelings, emotions appear to be based entirely 
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on biological facts rather than having concrete ties to rationality; for instance anger can be 
explained by factors such as an increased heart rate and blood pressure, rather than as a 
conscious and rational reaction to an external object. Again, emotions as feelings accounts 
therefore seem to be unable to give us the whole story.  
On the other side of the spectrum, two standard objections to cognitivism relate to the 
emotions of animals and children, as well as the issue of recalcitrant emotions. If emotions 
rely on judgements this would be unable to account for animals and very young children 
experiencing emotions because they lack the cognitive capacity to form the required 
judgements. Additionally, cognitivism cannot explain why we experience some emotions (e.g. 
fear of flying) despite our best judgement (e.g. that flying is statistically the safest mode of 
transport). If emotions are based on judgements, then recalcitrant emotions could not exist. 
Additionally, Carla Bagnoli offers another objection to cognitivist theories of emotions in 
the light of the kind of moral conflicts that I wish to consider. She claims that according to 
cognitivism an “emotion is justified only if there is a cognitive basis for it: only if a 
correspondent belief is justified” (2000, p. 171). Experiencing remorse could only ever be 
justified then if I have the justified belief that I did something morally wrong. The notion of 
tragic-remorse, though, which I will introduce in the next section, relies exactly on the 
possibility of one feeling this kind of negative emotion while holding that one did the overall 
right thing. Furthermore, I will argue that this emotion can be felt by the agent without her 
having to be subject to something like “emotional dissonance” (2000, p. 171) in which her 
emotions stand in a vicious contradiction to her judgements. The cognitivist account 
therefore does not appear to be able to make sense of our experience of dirty hands. Bagnoli 
claims that, “it seems to me that the question is not why apparently unjustified regrets survive 
reflection and deliberation, as cognitivism claims. The question is rather, why the agent has 
reason to retain them” (2000, p. 172). The point to consider is not why it seems that we have 
certain emotional responses that are in contrast to our judgement of a given action. A more 
fruitful enquiry looks at the perception of a certain part of the action that caused our 
emotional response and what that tells us about the situation beyond the overall judgement 
we made. Perceptualist theories appear to be superior because they seem to sit better with 
our phenomenology of emotions.  
At this point I will not go into any more detail on the debate between feeling, perceptualist, 
and cognitivist theories of emotions. While the above distinctions and arguments are 
certainly superficial, it will be helpful for the reader to have this rough background in mind 
when considering the following arguments. In the following I will indicate why it seems 
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plausible to view certain emotions as rational. The aim of this section is to give the reader an 
understanding of my reasons for shaping my account of dirty hands around this assumption.  
To understand the rationality of emotions we have to understand their function. Ronald de 
Sousa argues that the best way to do this is by considering a world without emotions. He 
claims that, “a being without emotion would either be some kind of Kantian monster with a 
computer brain and a pure rational Will, or else a Cartesian animal-machine, an ant, perhaps, 
in which every ‘want’ is preprogrammed and every ‘belief’ simply a releasing cue for a specific 
response” (1980, p. 135). Both beings would be fully determined by either programmed 
mechanisms or reason. He argues that, while the idea of the ant seems intelligible, even 
though alien, the idea of a Kantian monster seems difficult to comprehend. De Sousa argues 
that this is because “there is no such thing as fully determinate rationality” (1980, p. 135). 
The two most important features that tell against this determinacy are the issues of salience 
and of strategy.  
Salience is the question of which of the many possible aspects of a given situation we should 
be focussed on, and it is also the question of what actions we should occupy ourselves with 
under the given circumstances. Salience also poses the question of the threshold of 
probability that is required for it to be rational for us to accept something being the case or 
not. De Sousa gives the example of a decision between being soft- and hard-headed. The 
former implies an attitude of being easily susceptible to impressions, though one is happy to 
alter these first impressions as quickly as they were made. Being hard-headed, on the other 
hand, describes an attitude of being less susceptible to impressions that are, however, difficult 
to lose once they are made. Logic and reason alone do not seem to be able uniquely to 
determine our focus or threshold here; they do not tell us which of these two attitudes is 
superior.  
We are faced with the issue of strategy when, giving certain wants, we have to ask ourselves 
what the best ways of achieving these wants are. De Sousa gives the example of choosing 
between a minimax and maximin strategy. Imagine a lottery where tickets are very expensive 
but my chances of winning are good and the sums that are payed out are very high. If I decide 
to play I have a lot to lose if I pay for the ticket but do not win, but equally I have a lot that 
I could potentially win. If, on the other hand, I decide not to participate, I have nothing to 
gain or lose. De Sousa argues that in such a situation it seems possible that, “the probabilities 
involved may be such that the expected desirabilities of the two are identical” (1980, p. 136). 
Our rational calculation of probabilities might suggest that the two options are equally 
valuable; yet, there seems to be an important difference between trying to maximise gains as 
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opposed to minimising losses. If we are faced with alternatives that have equal results in a 
rational calculation, reason alone, again, does not seem to be able to fully determine our 
course of action. What de Sousa follows from these points is that “the function of emotion 
is to fill gaps left by […] ‘pure reason’ in the determination of action and belief”, and that 
therefore, “emotions are determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines 
of inquiry, and inferential strategies” (1980, pp. 136-137). 
Another reason to think that emotions are far from being irrational is the way in which we 
acquire our repertoire of emotional responses and how we adapt and refine them through 
experience. De Sousa adds to his account above that we learn to exhibit certain emotional 
responses through so-called paradigm scenarios. These present us from a young age with 
both a characteristic object of emotion and a set of characteristic emotional responses to it. 
De Sousa relates this to his wider account by arguing that “learning to ‘gestalt’ situations in 
terms of such scenarios is learning to attend differentially to certain features of an actual 
situation, to inquire into the presence of further features of the scenario, and to make 
inferences that the scenario suggests” (1980, p. 143). Peter Goldie takes this thought a step 
further: next to our ability to educate our emotions, our emotions can, and do, in turn educate 
our future decision-making. His emphasis lies especially on the influence of emotions such 
as regret in enabling us to learn from our mistakes. By externally engaging with others’ or 
one’s own past decisions that resulted in unfavourable outcomes we come to feel regret 
about them; regret is essentially a counterfactual emotion that makes us consider what might 
have been. This emotion then encourages the agent to engage in hypothetical reasoning 
about what other courses of action might have been available and which one of these should 
have been taken instead. Goldie concludes that “negative emotions, counterfactual narrative 
thinking, and regrets can have a feedback effect on one’s grasp of the relative hypothetical 
imperative, helping one to learn from mistakes” (2012, p. 87). I will return to the way in 
which certain emotions have a crucial impact on our practical deliberations with regards to 
dirty hands at the end of this chapter.  
While these considerations have given us an idea of why emotions in general play a crucial 
role in rational thinking and deliberation, what we have not considered yet is how we can 
determine whether a particular emotion is rational or not in a given case. We can look to 
Patricia Greenspan (1980) for an account of the conditions that an emotion requires to be 
rational. To develop these conditions, she starts by considering cases of ambivalence. 
Imagine that my best friend has received the promotion that I was after, and now I 
experience two emotional responses: I am happy, and yet I am also sad, frustrated, and angry. 
The argument then goes that this is not clearly a sign of irrationality because emotions are 
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rational if they are supported by some relevant reasons and can hence be seen as appropriate 
in the situation. This does not have to be all-things-considered, though, as partial relevance 
can be sufficient. I am happy as a response to the fact that someone that I deeply care about 
has received a promotion; at the same time I experience a variety of negative emotions as a 
response to the fact that I have lost out on something that I desired. Therefore, a certain 
emotion is rational if it appropriately responds to some part of the situation to which it is a 
reaction. I will discuss the notion of appropriateness further at the end of this section. 
Even if one accepts Greenspan’s line of argument, one might wish to ask whether trying to 
resolve such cases of ambivalence would not be more rational than upholding them.  Again, 
I think Greenspan has a convincing answer to this: no, it would not be more rational to 
resolve one’s ambivalent emotions, as the agent might lose something of importance during 
that process. She argues that, “by allowing the conflict, but controlling its behavioural effects, 
I can express my strong commitment to someone else’s interest without losing sight of my 
own” (1980, p. 241). My ambivalent feelings ensure that the complexity of the situation is 
not lost on me. While, for example, I might decide that it was all-things-considered the wrong 
decision for them to promote my friend because she was not the most qualified candidate, 
my ambivalent emotions of being angry about this state, while at the same time being happy 
for my friend, ensure that I am reminded of the different values at stake. 
So far I have shown that emotions can be perfectly rational when they respond to some 
feature of a given situation. The next question is now what sort of emotion would be 
appropriate in dirty hands situations. Before doing so, it will be important to understand 
what exactly we mean by “appropriateness”. I will use the language suggested by Justin 
D’Arms and David Jacobson (2000) in their discussion of the appropriateness of emotions. 
On what we can call the “fittingness interpretation” we ask ourselves whether the emotional 
response fits the external object to which it is a reaction to. The fact that your colleague has 
been promoted instead of you might make the emotional response of “anger” a fitting 
response to at least some of the features of the situation (e.g. the aspect of having lost out). 
On the “moral interpretation” we ask ourselves whether it is morally right to feel a certain 
emotion. I realise that the promotion was not based on merit, and my colleague did not 
deserve to get the job based on that criterion, so it is appropriate for me to feel anger. Lastly, 
on the “prudential interpretation” the question is whether it is useful for us to experience 
this emotion. Now that my colleague is in a higher position I might need their support for 
my future projects, so I should not show any anger because that might make a bad impression 
on her. Obviously feeling and showing an emotion are two different things, but I might come 
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to the conclusion that feeling anger could show in my behaviour even if I tried my best to 
hide it, so I should simply avoid feeling it altogether.  
Which of these interpretations of appropriateness should we be concerned with when 
assessing the sort of emotional response that is an adequate reflection of the conflictual 
nature inherent in cases of dirty hands? The emotions of regret, agent-regret and tragic-
remorse in question, similar to responses such as anger, can be described as moral emotions; 
that means that, as D’Arms and Jacobsen put it, “they present their objects in the light of 
such moral concepts as desert, fault, and responsibility” (2000, p. 87). The external object to 
which they are a reaction is of a moral nature so what is appropriate will therefore rely on 
the correct representation of a moral situation. The appropriate emotional response to the 
conflict inherent in dirty hands will have to reflect correctly the moral aspects of that conflict 
situation. As mentioned previously, it is possible for an agent to experience multiple, even 
conflicting, emotional responses that reflect different aspects of a particular situation. This 
is obviously also the case for dirty hands, but what I am concerned with in the next section 
is to identify the emotional response that will be present in any dirty hands case because it is 
the accurate reflection of the underlying moral conflict present in every dirty hands scenario. 
4.3. Agent-Regret and Tragic-Remorse 
A good starting point for understanding the appropriate emotional response to the conflict 
inherent in dirty hands is therefore to understand the moral considerations that our emotions 
ought to respond to. As an example, consider the following case: An evil criminal is holding 
you and two other people as hostages. The criminal now gives you the following options: 
either you kill one of the other hostages and you and the remaining person will be released, 
or the evil criminal will kill all three of you. I think it is not unreasonable to think that killing 
one of the other hostages might be the lesser of two evils in the situation. Given this, you 
choose to kill one of the hostages; for our purposes it does not matter whether you do so 
arbitrarily or based on prudential factors such as age, health or chances of survival. After you 
kill one of the hostages you and the remaining person are freed. You are a bit shaken by your 
experiences in captivity but, on the most fundamental level, are not troubled by the decision 
you made and the action you committed; it was the lesser of two evils after all. You go on 
with your life and are barely preoccupied with the fact that you have taken a life as a result 
of your own calculated deliberation and with your own hands. There seems to be something 
troubling about this attitude. The lack of a negative emotional response to what the agent 
has done seems to imply that she is not taking seriously the effect that her actions had on 
other people and how this should affect her as a moral agent. 
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This case is supposed to show us that it might be necessary for the agent to experience a 
specific moral and emotional response in order to fully comprehend the choice situation that 
she found herself in. The kind of emotion that would be appropriate in such instances, to 
accurately reflect the conflict inherent in dirty hands choices, will likely be a form of either 
regret or remorse because these are “the two central emotions used to characterise our 
responses to unfortunate and awful events” (de Wijze, 2004, p. 459).21 Which emotional 
response will be appropriate, however, is not as straightforward as in other instances of 
wrongdoing. De Wijze sums this up neatly by stating that “to feel mere regret about this state 
of affairs would fail to do justice to the serious moral violation […] while to feel remorse 
would falsely suggest that [the agent] had no moral justification for [their] actions. Agent-
regret will not do either since it is not merely the fact of [their] causal role in the event that 
is problematic” (2004, p. 464). All three notions (i.e. regret, agent-regret, and remorse) are 
discussed by Williams in his example of a car driver and their involvement in a car accident. 
It will therefore be helpful to start by introducing Williams’s account and showing why de 
Wijze is right in arguing that neither of the three emotions would be appropriate for dirty 
hands scenarios. Ultimately I will argue, following de Wijze, that tragic-remorse is a more 
fitting response. 
Williams asks us to imagine three situations in which an agent is driving her car at night. The 
first driver is going along the road when she sees a child running out into the road and being 
hit and killed by a car going the other way. In the second scenario, the driver is 
conscientiously going along the road when, out of nowhere, a child runs into the road in 
front of her. She does not have enough time to swerve or break and hits and kills the child. 
In the final scenario the driver falls asleep behind the wheel. Even though only gone for a 
few seconds, when she opens her eyes a child is in the road in front of her. She has no time 
to swerve or break and hits and kills the child. Given the differences in their situations, the 
three drivers are going to have different emotional responses to the death of the child. 
 
                                            
21 While guilt has also been suggested as an appropriate emotional reaction to the conflict faced by the agent in 
a dirty hands scenario (Walzer, 1973, p. 166) I will not consider this emotion here. One feels guilt, as defined 
by Anthony O’Hear, when “an unjust action is conceived as a transgression against a moral injunction” (1967, 
p. 82). Guilt is an acknowledgement that one has done something wrong and that one is liable to some negative 
third-person response as a result. Remorse goes a step further and is described by Raimond Gaita as the 
“suffering recognition and acknowledgement of one’s guilt” (1991, p. 49). Remorse adds a particular concern 
for the evil that one has done to someone else; as Ilham Dilman puts it, “in remorse it is the pain of what one 
has done to others that is sovereign in one’s consciousness of it” (1999, p. 325). Experiencing remorse ensures 
that “one apprehends  the  wrong  one  has  done  painfully  in  one’s  concern  for the person one has wronged 
and for the values one has violated” (1999, p. 326). In as much as remorse appears to imply an 
acknowledgement of one’s guilt but goes an important step further, I will be exclusively concerned with the 
subject of remorse in this section. 
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4.3.1. Regret 
The first driver was merely a witness. She was in no sense at fault for what happened, nor 
could she have done anything to safe the child. Nevertheless, she is likely to experience a 
negative emotional response toward the situation. She might wish that things would have 
been otherwise so that the child would still be alive. We can best label this emotion as 
“regret”, which is, in essence, what Bagnoli has described as a “counterfactual emotion” 
(2000, p. 177). Regret encourages us to engage in a hypothetical deliberation about how 
things might have been if the situation had played out differently. With regards to dirty hands, 
Cunningham, for example, has stated that they “involve actions that are morally justified but 
regrettable because of their grave moral costs” (1992, p. 242). 
When I regret something I have the implicit wish for things to have worked out otherwise; 
in dirty hands cases, however, I have purposely chosen to act in a certain way because I came 
to the conclusion that it was the overall lesser evil. I might feel regret about the existence of 
this dirty hands situation in general, but I do not feel regret about the way I acted under the 
circumstances; I do not wish to have acted otherwise. Using the word regret to describe the 
emotional response to dirty hands is therefore conceptually misguiding. As mentioned earlier, 
de Wijze critiques using this notion in dirty hands scenarios because it does not acknowledge 
the way in which the agent was implicated in the violation of an important moral value.  
4.3.2. Remorse 
The driver in scenario three, however, was clearly at fault for the collision and child’s death. 
She might wish that she had done things differently and that there was a way in which she 
could rectify the damage she has done. It weighs heavy on her that there is nothing she can 
now do to change what happened. What she is experiencing is best called “remorse”. It is 
what Raimond Gaita has described as the “suffering recognition and acknowledgement of 
one’s guilt” (1991, p. 49). He goes on to claim that remorse is not only about what we have 
done, but also about what we have become. Because of this, in comparison to mere regret, 
remorse can only be felt about something that we were morally responsible for. Finally, 
remorse can best be healed by an attempt to make amends for what one has done. Making 
amends is the active step to redeem oneself both in the eyes of others and in one’s own and 
to right the scales of injustice. With regards to dirty hands, Marcia Baron (1988) has suggested 
that remorse (in conjunction with the notion of agent-regret) would be an appropriate 
emotional response to the conflict faced by the agent. 
But remorse, as it has been described so far, will not do either because the agent did what 
was all-things-considered justified. Remorse, in the sense defined above, would simply 
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overlook the complexities of the agent’s deliberation and reasons for action. As de Wijze 
argued in the earlier quote, to advocate remorse as the appropriate emotional response to a 
dirty hands scenario would be to overlook that the agent had a moral justification for 
committing the moral violation in question. 
4.3.3. Agent-Regret 
The negative emotional response of the driver in the second scenario sits between those of 
the other two. She was driving conscientiously and to a good standard and there was nothing 
that she could have done better, and yet, even though she did not do anything wrong she 
caused the death of a child. Even though she only did so because she was at the wrong place 
at the wrong time, she is still very aware that her actions are what led to the child dying. This 
feeling is best described as “agent-regret”. The driver acknowledges that, through the causal 
chain of events, she is implicated in the wrong done; it is not something that simply happened 
to her, but rather something that she did. Her driving was the immediate cause of the death 
of the child. She feels in some sense implicated because, as Williams argues, “in the story of 
one’s life there is an authority exercised by what one has done, and not merely by what one 
has intentionally done” (2008, p. 69). 
Going back to our driver example, Williams interestingly argues that others will rightly 
attempt to make the driver abandon her agent-regret. Now one might try to infer from this 
that agent-regret cannot be a rational reaction to the situation if others are justified in pushing 
the agent away from it. Williams’s argument, however, implies nothing of the sort; that others 
are justified in driving the agent away from feelings of agent-regret is based on their concern 
for the agent; they “feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed 
presupposes, that there is something special about his relation to this happening, something 
which cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his fault” (1976, p. 
124). Others trying to push the driver away from her feelings is therefore not a sign of the 
irrationality of agent-regret, but an indicator of the delicate balance that has to be found in 
such situations between emphasizing the negative effects that one’s action had on others, 
without forgetting the lack of control that one had in bringing these effects about. This latter 
aspect also indicates that even though the agent might rationally feel implicated in the wrong 
done it would be, at the same time, inappropriate for others to blame or negatively judge her. 
The driver was causally implicated in the harm and this causes her to experience agent-regret 
because of the role that she had in this harm, but this does not give others any reason to 
evaluate her negatively for that harm. As I will show in chapter six, causal responsibility is 
not, in and of itself, sufficient for ascribing moral responsibility to an agent. 
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Contrary to the way that agent-regret has been used in some writings on dirty hands (Bagnoli, 
2000) it does not tell us the right story for dirty hands cases. In the case of the hostages 
(which is different to Williams’s cases in a very important sense), you neither simply witness 
the killing of the other hostage, nor do you kill her because of carelessness, and nor do you 
just happen to kill her because of unfortunate timing; you are given two options and you 
knowingly and consciously choose to kill the other hostage. You were faced with a choice 
between two values of which you had to forgo one, and you actively chose one of them over 
the other.22 Remember de Wijze’s quote with which I started section 4.3. earlier. He states 
that “to feel mere regret about this state of affairs would fail to do justice to the serious moral 
violation […] while to feel remorse would falsely suggest that [the agent] had no moral 
justification for [their] actions. Agent-regret will not do either since it is not merely the fact 
of [their] causal role in the event that is problematic” (2004, p. 464). Marcia Baron seems to 
have a worry similar to de Wijze about agent-regret; she explains that concentrating on agent-
regret rather than some form of remorse will enable the agent to see herself as merely causally 
responsible as opposed to responsible in any more substantial sense. She claims that, “despite 
what Williams’s term would seem to suggest, the person who feels only agent-regret does 
not, with respect to the situation at hand, really see himself as an agent” (1988, p. 269). 
4.3.4. Tragic-Remorse 
De Wijze therefore introduces the notion of tragic-remorse23 to discussions about dirty 
hands, to account for this concern. According to his definition, (1) tragic-remorse is an 
appropriate reaction to immoral acts or omissions that were nonetheless justified.24 Given 
my account of dirty hands developed in chapter two, I will have to add that not just any 
justified immoral act will do, but that the immoral act must be one that violates one of the 
agent’s core moral commitments. (2) It is a response to an action that the agent committed 
voluntarily, despite the fact that outside factors meant that it was only done because it was 
the lesser of two evils.  (3) The agent will experience this emotion because she violated a 
moral value for good moral reasons. (4) It means that the agent will become morally polluted 
and experience anguish because of her choice, but (5) she would act similarly if the same 
                                            
22 I will argue in chapter six how an agent can be said to be morally responsible even though they were acting 
in a situation of lesser evils in which they found themselves through no fault of theirs. 
23 This notion of tragic-remorse is in its essence close to the solution that Marcia Baron offers. She advocates 
for an emotional experience in which “remorse and agent-regret mutually temper one another” (1988, p. 274). 
The agent ought to understand her substantial, as opposed to merely causal, role in the events, while 
acknowledging that her agency was limited due to external factors outside of her control. 
24 It is important to note at this point that for the coherence view of rational moral judgement, which argues 
that there cannot be conflicts of absolute moral values, phrasing the problem along this line runs into the risk 
of reintroducing into dirty hands the irrationality that they have opposed. For them this condition could be 
rephrased into: (1*) Tragic-remorse is an appropriate reaction to an action that involves a choice between two 
pro tanto impermissible actions. 
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situation was to arise in the future. (6) As a result she does not have to reform the part of 
her character that made her act as she did. (7) It finally implies repairing the harm and giving 
a (public) justification for the wrong that one has done. In the following I will further explain 
and expand on these seven features of tragic-remorse.25 
Features (1) – (3) are a restatement of the conditions for something to be a situation of dirty 
hands. They can be summed up nicely by thinking of the object of tragic-remorse as, as 
Bagnoli puts it, “a valuable unchosen and not necessarily overriding alternative” (2000, p. 
178).26 With the fourth feature de Wijze wants to point us towards the effect that dirty hands 
have not only on those adversely affected by the choice, but also the effects on the agent 
herself. In dirty hands situations the action not chosen does not lose its force and still exerts 
an influence over the agent. This is the moral remainder that attaches to her. Because she 
has violated an important moral value, this remainder will elicit a negative emotional 
response. Feature (5) of de Wijze’s account tells us that the agent who experiences tragic-
remorse does not reject her action and would act in the same way if a similar situation was 
to arise in the future. At this point of the account one might object that it seems questionable 
that we can feel actual remorse without repudiating our acts. I think this worry is based on a 
conflation of right and wrong, and good and bad, and I’d like briefly to defend de Wijze’s 
account against it. D. Z. Phillips and H. S. Price reply to the worry that there cannot be 
remorse without repudiation, that this objection wrongly “identifies good with what ought 
to be done, and evil with what ought not to be done” (1967, p. 18).27 The objection therefore 
would seem to deny the possibility that in doing the overall right thing, we could not also do 
something evil. The situations that are said to require tragic-remorse, however, are 
specifically characterised by the fact that this is the case; in these situations the lesser evil 
might be what ought to be done and the very fact that we call it a lesser “evil” should show 
why the objection fails. If we acknowledge that what we did in the situation was what, overall, 
ought to have been done, and that it can at the same time include the violation of an 
important moral value, we can see how tragic-remorse without repudiation is possible. I 
would therefore like to hold on to de Wijze’s account of feature (5). The justification for 
feature (6) of his definition is related to that of the preceding feature. Tragic-remorse is not 
                                            
25 De Wijze also introduces a final feature in which he talks about some of the other emotions the agent might 
experience; these can be, according to him, guilt and shame, but also pride. I will briefly discuss the emotions 
that are likely to be present in addition to tragic-remorse later on in this section. 
26 While Bagnoli issues this statement about agent-regret and not about tragic-remorse, her version of agent-
regret is an amendment of Williams’s account in such a way that it comes quite close to the notion of tragic-
remorse. Therefore, I think that her description straightforwardly applies to our concept in question. 
27 Phillips and Price make this claim in relation to remorse, rather than tragic-remorse. They do, however, make 
their argument with the specific situation in mind where “whatever one does someone is going to suffer” (1967, 
p. 18). Therefore I think that their argument applies to tragic-remorse in the way I have described it, and that 
their use of the notion of “remorse” was not accurate for the situation they were trying to describe. 
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linked to moral failure on the part of the agent; after all, they chose the lesser evil in the 
situation. The emotional response is then not intended to be something like an internal 
sanction for the agent because of what they have become in committing this action; it is not 
meant to give them a motivation for changing. I will return in the next section to the specific 
function that tragic-remorse is intended to perform where I will argue that it constitutes a 
commitment to the forgone value, contributes to the agent’s deliberation, and makes her 
behaviour intelligible. Feature (7) tells us that in cases where tragic-remorse is appropriate, 
the agent should seek to make amends to those that are left worse off by her actions. If we 
would not separate the overall justification for the action in terms of it being the lesser evil, 
from the fact that it still did involve a violation of an important moral value, we would be 
unable to account for this. Amelie Rorty argues, as part of her account of the appropriate 
response to choosing the overall right action out of two evils, that “it is morally and 
practically important to attend to the mutual dependency of the two to assume a larger 
responsibility” (1980, p. 496).28 This larger responsibility is the agent’s duty to try to 
compensate or make amends as best as she can. Now one might wonder whether this is not 
putting too much pressure on an agent who is already acting under morally difficult 
circumstances. My intuition here is that it is hard to imagine that a morally good agent, who 
takes the harm that her action has done seriously, would stop there and would not wish to 
support in any way those that have been left off worse because of her. I will not take this 
question up further, though, because for the purposes of this thesis I have bracketed the 
question of what the agent and others ought to do in the wake of a dirty hands decision. 
I think tragic-remorse defined in this way is the best way to think of the emotional response 
that appropriately reflects the moral choice situation underlying every dirty-handed decision. 
Whenever an agent is confronted with a dirty hands situation it will be appropriate for her 
to experience tragic-remorse. As mentioned earlier, while tragic-remorse is the most 
appropriate response to the particular conflict underlying all dirty hands choices, other 
features of a particular dirty hands scenario may also give rise to additional emotional 
responses. 
Take the following example: Agamemnon is commander of the Greek forces on a mission 
to Troy that was ordered by Zeus. As such, under the prevailing Greek moral and religious 
norms, Agamemnon is under a divine obligation to fulfil the quest and do everything in his 
                                            
28 Rorty says this about agent-regret rather than about tragic-remorse. Her account of agent-regret, however, 
seems to conflate features of these two notions. This particular feature of assuming responsibility is better 
suited to the definition of tragic-remorse than to that of agent-regret, as the latter only requires a causal 
connection between the agent’s action and the outcome. 
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power to protect the cause and his men. Because of a past misdeed, Artemis wants to punish 
Agamemnon and she conjures up weather that prevents Agamemnon and his crew from 
making their journey home; if nothing changes this would ultimately prove deadly to them. 
Now Artemis offers Agamemnon a deal; she will ensure that the ship can continue its 
journey, if Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia. He is faced with the decision 
between both letting his men die and failing in his duty to both his country and to Zeus 
himself, and killing his own daughter. He finally decides to sacrifice Iphigenia, which the 
chorus of the play accepts as the all-things-considered preferable choice. He is, however, 
criticised for his lack of emotional response in the wake of his deed. Agamemnon is not 
subject to any form of negative emotional response that would indicate an understanding of 
the morally blameworthy act he had to perform in doing the lesser evil.  Instead, when he 
decided that killing his daughter was the lesser of two evils, he wholeheartedly embraced that 
option as the right thing to do simpliciter. Next to his lack of tragic-remorse, which would 
have constituted the necessary acknowledgement of the tragic choice that he had to make, 
there are further emotions that we might be missing from him given the particularities of this 
case. We would probably expect sadness about missing his daughter, a longing for spending 
time with her again, anger at Artemis for pushing him towards this action, pride at having 
chosen the overall lesser evil in a difficult situation, and many more.29 The only emotion that 
we might be able to attribute to him is contentment for having chosen the lesser of two evils. 
What this example goes to show is that tragic-remorse will seldom be a solitary emotional 
response but will be connected to, and potentially confounded, by a variety of other 
emotions. 
After having given an indication for why it is plausible to see certain emotions as rational, 
and after having argued for tragic-remorse as the most fitting emotional response to the 
conflict inherent in dirty hands cases, it now remains to be seen why the experience of this 
emotion should be so important in dirty hands scenarios. 
4.4. The Function of Emotions in Dirty Hands 
In section 4.2. I argued that it would not be irrational to hold two conflicting emotions in 
response to a situation such as, for example, my friend being promoted rather than me. Now 
imagine a situation in which, rather than having two opposing emotions, we are faced with a 
contrary judgement and emotion. In a dirty hands situation we are said to find ourselves in a 
                                            
29 I think the fact that we would expect him to experience several of these emotions is another reason that 
speaks in favour of using a perceptualist over a cognitivist account to explain the rationality and appropriateness 
of emotions. Because these emotions only have to be an appropriate reaction to a partial feature of the situation, 
instead of being a full-blown judgement of the situation, the emotional responses can be more varied and 
nuanced. 
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situation with feelings of tragic-remorse while holding the judgement that we did what was 
right overall. Would it not be more rational to resolve this conflict? In the following I will 
argue that this is not the case because the conflicting emotion fulfils three important moral 
functions for the agent. It shows a commitment to the forgone value, it makes a contribution 
to her practical deliberations, and makes her behaviour intelligible to others. 
4.4.1. Commitment to the Forgone Value 
The first function lies in the way in which this emotion highlights the agent’s commitment 
to the forgone value, and thereby adds a richness to our moral understanding of a dirty hands 
situation that would be lost if we were to look at it only through the lens of all-things-
considered judgements. Drawing from Greenspan the insight that only parts of a dirty hands 
situation have to support the agent’s reasons for experiencing a particular emotion, feeling 
tragic-remorse ensures that the value that had to be forgone is not forgotten. When an agent 
is faced with a situation of moral conflict, she inevitably will have to come to a decision on 
which action to take, which implies having to make an all-things-considered judgement of 
what the lesser evil in the scenario will be; but, crucially, the story does not end here. We will 
experience a response of tragic-remorse if the value that was lost out on is given due 
consideration. A lack of this emotion would be a sign that the agent did not fully understand 
the situation at hand. Even if the agent did appreciate the gravity of the situation, a lack of 
tragic-remorse would make it too easy for the agent to forget this in hindsight. Experiencing 
tragic-remorse reminds us of the different moral requirements that were at stake.  
According to this function of tragic-remorse, the agent’s emotional response in dirty hands 
scenarios is a vital component that is necessary to ensure that the situation can be 
comprehended in its full complexity. For this to be the case the agent will have to experience 
tragic-remorse after the dirty-handed act. It then presents an affirmation of the forgone 
moral value and a sign of respect for those that have been left off worse by the agent’s dirty 
hands. As such it is not merely an instrumental but an inherent part of being a moral agent 
in a dirty hands scenario. Tragic-remorse, in this sense, is not merely a useful heuristic that 
makes us understand better what was at stake; on the contrary, this emotion becomes a 
necessary result of having fully comprehended the value that one had to forgo. When 
someone does not experience tragic-remorse after dirtying their hands, this is a clear sign 
that they have not apprehended the dirty hands situation in its full complexity, i.e. that when 
a moral value is outweighed this does not mean that it vanished; after all it still stands and 
exerts an influence over the agent. 
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4.4.2. Contribution to Reasoning and Deliberation 
The second function of tragic-remorse lies in the contribution that this emotion makes to 
practical reasoning and deliberation. In section 4.2. I have already touched on this when 
talking about Peter Goldie’s account of emotions. Goldie argued that negative emotions play 
a crucial role in our moral education by encouraging counterfactual and hypothetical 
deliberation about how things might have been had we acted differently. Carla Bagnoli takes 
a step forward from this claim and argues that “by calling attention to the alternatives the 
agent did not have, the agent may be pushing the boundaries of what she thinks possible for 
her to do. […] Counterfactual reasoning is a way of questioning the ineluctability and 
necessity of some of our deliberative constraints” (2000, p. 180). When an agent is faced with 
what they think is a dirty hands scenario the prospect of the emotional burden of getting 
one’s hands dirty ensures that the agent will search for alternative and morally 
unobjectionable courses of action. Bagnoli highlights that “the valuable alternatives are not 
merely descriptive features of the context of choice, but the outcome of the agent’s 
deliberation” (2000, p. 181). While the agent might think that she only has two options 
available to her, in reality she will most likely already have dismissed a variety of other courses 
of action as unviable. We want to ensure that dirty hands reasoning does not supply agents 
with an excuse to act in morally objectionable ways by wrongly claiming that they had no 
other choice because they were faced with a dirty hands scenario. Tragic-remorse is a 
considerable burden for the agent to carry, so trying to avoid it can ensure that the agent 
considers other courses of action which she otherwise may have left unexplored. Tragic-
remorse has the instrumental function of aiding the agent in her practical deliberation. 
For tragic-remorse to fulfil this function the agent has to recall past or imagine future feelings 
of tragic-remorse before and during her deliberation. Additionally, I would like to argue that 
experiencing this emotion for this purpose is merely instrumental, as opposed to inherent, 
to being a moral agent in a situation of dirty hands. It provides the agent with a heuristic for 
becoming a better moral agent. An ideal moral agent might not require this help to ensure 
that they fix the parameters of their choice correctly, but given that none of us are such ideal 
moral agents, tragic-remorse is a useful device to ensure that we deliberate in the right way 
about the options available to us. 
4.4.3. Making Behaviour Intelligible 
The third sense, in which tragic-remorse is an essential contribution to dirty hands scenarios, 
is the way in which it makes the agent’s behaviour intelligible. Remember that I have defined 
tragic-remorse in such a way that does not require the repudiation of the dirty-handed action 
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or the part of one’s character that led to that decision. I have also briefly suggested that 
tragic-remorse implies that we ought to make compensation or issue an apology to those that 
have been adversely affected by our dirty hands. Without the notion of tragic-remorse it 
seems hardly intelligible why we should be making amends when we have done what was an 
overall justified action. This idea can be found in Bernard Williams’s account of the 
importance of emotions when he argues that “in some cases, the relevant unity in a man’s 
behaviour, the pattern into which his judgements and actions together fit, must be 
understood in terms of an emotional structure underlying them” (1999, p. 222). 
To fulfil this function the agent ought to experience tragic-remorse after having dirtied her 
hands. This will help her understand what is morally required in the aftermath of a dirty-
handed action. Like the second function of supporting the right kind of deliberation, the 
function of making behaviour intelligible is instrumental to good moral agency. As a heuristic 
it encourages the agent to understand better the ways in which an ideal moral agent ought to 
behave in the wake of dirtying her hands. 
Now one might worry that giving such a central role to an emotion like tragic-remorse comes 
with certain dangers. It could be used in an egocentric way to manipulate others, for example, 
in order to gain attention or sympathy. Alternatively, the experience of tragic-remorse could 
be morally debilitating if the agent is given the impression that she cannot do the right thing 
whatever she does, even if she does what she ought to do. When what at the beginning could 
be called tragic-remorse is turned into a tool to manipulate others it is merely a sham rather 
than a genuine reaction to the way in which our actions have left others worse off. The case 
of moral debilitation is more difficult and this is a serious bullet my account will have to bite; 
but in these cases I think that we can dispel the worry, at least partially, by arguing that tragic-
remorse nonetheless remains morally important; as Amelie Rorty puts it, “properly focused, 
[it] can conduce to agent responsibility, sensitising a person to preventive and remedial 
measures […] and it is important to be aware of the harmful and undesirable features of 
desirable actions” (Rorty, 1980, p. 501). 
What I have tried to show above is that one of the functions of experiencing tragic-remorse 
in situations of dirty hands is an inherent feature of being a good moral agent. Furthermore, 
given that none of us are ideal moral agents, it also provides us with a further two functions 
that are instrumental to moral agency in dirty hands scenarios. What we can conclude from 
this is that if an agent does not experience tragic-remorse after dirtying her hands, this is an 
indication that she has not fully comprehended what was at stake and that her choice was at 
best not fully informed, and at worst made for the wrong reasons.  
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4.5. Conclusion 
Dirty hands theory takes recourse to the importance of emotions in a variety of ways. It relies 
on the assumption that our emotions are rational reactions to the features of choice situations 
that we are faced with such that our emotional responses can tell us something about our 
moral reality. The fact that agents actually do feel a certain negative emotional response in 
supposed dirty hands situations therefore gives credence to the way in which dirty hands 
theorists make sense of these choice scenarios. As a result, there has been debate about what 
the most appropriate emotional response is to feel in dirty hands situations. Finally, dirty 
hands theorists claim that the agent’s emotional response fulfils a variety of important 
functions in the agent’s deliberation and will affect the way in which we assess her character. 
In response to these claims I first set out in this chapter to show why emotions can indeed 
be rational and come with a set of conditions that explain why an emotional response is 
appropriate or not in a given situation. I supported the idea that emotions can be rational 
and can point us toward some of the features of our moral reality. I then argued that the 
emotional response most appropriate to the conflict inherent in dirty hands scenarios is 
tragic-remorse. Experiencing tragic-remorse is important because it shows a commitment to 
the forgone value, contributes to the agent deliberating in the right way, and ultimately can 
make her behaviour intelligible to third parties.  
In the previous three chapters I have developed an account of dirty hands that understands 
them as a conflict between plural values which attacks some of our core commitments. This 
results in a moral remainder which attaches to the agent and shows itself in an experience of 
tragic-remorse. Once an agent is confronted with a dirty hands scenario, it is too late to keep 
her hands clean in any way. Her action will be dirty no matter what she does, and this points 
us toward the sometimes tragic nature of moral action. In the next part of my thesis I want 
to understand whether, and if so how, dirty hands reasoning can be applied to democratic 
politics and what results this has for both political actors as well as citizens. 
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PART II: Democratic Dirty Hands 
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5. In Defence of Democratic Dirty Hands 
5.1. Introduction 
Can politicians lying, deceiving, or even ordering the torture or killing of another human 
being be compatible with democratic politics? Advocates of dirty hands have tried to show 
that, in certain circumstances, such actions may present the lesser of two evils. As such, these 
actions can be justified, even if they nonetheless remain wrong. David Shugarman (2000) 
and Maureen Ramsay (2000a), however, have argued that there is no such thing as genuinely 
democratic dirty hands. Dirty-handed means are incompatible with the democratic ends 
supposedly used to justify them and the use of dirty hands is a sign that political action is no 
longer democratic. The aim of this chapter is to defend the concept of democratic dirty 
hands.30 I will begin by outlining the background assumptions that these critics make about 
the nature of both democracy and dirty hands. Next, I will extract three arguments for the 
claim that dirty hands have no place in democratic politics. The first argues that it is 
contradictory, in principle, to use undemocratic means to pursue democratic ends. The 
second claims that using dirty-handed means, in practice, will undermine democracy more 
than they promote it and as such cannot be justified. The final criticism states, more generally, 
that dirty hands are a sign that politics is no longer meeting the criteria necessary to be called 
democratic. The chapter goes on to argue that the rejections of the notion of democratic 
dirty hands are based on some fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of dirty hands 
and democratic politics.  
Before doing so, it will be useful to clarify exactly what criticism of dirty hands in democracies 
I am concerned with in this chapter. I want to distinguish between two worries; on the one 
hand what I call the “exegetical worry” and on the other what I call the “substantive worry”. 
The aim of this chapter is to refute the latter. The exegetical worry holds that if dirty hands 
are not understood properly by philosophers, politicians, and citizens, then dirty hands talk 
will have a corrupting effect on democratic practices. Some ways of talking about dirty hands 
need to be urgently revisited as a result in order to safeguard democratic politics. While this 
worry is not opposed to the idea of dirty hands in principle, it argues that our current 
understanding of the phenomenon in the literature prevents it from being democratic. Such 
                                            
30 Throughout this thesis I will be adhering to the terminology of “democratic dirty hands” that is most 
commonly found in the literature. Generally speaking, having democratic dirty hands can be understood as a 
short hand for getting your hands dirty in a way that is permissible in a democracy. We might think, however, 
that these two terms are not entirely identical. Take the example of stuffing ballot boxes in order to prevent a 
future dictator coming to power. While it may be permissible in certain circumstances to stuff said ballot boxes 
in a democracy we might think that this does not make such an action democratic. For the purposes of this 
thesis I will put this complication aside and simply use the term “democratic dirty hands”. 
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an argument can be found in S.L. Sutherland’s (1995) work on the subject. Sutherland does 
not deny the possibility that sometimes politicians in democracies will have to get their hands 
dirty, it is just that dirty hands as currently understood in the literature and as used by 
politicians in practice will not be democratic. While this is not entirely clear in her writing, 
she appears to take the stance that, if the conduct appropriate in dirty hands situations is 
correctly understood as requiring politicians to be ultimately accountable to the people 
through formal retrospective processes, it can be squared with democratic values. As she 
puts it, “while it may be necessary to bypass deliberative politics in emergencies, in principle, 
such substantial debates as may have been avoided in the decision-making phases, with 
justification or not, can still be undertaken after the event” (1995, p. 504). Dirty hands could 
be made democratic if they honour the retrospective phase of deliberation and justice. This 
criticism is different from the substantive worry that I want to consider in this chapter, 
though. I am concerned with the more serious criticism that dirty hands, by their very nature, 
could never be compatible with democratic politics. While this worry does not deny the 
existence and necessity of dirty hands more generally, it denies the existence of genuine 
democratic dirty hands. This criticism can be found in David Shugarman’s (2000) and 
Maureen Ramsay’s (2000a) discussion of the topic in which they appear to take a stricter 
stance than Sutherland.31 I will respond to these two critics and argue that, in fact, there can 
be genuine democratic dirty hands.  
5.2. Background Assumptions 
In order to understand why Shugarman and Ramsay think that dirty hands and democracy 
are incompatible, it will be important to understand some of the background assumptions 
about both democracy and dirty hands on which their position relies.  
5.2.1. Democracy 
Shugarman states in a footnote that he is particularly influenced by John Dewey’s conception 
of a participatory democracy that, according to Shugarman, shows “persuasive arguments 
that democracy is much more than a formal method for choosing or authorizing 
governments, that it requires effective participation by the populace in agenda-setting and 
decision-making and cannot be squared with elite rule in either political or economic 
organizations” (2000, p. 247). Dewey argues that the underlying ethos of democracy “is that 
all those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing and managing 
                                            
31 This interpretation differs from de Wijze’s (2018, p. 146) account of Shugarman. He argues that Shugarman 
takes the position that I have ascribed to Sutherland. He overlooks Shugarman’s stricter stance on the 
opposition of dirty hands, however they may be conceived of, and the fundamental democratic values they 
override. 
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them” (1987, p. 218). The aim of democracy is twofold: to produce the full development of 
individuals as well as overall societal wellbeing. For democracy to achieve these aims it has 
to be, in Dewey’s view, a form of communal exercise. Knowledge and progress are generated 
when people pool together their intelligence and become habituated in the communal use of 
their capacities.  In the context of democracy this means that popular participation has to 
extend beyond merely periodically electing officials who then take decisions for us in the 
interim. The people have to be included through discussion and consultation in the decisions 
that affect them. This is also necessitated by Dewey’s mistrust of elites and their ability to 
make decisions for us and in our best interest. Ultimately, these procedural requirements 
stem from Dewey’s focus on the equality and liberty of citizens as fundamental democratic 
values. “All individuals are entitled to equality of treatment by law and in its administration”, 
“each one is equally an individual and entitled to equal opportunity of development of his 
own capacities”, and “each has needs of his own, as significant to him as those of others are 
to them” (1987, pp. 219-220). This goes hand in hand with his emphasis on the individuality 
of each citizen and the need to secure this through ensuring their freedom, understood as 
“freedom of mind and of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary 
to produce freedom of intelligence” (1987, p. 220). In order to secure the ability to develop 
their individuality and ensure societal well-being, citizens have to become actively involved 
in the production and management of decisions that directly affect them. Those that 
represent us cannot be entrusted with the task of generating the knowledge and progress 
necessary to ensure these aims without the help of citizens. Democracy, therefore, requires 
a habit of active participation by the public. Anything that undermines the public ability to 
participate in frequent discussion of governmental policies and the political agenda itself 
would therefore constitute a problem for a secure and well-functioning democracy. 
In contrast, Ramsay is less clear about the overall view of democracy she subscribes to. She 
does, however, identify four core features of a well-functioning democracy: consent, 
participation, representation, and accountability (2000a, p. 36). We can assume that for her, 
at a minimum, democracy requires the popular consent of the people expressed through their 
participation in elections to select their representatives who will be ultimately accountable to 
the people. In particular, she goes on to highlight the importance of free expression and 
discussion of ideas in a democracy based on John Stuart Mill’s argument for the importance 
of free speech. Mill provides us with three points in favour of freedom of speech. Firstly, we 
should encourage open and frank discussion because our ideas may be wrong. For him, “all 
silencing is an assumption of infallibility” (2006, p. 24). Secondly, we need to listen to the 
views of others, because it does not matter how true our own opinion may be, “if it is not 
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fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” 
(2006, p. 42). We will forget the meaning of the view in consideration and as a result lose out 
on the full complexity of its truth. Lastly, freedom of expression is of utmost importance 
because any single view is unlikely to contain all of the truth; instead, we are most likely to 
encounter cases in which “the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other 
false, share the truth between them” (2006, p. 53). One of the results of Mill’s discussion of 
the fallibility of our views is that he wants to ensure that individuals are given equal chances 
to pursue their individuality in matters that do not directly harm others; “as it is useful that 
while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be 
different experiments of living” (2006, p. 65). Mill emphasises the importance of an equal 
right to the liberty of our thoughts and ideas, as well as tastes and lifestyles.  
Ramsay applies Mill’s arguments to the democratic context by claiming that “according to 
Mill, the silencing of discussion and the suppression of ideas assumes the infallibility of 
government decisions. Different ideas must be openly debated and exposed to contradiction 
and refutation, rather than suppressed” (2000a, p. 36). Her emphasis is on the fact that, 
ultimately, governmental powers need to be constrained by checks and balances which are 
achieved through transparency and accountability to the public. While she does not do so 
herself, we could add to this the important role that the values of equality and liberty play in 
democratic politics. After all, it is these values that open and free discussion are thought to 
enable and further according to Mill. Actions that violate these values and processes would 
therefore constitute a problem for good democratic governance.  
5.2.2 Dirty Hands 
When these pictures of democratic politics are combined with the critics’ particular 
understanding of dirty hands it will become clear why they oppose the concept of democratic 
dirty hands. I contend that the critics take their understanding of dirty hands from a particular 
reading of both Michael Walzer’s paper “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands” 
(1973) and Machiavelli’s (2003a; 2003b) political thought to which the wider dirty hands 
debate is indebted.32  
As mentioned in chapter two, Walzer begins by characterising the conflict inherent in dirty 
hands as a clash between deontological and consequentialist morality. He says that “a 
                                            
32 Ramsay’s and Shugarman’s accounts could already be objected to on the basis of some of the particularities 
of their understanding of dirty hands. For a criticism of their accounts along these lines see: (de Wijze, 2018). 
What I want to point out here, however, is that the reason for their objection to the idea of democratic dirty 
hands runs deeper and that it will be necessary to bring to light these more fundamental concerns in order to 
answer fully their criticism of democratic dirty hands. 
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particular act of government […] may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and 
yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong” (1973, p. 161). While everyday political 
decisions ought to be made adhering to deontological principles and rules, in extreme 
situations and emergencies, he argues, politicians ought to use consequentialist calculations. 
Ultimately the problem arises because a leader’s deontological commitments clash with the 
potentially severe consequences of sticking by them. Walzer justifies his choice to single out 
political actors because “the dilemma of dirty hands is a central feature of political life, […] 
[which] arises not merely as an occasional crisis in the career of this or that unlucky politician 
but systematically and frequently” (1973, p. 162). To illustrate the problem he introduces the 
hypothetical ticking bomb scenario in which a political leader is asked to authorise the torture 
of a rebel leader in custody who may know the location of hidden bombs (1973, p. 167). In 
such a case, he argues, we want a politician to order the torture. Walzer thinks that a good 
political leader is one who holds on to her deontological commitments but knows when to 
break them and is willing to do so in the name of her citizens. Such a leader, he argues, will 
then rightly feel guilty for having infringed deontological constraints and will seek 
punishment for it. He draws an analogy to Camus’s play “The Just” in which revolutionaries 
willingly accept the price they have to pay for having become assassins. Their execution “is 
not so much punishment as self-punishment and expiation” (Walzer, 1973, p. 178). The 
politician, induced by her guilt, will ensure that she undergoes the appropriate form of 
punishment. 
This characterization of dirty hands is taken for granted and is then, in the eyes of the critics 
of democratic dirty hands, given an inherently anti-democratic flavour by tracing this 
tradition back to Machiavelli’s treatment of politics.33 Ramsay begins by pointing out that 
Machiavelli’s theory has been associated with “the justification of all political means, even 
the most unscrupulous, on grounds of reasons of state and the use of fraud, force, coercion 
and deceit in order to achieve political ends” (2003a, p. 5). Her reading of his politics 
becomes most obvious, however, in her paper “Machiavelli’s Political Philosophy in The 
Prince” (2000b). She lays out Machiavelli’s assumptions about human nature and the resulting 
state of politics. According to her, Machiavelli views “human beings as natural egoists with 
a lust for domination and power” which “led him to see history as an arena of conflict 
involving deceit, treachery, and violence” (2003b, p. 37). As a result order and security 
                                            
33 In the following I am going to concentrate on Ramsay’s reading of Machiavelli because it is more detailed 
and nuanced. Shugarman provides a rather crude overview that focusses on the single political leader and his 
need to engage primarily in military action and war, while overlooking Machiavelli’s explicit advice to princes 
that they are reliant on the goodwill of other political actors and the people and that his conduct has to be 
tempered by conventional morality as much as possible (2003a, pp. 53-54). 
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become important ends for all human beings because they are required in order to achieve 
and promote well-being. It is the ruler’s task then to pursue these values, but the problem is 
that in doing so he will have to learn how not to be good. This is because “no ruler can 
possess or fully practice virtues because the reality of the human condition dictates behaviour 
which by normal standards would be condemned as immoral” (2000b, p. 34). She ascribes 
to Machiavelli four distinct, though related, statements. Firstly, the use of immoral means 
can sometimes be justified by the good ends in pursuit of which they are used. Secondly, not 
using such immoral means implicates the prince in the resulting bad consequences. Thirdly, 
the prince therefore has to understand that he cannot adhere to common moral standards in 
situations in which the common good or the state itself are at stake. Lastly, “sometimes, in 
employing immoral means, the Prince will be closer to displaying the virtues of conventional 
morality than those who, by embodying these virtues, achieve the opposite” (2000b, p. 35). 
According to Ramsay, Machiavelli does not take the use of immoral means lightly. A prince 
ought to adhere to conventional morality as far as possible, and should the constraints of 
human nature and politics make the use of measures that contravene it necessary, the good 
results do not negate the fact that the means employed to pursue them were immoral 
themselves. In order for a leader to act well he ought to cultivate Machiavellian virtú. She 
argues that it is not straightforward to articulate what is entailed by virtú, but that it 
“embodies those qualities, capacities and dispositions necessary for the Prince to establish, 
restore, or maintain the stability of the state, to win honour and glory for himself and to 
overcome the blows of fortune” (2000b, p. 36).  
Ramsay argues that the problem with relying on a  Machiavellian understanding of politics is 
that he takes expediency to be a core feature of political action because the “need for immoral 
action was for him part of the human condition” (2000a, p. 9). He presupposes a political 
situation in which an absence of checks and balances on political leaders leads to a constant 
struggle for power. This, she thinks, is inappropriate for today’s politics. After all, according 
to Ramsay, “moral dilemmas where politicians must choose a lesser evil in order to avoid 
political catastrophe are not a standard ingredient of political life”, “the costs of moral refusal 
are not frequently national ruin” (2000a, pp. 38-39) or the like, and we ought not to rely on 
Machiavelli’s negative view of human nature. He cannot make sense of modern democracies, 
and letting his vision inform political action today makes the dirty hands debate anti-
democratic in nature. 
Based on their view of democratic politics as well as their reading of Walzer’s article and the 
broadly Machiavellian tradition they see reflected in it, the critics of dirty hands in 
democracies have articulated three different problems.  The first criticism argues that it is 
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contradictory, in principle, to use undemocratic means in the name of democratic ends. 
Shugarman begins by embracing a view that establishes a close connection between means 
and ends. He then shows that dirty hands are undemocratic because they undermine certain 
values and as such are illegitimate means to further those very values. As a result there cannot 
be genuine democratic dirty hands. The second criticism argues that, in practice, we cannot 
find a justification for dirty hands in democracies. Ramsay starts by setting out dirty hands 
as a clash between consequentialist and deontological morality. She continues that it is not 
possible, however, to make a successful consequentialist case for dirty hands in democratic 
politics because dirty-handed means in practice would always undermine democracy. There 
is then no such thing as democratic dirty hands. Thirdly, Shugarman and Ramsay also criticise 
the idea of democratic dirty hands on a wider level. What, after all, does it say about the state 
of politics that politicians feel the need to make use of dirty-handed means? There are certain 
conditions that a state has to fulfil in order to be called democratic, and when politicians 
have to get their hands dirty, this shows us that these conditions are no longer being met. 
Where justified dirty hands begin, democracy has ended. I will argue in the following that 
these critics have misread the nature of dirty hands and democratic politics and that, if 
properly conceived, the concept of democratic dirty hands does not fall prey to any of their 
objections.  
Before discussing each of these objections in turn it is important to note that, if we subscribe 
to a symmetrical reading of dirty hands as I have advocated in chapter three, none of the 
following arguments can get off the ground. If once confronted with a dirty hands situation 
it is impossible for us to keep our hands clean, the idea that a politician could somehow avoid 
getting her hands dirty in democratic politics makes no sense. It is too late for that and 
democratic politicians will have to get their hands dirty either way. In the following I will 
show that, even if we do not accept the symmetry view and think that somehow an agent 
could choose to keep her hands clean in such a scenario, the arguments brought forward by 
the critics of democratic dirty hands do not hold up. Additionally, I think that in the process 
of refuting these arguments we can clarify some of the underlying misconceptions about the 
nature of both dirty hands and democracy that are implicit in some discussions of dirty hands 
in democratic politics. 
5.3. It's Contradictory in Principle to Use Undemocratic Means for 
Democratic Ends 
The first criticism of democratic dirty hands is conceptual in nature. Shugarman argues 
against the Machiavellian idea that the ends can justify any means and emphasises the 
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connection between ends and the means that can legitimately be used to pursue them. What 
he wants to show is that there is a contradiction in arguing that we could use undemocratic 
means to pursue democratic ends because “the proposition that it is democratic for a 
democracy to disenfranchise itself is logically […] incoherent” (2000, p. 240). In particular, 
he states that he supports Martin Luther King’s position that “the means we use must be as 
pure as the ends we see [and] that it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends” 
(King, cited in (2000, p. 232)). When discussing Camus, Shugarman ascribes to him the 
related view that “if the means necessary to a particular end are shameful, then we ought to 
choose a different end” (2000, p. 238). Our means ought to be as pure as our ends, and 
should we find that the end we desire can only be achieved through dubious means then we 
ought to reconsider the end itself. While Shugarman himself does not provide us with a 
justification for why we ought to accept such a view of the connection between means and 
ends, we can find a slightly more detailed articulation of this position in the writings of King. 
King argues that “means and ends must cohere because the end is pre-existent in the means 
and ultimately destructive means cannot bring about constructive ends” (1986, p. 255). He 
explains this relationship between means and ends further by comparing the means to the 
seed and the ends to a tree; you cannot grow a good tree from a bad seed because the means 
determine what the end can hope to be. King goes on to argue that the means represent “the 
end in process” (1986, p. 254); whatever end one wishes to reach has to be engendered by 
the means one uses. Immoral means inevitably taint the end that they are said to pursue and 
that are the supposed grounds for their legitimacy. Once, however, the end is no longer clean 
it cannot be used to legitimise the means anymore. Using immoral means, therefore, 
undercuts their own basis for legitimacy. Hence, there is a contradiction in trying to justify 
using means that are antithetical to the end.  
While Shugarman is not explicit about the reasons he has for supporting the view that there 
is a contradiction in justifying using undemocratic means in pursuit of democratic ends, here 
is what he might say. There is a conceptual connection between ends and the legitimacy of 
the means used to pursue them. As soon as we make use of dirty means, we also inevitably 
undermine the democratic end that was supposed to legitimate their use. The grounds for 
legitimacy vanish because the dirty means inevitably undermine the supposedly clean 
democratic result. Undemocratic means can therefore not be justifiably used in the name of 
democratic ends.  
What exactly are the dirty-handed means and democratic ends that Shugarman is concerned 
with and how does he perceive them to be incompatible? Based on his understanding of 
democracy as participatory, he is particularly concerned with preserving citizens’ ability to 
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get involved in the democratic process through consultation and discussion. The use of dirty-
handed means is undemocratic because they turn the citizenry into a passive collection of 
individuals and the politician becomes a heroic leader who has to make choices for them 
without the need for her citizens’ knowledge, consent, or judgement. As he puts it, “the 
picture painted of the dirty-hands leader is a composite of wily negotiator, clever 
manipulator, no-nonsense general, and ‘father-knows-best’ moral actor. It is a highly 
romanticized view of leadership and a dangerous one” (2000, pp. 242-243). This picture is 
aggravated by the supposed feature of dirty hands wherein a politician facing such a conflict 
would only be accountable to herself. Shugarman objects to allowing politicians to be judges 
in their own cases, because “the use of power without checks and balances leads to its abuse” 
(2000, p. 243).34 Grounded in Dewey’s distrust of the ability of political elites to make 
decisions that are in the best interest of citizens, and in his assertion that active political 
participation is necessary to ensure both equality and liberty, Shugarman opposes dirty hands 
in democracies because they undermine the relationship between leaders and led. Such 
actions are undemocratic because they undermine the processes that are supposed to secure 
the political equality and liberty of citizens, and, based on his earlier endorsement of King 
and Camus, such undemocratic measures cannot be justifiably employed to pursue 
democratic values. Dirty hands, he argues, are then not legitimate means to pursue 
democratic ends. 
We can object to Shugarman’s argument by calling into doubt the claim that it is always 
illegitimate to use undemocratic means for democratic ends. We could do so in either of two 
ways. Firstly, we could try to show that dirty-handed means in fact do not always tarnish the 
democratic ends. This, however, I do not take to be a fruitful strategy. I agree that when 
politicians dirty their hands, democratic values will have always been promoted at a cost (e.g. 
lies or violence) that we should not try to explain away. An important part of the dirty hands 
language is, after all, the acknowledgement of moral remainders that result when values are 
violated. The second strategy for driving a wedge between the connection of means and ends 
that he defends is to argue that sometimes using undemocratic means is more in line with 
democratic values than refraining from employing them. I want to adopt this strategy by 
                                            
34 The assumption that dirty hands prevent democratic accountability can be challenged. Take the example of 
President Carter and the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In an attempt to rescue the hostages he ordered a secret military 
mission – it failed, and cost the lives of eight citizens. The secrecy did not prevent the public from holding 
Carter accountable, though. Within a month’s time a governmental enquiry into the failure of the mission was 
ordered. It concluded by identifying several major issues with the way in which the mission had been conducted. 
Additionally, the failure of this rescue attempt also had a negative impact on Carter’s popularity and contributed 
to his defeat in the next presidential election. For a more in-depth discussion about how secrecy, accountability, 
and citizen participation could be squared with one another in a democracy see Thompson (1987, pp. 11-39). 
I will introduce his argument in more detail in chapter seven. 
  
83 
  
suggesting that using such means could simply constitute a lesser evil and as such could be 
legitimate in some circumstances. An example will be helpful to illustrate my reasoning.  
In the film Lincoln, President Lincoln is portrayed in his struggle to abolish slavery.35 Toward 
the end of the civil war he is concerned that he will have to pass the Thirteenth Amendment 
before the Confederate states can defeat it when the union is restored. In order for the 
amendment to pass, though, several factions with varying interests would have to be 
persuaded. The radical Republicans who backed Lincoln’s push for the amendment did so 
because they prioritised ending slavery over ending the war. Other factions of the 
Republicans, especially those in the states on the border who were most immediately affected 
by the violent conflict, would only vote for the Amendment if doing so would not prolong 
the war. In order to secure the vote of these other factions of his party Lincoln therefore 
would have to engage in negotiations with the Southern States, something that the more 
radical Republicans would strictly oppose. He therefore had to lie and deceive to keep faith 
with the various demands of the different factions. Many of the Democrats had meanwhile 
lost their seats in the recent election (becoming lame ducks) and to ensure their vote in favour 
of the abolition of slavery Lincoln had to incentivise them by contacting them about the 
possibility of jobs in the new government. His duplicitous means in the end paid off and the 
Amendment passed by the smallest of margins. Around two months later the Confederate 
States surrendered.  
Several of the measures taken by Lincoln seem morally questionable. He had to deceive the 
radical parts of his party about the fact that he offered to negotiate with the Confederate 
States. At the same time he had to deceive the rest of the Republicans that his main priority 
was to end the Civil War, even if that meant leaving slavery intact. He additionally had to 
manipulate the Confederacy into thinking that he was open to peace negotiations. Lincoln 
then also provided “incentives” to some Democrats for their votes. He used secrecy, lies, 
and deception to fool several factions within the government. In doing so, he did not treat 
his fellow politicians as equals and undermined their liberty to make their own informed 
choices. While this therefore violated the core democratic values that govern democratic 
political action, the reason Lincoln used it was to ensure the abolition of slavery. Surely that 
is a more than worthwhile endeavour, and most importantly for the criticism we are 
considering, it promotes core democratic ideals of equality and liberty. In a situation like this 
there is a genuine case to be made for saying that using dirty-handed means such as lies, 
secrecy, and deception have promoted democratic ideals such as equality and liberty more 
                                            
35 I will not discuss the historical accuracy of the film, but use the events as depicted in the film as my case at 
hand. 
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than they have undermined them.36 Engaging in some undemocratic behaviour in such a case 
will be closer to exemplifying a serious concern for democratic ends than rigidly sticking by 
the democratic process.  Doing something undemocratic can in the end be more in the spirit 
of democracy. If we were to go along with an argument about the inherent connection 
between means and ends, democracy after Lincoln’s actions would be tarnished. Clearly, 
however, this is still more democratic than a state in which major parts of the population are 
enslaved. If Shugarman is right that politicians in a democracy ought not to get their hands 
dirty, the onus is on him to show why we should prefer the latter state over a democracy 
brought about through some morally dubious means.37 Sometimes using undemocratic 
means can be the lesser evil when trying to promote democratic ends. This makes the use of 
such means legitimate in these cases because they do not undermine the end; on the contrary, 
they actually promote it. There is therefore no reason to think that politicians cannot have 
genuine democratic dirty hands. 
5.4. Violating Democratic Values can Never be Justified in Practice 
In contrast to Shugarman’s conceptual criticism, Ramsay is less concerned with whether we 
can legitimately use immoral and undemocratic means to pursue moral and democratic ends 
in principle, and more with the empirical claim that we can, in practice, find a justification 
for dirty hands in democracies. Her answer is that dirty-handed means will always undermine 
the ends they are supposed to achieve. Her criticism relies on an understanding of dirty hands 
as originating from a clash between deontological and consequentialist reasoning. She argues 
that while dirty hands are supposedly justified when consequentialist reasons outweigh 
deontological constraints, we cannot in fact make a successful consequentialist case for 
violating fundamental democratic values in any particular case. While she is primarily 
concerned with cases that involve lies and secrecy, she seems to suggest that her comments 
are valid for all forms of dirty hands.38  
                                            
36 There is a slight complication in this example because it is the equality and liberty of the enfranchised that is 
violated in order to promote the equality and liberty of the disenfranchised. In chapter two I argued, following 
Hurka (1996, pp. 563-564), that we should not treat these as two separate values but instead as instantiations 
of the same value (i.e. this person’s and that person’s equality are instantiations of the overall value of equality). 
There is then no problem for my argument that this is a case in which a value has been violated in order for 
that same value to be promoted. 
37 Shugarman has a potential reply to this. He can accept my point and say that, while in some circumstances it 
may be acceptable for a politician to get her hands dirty, this does not mean that she has democratic dirty hands. 
In fact, as soon as a politician dirties her hands this is a sign that we have stepped outside democratic politics. 
I will consider this objection later on. 
38 At one point she explicitly critiques the dirty hands notion that “the proper ends of politics can only be 
achieved by lies, deceit, fraud, force and strength” (2000a, p. 38). She thinks that democratic institutions can 
“undercut and replace arguments for the inevitability and necessity of fraud, force, lies and violence” (2000a, 
p. 41). Her mention of force, strength and violence in this context can give us reason to think that she wants 
her argument to apply to cases of dirty hands including cruelty just as much as those including lying and deceit. 
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When we perform a proper consequentialist calculation, she contends, we will see that there 
are strong consequentialist reasons against anything that undermines the democratic process 
itself. She draws an analogy between dirty hands reasoning and the minimal conditions 
stipulated by just war theory; the justifiability of dirty hands “would depend on the cause or 
end for which [they were] undertaken, on whether there were other means available, whether 
the harm caused […] does not outweigh the good achieved and on whether there is a 
reasonable chance of success in achieving the end through these means” (2000a, p. 29). None 
of these conditions, according to her, can be satisfied by dirty hands in democratic politics. 
With regards to ends, she argues that there is no scholarly consensus on supposed ends such 
as the national and the public interest and that these therefore cannot be invoked to justify 
dirty hands. Politicians also face too many barriers such as “distorted judgements, 
discrimination, ideological bias, error and self-deception” (2000a, p. 35) to make a sound 
means-end judgement about the justifiability of dirty-handed tactics in a democracy. These 
barriers will prevent politicians from considering reasonable alternative options. 
Furthermore, the cost of circumventing the democratic process alone would be enough to 
outweigh the benefits of any dirty-handed lie, because “they contradict the basic principles 
of democratic society based on accountability, participation, consent and representation” 
(2000a, p. 35). Additionally, the repeated use of dirty-handed tactics will erode the integrity 
of public officials and cause cynicism about and distrust of politicians and democratic politics 
in general.  
Ramsay therefore concludes that if the justifiability of dirty hands is the result of 
consequentialist reasons prevailing over deontological constraints, then there will not be any 
justification for dirty hands in democracies at all because the use of dirty-handed means is 
going to undermine democratic values more than they would further them. In the following 
I will show that Ramsay’s argument, as presented currently, is beside the point because of a 
false assumption she makes about the nature of dirty hands. While her underlying worry can 
be re-stated in terms that are in line with a more accurate understanding of dirty hands, I will 
show that this version suffers from internal flaws because of which we ought to reject her 
criticism.   
Firstly, as I discussed at the beginning of chapter two, we need to question the major 
assumption that dirty hands are best described as a clash between deontology and 
consequentialism. As I have argued previously, this is a mischaracterisation of the 
phenomenon that could not make sense, for example, of a choice between equality and 
liberty. Ramsay’s (as well as Shugarman’s) conception of dirty hands as a clash between 
deontology and consequentialism does not explain the nature of the conflict and wrongly 
  
86 
  
constrains what can be called an instance of dirty hands.  Consider another example in which 
a politician is faced with the following problem: her country is home to some important 
ancient places of worship and cultural heritage. Unrelatedly, the politician’s secret service has 
been successful in incarcerating the members of a criminal organisation that has been 
operating in the country for some time now. The politician now receives a message stating 
that, unless she immediately agrees to free the prisoners, the criminal organisation will 
detonate bombs that will destroy these invaluable places of worship and heritage. The 
politician and her staff believe this threat to be credible. She now has to choose between 
preserving an important part of her country’s culture and upholding the rule of law and not 
undermining justice.  
What is at stake here is a trade-off between plural and competing values, not a clash between 
deontology and consequentialism. When there are two moral values or more at stake (e.g. 
cultural heritage and the rule of law) the politician will have to decide which one to prioritise 
under the circumstance. She might invoke moral theories in her deliberation (e.g. what 
obligations do I have to my citizens and my country, what action will result in the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number) but it is not at this stage where the original conflict was 
generated. She might even come to the conclusion that deontological and consequentialist 
reasoning are pointing in the same direction in this case (e.g. her primary obligation is to 
ensure that her nation’s heritage is preserved and that ensuring this will also result in the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people) and yet she will feel conflicted about 
having to violate justice because of it. A deontology/consequentialism definition of dirty 
hands could not make sense of such a case. Insisting that dirty hands are always a result of a 
clash between deontology and consequentialism would therefore unduly limit the concept. 
As argued before, we should instead understand dirty hands as a clash between plural and 
conflicting values.  
Stating that dirty hands in democratic politics cannot be justified because we cannot make a 
consequentialist case is therefore beside the point. We can, however, re-state Ramsay’s 
underlying worry in terms that are in line with a more accurate understanding of dirty hands. 
It might be re-framed in the following way: it is never worthwhile to engage in dirty hands 
because using such means will always be counterproductive and ultimately undermine 
democratic values more than they promote them. 
The overall problem with this argument is that, once we understand dirty hands as a clash 
between plural and conflicting values, we cannot rule out the existence of cases in which 
getting one’s hands dirty might promote democratic values more than it would undermine 
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them in practice. Imagine you are in charge of overseeing ballot boxes in the 1932 German 
elections when you are being approached by an organisation who proposes to stuff said ballot 
boxes in order to prevent the NSDAP from rising to power. Tampering with ballot boxes is 
without a doubt a clear violation of one of the most fundamental democratic processes and 
if this action were to become publicly known, it could seriously erode the public’s trust in 
the democratic system overall. At the same time, however, this would have been the only 
way to prevent the NSDAP from becoming the strongest power in Parliament which in the 
end led to dictatorship and the atrocities of WWII. We are then left with a situation in which 
the only way to prevent your democracy from turning into a dictatorship is to betray the 
democratic election process. Clearly, the harm done to the democratic process would be 
outweighed by the benefits derived from using dirty-handed means in this situation. The 
attack on democratic values can then sometimes be justified as the lesser evil because it 
promotes democratic values more in the long run. There is therefore no reason to think that 
politicians could not have genuine democratic dirty hands. 
5.5. Dirty Hands are a Sign that Politics is No Longer Democratic 
Even if Shugarman and Ramsay were to accept my above criticisms, they have a further 
worry about the idea of democratic dirty hands. The critics might argue in response to my 
earlier examples of Lincoln and the abolition of slavery or the hypothetical stuffed ballot 
boxes in the Weimar Republic that while dirty-handed means may have been justified or 
legitimate in these circumstances in pursuing democratic ends, they are nonetheless a sign 
that politics at that point was no longer democratic (or maybe was not democratic in the first 
place). If politicians are required to circumvent democratic values and processes in order to 
further democratic ideals, this is a sign that the current state of affairs cannot be democratic. 
The idea is that where dirty hands begin, democracy ends and therefore politicians cannot 
have genuine democratic dirty hands. 
Shugarman makes this explicit when he states that “dirty hands is an extreme exception to 
democratic politics rather than a staple of it and resort to such tactics is the result of a failure 
of politics and a turn to war” (2000, p. 236). For him, the claim “that dirty hands and politics 
are inextricably linked such that […] you can’t have one without the other” (2000, p. 230) is 
misguided. He wants to deny that dirty hands can tell us something about the nature of 
democratic politics. Shugarman compares holding such a view of dirty hands to the notions 
that hard cases make bad law and not taking the exception to be the rule. While he 
acknowledges the existence of dirty hands, he argues that we should not make them an 
integral part of democratic politics. For him this cannot be the case because they undermine 
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values such as “integrity, trust, accountability, and publicity and as such the democracy/dirty 
hands connection is only sustainable given a highly truncated, narrow, elitist version of 
democracy” (2000, p. 244). Instead, when politicians have to dirty their hands, this is a sign 
that politics is no longer democratic.  
Ramsay makes the similar point that dirty-handed means are a sign of non-democratic 
governance. She claims that “justifications for lies and violence as rational and realistic 
responses to political problems are less compelling, however, when applied to political 
contexts which do not conform to the realist model. Notions of practical necessity and raison 
d’etat are inappropriately applied in the context of relations between and within liberal 
democratic states” (2000a, p. 40). She argues, pace Walzer, that dirty hands situations in 
which “politicians must choose a lesser evil in order to avoid political catastrophe are not a 
standard ingredient of political life” (2000a, p. 38). The only circumstances under which dirty 
hands might be justifiable are in a Machiavellian international order, or when individuals 
within a state are powerless and do not have legitimate democratic channels of dissent 
available to them, and become one of Camus’s revolutionaries or freedom fighters. In the 
context of modern democratic regimes, however, the concept is simply not applicable 
because in such a realm “mutual recognition, legitimation, and common standards should 
dictate norms of inter-state behaviours and give rise to generalised principles of conduct” 
such as “interdependence, cooperation, collaboration, reciprocity, and conciliation” 
(Ramsay, 2000a, p. 40).  She supports this point by arguing that the problem with dirty-
handed means (in particular those involving secrecy and lies) is that they undermine the 
ability of the public to consent. After all, “the very distinction between a democratic and a 
non-democratic government is that in the former politicians rule by the consent of the 
people” (2000a, p. 36). Again, this suggests that when politicians have to get their hands dirty, 
this would be a sign of politics no longer being fully democratic. Where dirty hands begin, 
democracy ends. 
The problem with these arguments is that they assume that democracy, based on agreement 
and consensus, could avoid the kinds of conflict that result in dirty hands problems. Even 
an ideal democracy, however, could not hope to do so. They overestimate the ability of 
cooperation and consensus to keep democratic politics clean, while at the same time 
underestimating the pervasiveness of conflict.  
I want to argue that having a picture of democratic politics that is simply cleaned up through 
consensus and agreement is misguided. One way of showing this can be found in Bellamy’s 
rejection of the liberal idealist (with this he basically refers to Rawls and post-Rawlsians) idea 
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that we can somehow eliminate the need for dirty hands by having a clean politics. He argues 
that “liberal idealists have seen the entrenchment of rights in written constitutions and 
judicial review by constitutional courts as suitable mechanisms for keeping politics clean. 
Rights enshrine liberal political principles, while courts offer a suitably depoliticized 
mechanism for upholding them in an impartial way” (2010, p. 420). While there may be 
reasonable disagreement about what is in the public good in a given situation, they assume 
that there can be agreement about what is right. Bellamy, however, suggests that this will not 
do. He provides the example of free marketeers and social democrats arguing with one 
another about state involvement in economic matters. It is not just that they disagree about 
what constitutes economic growth and the economic good, but also that it involves a deeper 
running disagreement about what is right and how we ought to treat people. The problem 
with the liberal idealist picture is that “a given conception of political justice does not frame 
but is at issue in the political debate” (2010, p. 421). This means that reasonable disagreement 
is not simply at the periphery of politics but that conflict is an integral part even of ideal 
democracies. Bellamy argues that politics cannot do away with the occasional need for what 
he calls “massaging” (2010, p. 422) the truth. Politicians have to try and keep faith with a 
variety of different actors in order to engage in successful political action, and this will 
sometimes present them with moral conflict. Bellamy argues that a certain degree of “smoke 
and mirrors is often necessary even when presenting politics that a majority support because 
[the different parties] value them not for the same reasons but for a variety of different and 
possibly inconsistent reasons” (2010, p. 423). There arises a “need for democratic politicians 
to make deals and compromises either to accommodate diverse groups and interests and 
build coalitions between them, or to square the different and often conflicting moral 
concerns and considerations present within hard cases and difficult decisions” (2010, p. 412). 
If we acknowledge the complexity and conflictual nature of democratic politics, then we can 
see that dirty hands situations may frequently arise even in an ideal democracy. Additionally, 
being in a democratic country does not protect us from the immoral actions of others which 
might require politicians to act in a manner that conventional democratic processes cannot 
accommodate. Even in an ideal democracy a criminal or rogue foreign state could put a 
politician into a situation in which dirtying her hands may become necessary.  
De Wijze also makes this point, drawing on Stuart Hampshire’s claim that “a person of 
experience comes to expect that her usual choice will be the lesser of two or more evils” 
(Hampshire, 1991, p. 170). Hampshire thinks that not only is conflict a standard ingredient 
of both personal and political life, but also that it is not a sign of vice or defect. We simply 
ought to accept that “as individuals, our lives will turn out in retrospect to be a rough and 
  
90 
  
running compromise between contrary ambitions, and the institutions that survive in the 
state have usually been cobbled together in the settlement of some long past conflicts, 
probably now forgotten” (2000, p. 33); in the end “conflict is perpetual” (2000, p. 48). 
Following from these insights, for de Wijze, politics is a tragic realm in which sometimes we 
will be unable to avoid engaging in what we think are immoral actions. According to him, 
the critics misrepresent democratic politics by claiming that its nature could somehow 
eliminate the need to engage in such behaviour. As he puts it, “to argue […] that when facing 
such situations democratic politicians always have a higher and prior moral duty to not bypass 
or corrupt the democratic process of deliberation and disclosure, seriously and dangerously 
misunderstands the nature of politics and the challenges that might unavoidably arise” (2018, 
p. 137). Such a cleaned-up view of politics paints a picture of democracy in which adhering 
to democratic processes could never come at the cost of undermining important democratic 
values. This is a questionable empirical claim. Sometimes, as we have seen, adhering to these 
processes will actually represent a greater evil. In such situations, politicians may have 
democratic reasons to behave in undemocratic ways. Denying this possibility is dangerous 
because it could undermine the pursuit of fundamental democratic values. Politicians, both 
in ideal and non-ideal democracies, may have genuine democratic dirty hands. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have defended the possibility of democratic dirty hands. I began by showing, 
pace Shugarman, that using dirty-handed means to pursue democratic ends does not have to 
be contradictory in principle. Using dirty-handed means can be in the spirit of the democratic 
ends that a politician wants to pursue. In such situations the best way, or even the only way, 
to do justice to democratic ends can be through dirty-handed means. This does not have to 
corrupt the end in such a way as to remove the grounds for legitimacy from the means. I 
then showed, pace Ramsay, that there is no reason to think that dirty hands cannot be 
justified in democracies in practice. I firstly argued that her argument as initially presented is 
beside the point because her understanding of dirty hands falsely assumes that the conflict 
arises as a result of a clash of consequentialism and deontology. I argued that dirty hands are, 
instead, best understood as a clash of plural values in which the politician has to choose the 
lesser evil. After re-stating her worry I then showed that even this version is open to criticism 
because sometimes dirty-handed means can promote democratic values more than they 
undermine them. Lastly, I showed why dirty hands are not a sign that politics more generally 
is no longer democratic. Even ideal democracies may not be able to eliminate the need for 
politicians to dirty their hands. There is therefore no reason to think that dirty-handed means 
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are incompatible with pursuing democratic ends or that dirty hands should be a sign of 
politics no longer being democratic. Politicians may have genuine democratic dirty hands. 
Sometimes, even in democratic politics, politicians will have to get their hands dirty. It is 
therefore important to understand what this entails for the political actors involved in such 
dirty-handed decision making. The following chapter will question how the dirt and moral 
responsibility is shared amongst different political actors who work together as part of the 
democratic decision-making process. 
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6. Who is Responsible: Political Actors 
6.1. Introduction 
So far I have established that it is permissible, and sometimes inevitable, that politicians will 
dirty their hands in democratic politics. As dirty hands are part and parcel of democratic 
politics, we are faced with the problem of how to react to those involved. On the one hand, 
people are left significantly worse off, harmed, or killed. On the other hand, these harms 
were only committed in order to prevent an even greater evil from occurring. So what are 
we to do with those with dirty hands? Are they blameworthy or praiseworthy? Should they 
be punished or rewarded? Indeed who exactly are “they” and on what grounds are they 
legitimate targets for ascriptions of responsibility in the first place? Once we are clearer on 
the answer to this latter question, we can move on to discuss questions of blame and 
punishment or praise and reward. What I therefore propose to do in the rest of this thesis is 
to provide the conceptual tools to analyse who has dirty hands in democracies and is 
therefore responsible for the outcomes of such decisions and actions. 
There have been some attempts at understanding the responsibility of those involved in 
dirty-handed decisions in politics (Hollis, 1982; Archard, 2013; de Wijze, 2018) but none of 
them have presented a theory that will enable us to systematically track the responsibility of 
political leaders and public officials in dirty hands scenarios. Instead, they have mostly taken 
for granted that political leaders are responsible and have primarily engaged with the issue of 
whether citizens can be morally responsible for the dirty hands of their leaders. While this is 
an important question which I will take up in the next chapter, I first want to concentrate on 
the responsibility of different political actors.  
Understanding the complex roles that different officials play in the decision-making process 
and their resulting implication in a dirty-handed outcome will be important for two reasons. 
The first is that it will dismiss the myth of the single-handed dirty actor. As briefly mentioned 
in the introduction of this thesis, the famous dirty hands examples such as Walzer’s ticking 
bomb scenario and the way in which the dirty hands literature has been developed more 
broadly could easily lead one to suppose that dirty hands reasoning relies on a notion of 
leadership that does not reflect political reality and that such reasoning is therefore beside 
the point. Sutherland, for example, claims that “the dirty hands dilemma is a circumstance in 
which a political actor must strive heroically and autonomously to achieve the least-evil 
outcome” (1995, p. 482). Similarly, Shugarman takes dirty hands to see “politics as very much 
a realm for the crafty, well-intentioned, ruthless warrior” (2000, p. 231). They repeatedly 
  
93 
  
allude to the idea of the lone decision-maker or tragic hero that has to make choices of lesser 
evil without the consultation or even knowledge of others. The idea here seems to be that if 
dirty hands reasoning requires us to focus on a single actor, then this concept will help us 
very little in an analysis of democratic political action in which a variety of political actors 
must work together. When we consider Walzer’s account of dirty hands, one can see that 
this criticism seems to have some initial plausibility. Not only is it relevant to this initial 
description of dirty hands, but also to the way in which it is still being used in the more recent 
literature. Consider here Richard Bellamy’s paper on dirty hands in politics where he 
repeatedly talks about the actions of a “democratic prince” (2010, pp. 424, 427). By 
unpacking the complex web of relations in which political leaders act with others to make 
decisions, and by understanding how this can affect the moral responsibility of the different 
actors involved, I will be able to address this misconception about dirty hands reasoning. 
Some of the actors that could, for example, contribute in one way or another to a given 
political decision are government ministers, members of parliament, special advisors, or civil 
servants.  The problem of dirty hands does not presuppose a sole leader who acts heroically 
and in isolation from others; instead it is entirely compatible with complex democratic 
decision-making.  
The second aim of this chapter is to combat a position that could potentially flow from the 
above misconception of dirty hands reasoning. When we focus solely on the political leader 
who makes decisions by herself one might follow from this that she alone takes all of the 
dirt and responsibility as well. Everyone else’s hands would then stay clean. On the one hand 
this position is flawed because moral responsibility simply does not work like that. Neither 
politicians nor the democratic system have the power to take away the moral responsibility 
for dirty-handed acts from those who are involved in the political decision-making process. 
I will show why this is the case in more detail later in this section. On the other hand, such 
a position could also potentially be dangerous. It would enable public officials and citizens 
to disassociate themselves from the acts they were in some way or another involved in by 
providing them with something akin to a moral get-out-of-jail-free card. The political leader 
would turn into a scapegoat, which allows others to go on with their lives without having to 
reflect critically on their own involvement in the moral wrongs committed. This would make 
other officials and citizens more likely to support wrongdoing by their leaders if doing so 
could in some way be of benefit to themselves. By showing how different political actors can 
be implicated and partly morally responsible for dirty-handed outcomes I hope to show that 
political leadership cannot get other actors off the moral hook. I will turn to the question of 
citizen responsibility in the next chapter. 
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I will begin by giving a brief overview of the debates surrounding individual moral 
responsibility for outcomes. Given the subject of this thesis I will not be able to provide a 
thorough analysis of the nuanced debates in the responsibility literature. My discussion will, 
however, be sufficient to draw out some of the key principles that are necessary for ascribing 
moral responsibility for an outcome to an individual. I will then discuss the grounds we might 
have to hold political leaders and public officials responsible given the circumstances of their 
roles in democratic politics. In a final step I want to relate this back to the issue of dirty hands 
by applying the theoretical background I have laid out to a real-life dirty hands situation.  The 
approach taken in this analysis could then be extended to apply to other dirty hands cases 
involving a multitude of actors as well. 
6.2. Moral Responsibility 
In the following I want to give a brief taxonomy of the concept of moral responsibility.39 
Firstly, we need to distinguish between responsibility for actions and for outcomes. In the 
former, we can hold someone responsible for what they do or say or what they fail to do or 
say. Agents can be morally responsible for their actions and omissions. In the latter case, we 
can hold someone responsible for the results of their actions and omissions. Agents can be, 
all other things being equal, morally responsible for the states of affairs that obtain in the 
world as a consequence of what they did or failed to do. In this thesis I will be primarily 
concerned with this latter concept. Agents can be morally responsible for an outcome to a 
smaller or larger extent. Additionally, responsibility for a given outcome is not a zero-sum 
game. The fact that one agent has more responsibility does not mean that the next one has 
to have proportionately less responsibility. 
Secondly, there appear to be what Gary Watson (1996) has called “two faces of 
responsibility”. To be responsible, on Watson’s view, means to be a legitimate target for the 
reactive attitudes of others such as blame or praise. On the one hand there is responsibility 
as attributability and on the other there is responsibility as accountability. We can say that an 
agent is attributability responsible if the agent can identify with her action and its outcome. 
Judging someone to be responsible in this sense does not have to be moral in nature. It can 
come from what Watson describes as the “aretaic perspective” (1996, p. 231). Imagine, for 
example, that I am not a morning person and really struggle to get up in the morning. Further 
imagine that my passion is baking and that I have often considered becoming a baker, 
thinking that I could earnestly excel in this line of work. Unfortunately, I know that being a 
                                            
39 My discussion of moral responsibility in this and the next chapter was greatly helped by reading Morten Hojer 
Jensen (2017). 
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baker involves going to work at 5am in the morning, which is at odds with the fact that I am 
not a morning person and physically struggle to be awake, alert and productive at such a 
time. Ultimately I decide not to pursue my career dream and instead take an office job which 
is neither particularly suited to my talents nor excites me.  To say that I am responsible in the 
attributability sense for having chosen the office job over a career as a baker is to say that I 
am the author of that action and outcome. Not only am I causally responsible, but in an 
important sense I can identify with the action and the outcome because they are an accurate 
reflection of my reasoning and decision-making. Angela M. Smith, in her discussion of 
Watson’s account provides us with the following analysis of his notions of attributability and 
accountability:  
Just as we can evaluate writers on the basis of the quality of the stories they 
author, we can evaluate rational agents on the basis of the quality of the 
lives they author. But evaluating someone as a bad life author, he suggests, 
is different from holding her ‘accountable’ for the life story she tells. If we 
hold her ‘accountable’ for her life story, we are saying that she is a legitimate 
target of certain forms of ‘adverse reaction’ (such as blaming attitudes and 
behaviors) on the basis of the story she tells. And in order for someone to 
be the legitimate target of adverse reactions, he claims, it is not sufficient 
that her attitudes and actions reflect her practical judgment (that she be ‘the 
author’ of her conduct); she must also have had a fair opportunity to avoid 
being subject to those adverse reactions. (2008, pp. 376-377) 
Given that I turned out to be a person who physically struggles with early mornings, for one 
reason or another, does not in and of itself give us reason to blame me for not pursuing my 
dreams and passions. It says something about the kind of person that I am, but it is not 
sufficient to say that I am blameworthy for it because, for example, my inability to function 
in the morning may not be something that I have control over. Watson argues that, even 
though attributability cannot ground our negative reactive attitudes, it is a proper form of 
responsibility because “in virtue of the capacities in question, the individual is an agent in the 
strong sense, an author of her conduct, and is in an important sense answerable for what she 
does” (1996, p. 229).40 When I, in the following, refer to individual moral responsibility for 
an outcome, I have in mind this second face of responsibility. An agent is morally responsible 
if the reactive attitudes of blame or praise would be an appropriate response to their actions. 
In the following I want to give a brief outline of the conditions that need to obtain in order 
for ascriptions of blame and praise to be appropriate.  
                                            
40 There is a wealth of literature interpreting this distinction between attributability and accountability. For the 
purposes of my argument I do not have to engage with this in any further detail. For an argument pointing out 
the problems with Watson’s distinction see Angela M. Smith (2008, pp. 375-380). 
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There mostly is agreement about the basic outline of the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for individual moral responsibility. An agent is responsible if she a) had the right cognitive 
capacities, b) fulfilled certain epistemic criteria41, c) acted voluntarily, and d) played a causal 
role in the outcome. The disagreement lies largely in how these different conditions are 
spelled out and weighted. I will briefly take each of them in turn and then discuss what might 
be additionally required to hold someone who is responsible for an outcome also liable to 
make up for it.42 While these conditions may seem common-sense, they will be relevant for 
the later discussion of this chapter and particularly crucial for the more messy case of citizen 
responsibility in the next chapter. As such it will be important to spend some time laying out 
the basics of these four conditions. 
6.2.1. Cognitive Condition 
The first condition an agent has to fulfil regards her cognitive abilities and state at the time 
of her action that led to the outcome in question. We only want to hold an agent morally 
responsible if she had the ability to understand her action, the context in which it was 
performed, and its likely consequences. She must have had the ability to deliberate and reason 
on these issues. Should she have been unable to do so, we generally do not think that she 
can be responsible for what she does.  This is, for example, why we do not hold young 
children or adults with severe mental disabilities morally responsible for the outcomes of 
many of their actions. Often they simply will not have had the right cognitive capabilities to 
understand fully their action and the potential outcomes. The cognitive condition therefore 
requires a general ability to deliberate on and weigh up reasons for action in particular 
contexts in order for us to hold someone morally responsible for the outcomes of their 
actions. 
6.2.2. Epistemic Condition 
In addition to having the right cognitive capacities, the agent also must have had the ability, 
in principle, to know that her actions would lead to certain outcomes to be morally 
responsible for them. If, for example, I leave my house and by shutting the door set into 
motion some butterfly effect scenario in which a chain of unlikely events cause harm to 
someone in a way that was completely unforeseeable, I should not be held morally 
responsible for that harm. That the agent did not know that her action would lead to a certain 
                                            
41 These first two conditions are what Aristotle designated as “voluntariness” (1999, pp. 37-40) and H.L.A. 
Hart has called them “capacity responsibility” (2008, p. 218) 
42 Note that most of the literature is interested in responsibility for negative outcomes and liability to sanctions, 
but these points are meant to similarly apply to cases of responsibility for positive outcomes and distributing 
rewards. 
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outcome does not, however, always shield her from moral responsibility. She may have been 
ignorant, but if her ignorance was culpable then she is still morally responsible because she 
ought to have known better. If, for instance, I dispose of chemicals clearly marked as an 
environmental hazard in the local river and thereby poison and kill the fish in it, it will not 
do for me to say that I simply did not know that my actions would have such a result. Even 
if I genuinely did not know because I did not make the effort to check the label, this is not 
enough to shield me from moral responsibility for the environmental damage. The 
information was readily available and I could have known with little effort on my part. Holly 
Smith argues that there are three ways in which our ignorance can be culpable. Firstly, we 
may have deficiently investigated the information potentially available to us; “S would have 
believed B to be wrong if S had investigated the situation as thoroughly as he ought to have 
done” (1983, p. 544). This was the way in which the agent in the environmental pollution 
case was culpable for their own ignorance. Secondly, ignorance is culpable when the agent 
prevented herself at an earlier point from subsequently discovering the relevant information; 
“S would have believed B to be wrong if he had not at an earlier time induced (or failed to 
remove) a condition which made it impossible at the time of B for him to acquire true belief 
as to B’s nature” (1983, p. 544). A frequently discussed example of this are leaders who create 
structures that prevent bad information from the bottom of the organisation reaching them. 
Finally, an agent’s ignorance can be culpable when she does not make a correct inference 
from the beliefs she currently holds; “S would have believed B to be wrong if he had made 
the inference warranted by his background beliefs” (1983, p. 545).  My neighbour has tasked 
me with looking after their cat that needs to be given their medicine every evening at 6pm. 
This evening I decide to go for drinks after work and the cat dies without the medicine. I 
failed to make the correct inference about what action was required from me based on the 
information that I had, so my forgetting to give the medicine to the cat was an instance of 
culpable ignorance. In general, Smith argues that instances of culpable ignorance consists of 
an original “benighting act” which leads the agent to commit a subsequent wrongful act, 
where this subsequent act “falls within the known risk of the benighting act” (1983, p. 551). 
I am morally responsible if I should have been aware of the risk that my earlier act could lead 
me to commit unwittingly a wrongful act later down the line. 
6.2.3. Voluntariness Condition 
It is generally argued that the third condition an agent has to fulfil in order to be morally 
responsible for an outcome is that she must have performed the action voluntarily.43 The 
                                            
43 This condition has been questioned by non-voluntarists. In particular they are concerned with showing that 
we can be responsible for our characters, even if we were not in control over and had not voluntarily chosen 
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idea is that if an agent acts because of force, duress or compulsion then her act can no longer 
be regarded as voluntary. If, for example, I am a bank employee and a robber puts a gun to 
my head and demands that I open and empty the cash register, then we do not want to hold 
me morally responsible for having been complicit in the robbery because I did not act 
voluntarily but under duress. Similarly, if someone has hypnotised or brainwashed me so that 
I am no longer in control of my own actions and then instructs me to rob a bank, then we 
do not want to hold me morally responsible for having been complicit in the robbery because 
I did not act voluntarily but under compulsion. Serena Olsaretti argues that an action is not 
voluntary if “A does x because A has no acceptable alternative to doing x” (1998, p. 54). In 
the first example, the bank employee is forced to hand over the cash to the robber and only 
does so because she has no acceptable alternative – assuming that she sees agitating someone 
who is threatening to kill her as an unacceptable alternative – and thus the employee’s action 
cannot be called voluntary.44 Olsaretti emphasises that this is not to argue that someone acts 
involuntarily whenever the alternative option is worse than the one chosen. Only if the other 
option is unacceptable can the action be involuntary. In a different paper she argues that “the 
standard of acceptability by which options are assessed is an objective one that views basic 
needs satisfactions as central, so that choices made so as to avoid having one’s basic needs 
go unmet are non-voluntary ones” (2004, p. 140).  
While this notion of voluntariness appears to be quite plausible at first, it cannot make sense 
of some instances in which we want to argue that someone acted voluntarily even though 
they did not have an acceptable alternative available to them. Alan Wertheimer, in his critique 
of accounts like Olsaretti’s, asks us to consider a medical patient with a potentially fatal 
disease. Their only available options are to consent to a very invasive but potentially life-
saving procedure, or to accept death. Death would clearly count as an unacceptable 
alternative, and yet it seems that we would want to say that the patient voluntarily gave their 
consent to the medical intervention (2012, pp. 235-236). If we accepted Olsaretti’s account 
the patient would not be acting voluntarily and, crucially in the medical case, this would 
undermine their ability to give valid consent. This would leave us with the option to say that 
either we should not provide the life-saving treatment in this case, or that it is acceptable to 
provide a very invasive procedure without the patient’s consent. The implications of either 
of these options are unattractive. Either we end up withholding life-saving surgery, or we 
                                            
them. See, for example, Smith (2008). This question is not directly relevant for the kind of situations that I am 
looking at, so I will leave this debate aside for the purposes of this thesis. 
44 Imagine a case in which the employee still has a gun to her head but she does not hand over the money 
because of said gun (e.g. she may falsely believe that the gun is fake), but because she really hates working at 
the bank. While she did not have an acceptable alternative to handing over the money, this was not the 
motivation behind her handing over the money, so her action is voluntary. 
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undermine patient autonomy by overriding the fundamental importance of consent. 
Wertheimer argues that where Olsaretti’s account has gone wrong is by attempting to find 
an empirical and value-neutral account of voluntariness. Such an account argues that we can 
determine the voluntariness of an action “by examining the agent’s options, beliefs, and 
capacities at the time of consenting” (2012, p. 229). In Olsaretti’s case, her exclusive focus 
on the alternatives available to the agent at the time of the action ends up giving us counter-
intuitive results in the life-saving treatment example. Wertheimer opposes her approach with 
a moralized account which holds that in order to determine the voluntariness of an action 
we have to include certain moral judgements about the situation in which the agent is acting. 
In order to reach a decision, we therefore have to ask whether we have good moral reasons 
in a given situation to call an act voluntary or not. With regard to his example of the patient 
deciding between accepting death and consenting to very invasive surgery he provides us 
with both a deontological and a consequentialist reason for calling the choice voluntary. 
Wertheimer argues that calling the choice voluntary is the only way in which we can ensure 
the patient’s autonomy (i.e. the deontological reason) and ensure that she can engage in 
actions that improve her well-being (i.e. the consequentialist reason) (2012, pp. 242-243). We 
want people to have the ability to give valid consent to treatment in life-or-death decisions 
because we think that doing so is an important part of having control over one’s life. For 
people to have this power and to give valid consent, though, their decision will have to be 
voluntary. Therefore we have good moral reasons to call the patient’s decision to consent to 
the very invasive but potentially life-saving surgery voluntary.  
The kind of moral reasons that will speak in favour of an action being voluntary or 
involuntary will vary according to the kind of choice at stake. Take for example a public 
figure who is being extorted; unless they transfer thousands of pounds into the villain’s bank 
account the villain will release private information about the public figure’s marital problems 
to the press. We would not want to call transferring the money voluntary because we have 
good moral reasons for not doing so. If the transfer of the money was voluntary, then the 
public figure would have no legal claim for compensation. On the one hand this would 
undermine our understanding of property rights and on the other hand this would incentivise 
the practice of blackmailing which is something that we would want to avoid. We therefore 
have good moral reasons to call the public figure’s decision involuntary. 
Finally, let us consider the example of a politician who deliberates whether or not to order 
the torture of a suspect in custody. I think that we have good moral reasons to call the 
politician’s decisions voluntary, because we need politicians to have the ability to make 
binding decisions. Imagine that, in this instance, torturing the suspect would be the lesser of 
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two evils, as such we want someone to have the ability to give the binding order to do so. 
The politician ought to have the final say and be able to make a decision that is then followed 
by those lower down in the chain of command. If this authority were not to exist and no 
binding order to torture (i.e. the lesser evil) could be given, then the suspect would in all 
likelihood not give up the locations of the bombs and many innocent citizens who the 
politician had a responsibility to protect would die (i.e. the greater evil). If the politician’s 
decision in this scenario was involuntary because, for example, we think their decision was a 
result of coercion by the terrorist, it is not obvious that this decision would be binding and 
that those lower down in the chain of command would have to follow it. We therefore have 
good reasons to call the actions of those in political power in dirty hands cases, such as the 
ticking bomb scenario, voluntary, because it is morally important that such agents can make 
binding decisions and exercise their responsibility toward their citizens.45 
6.2.4. Causal Condition 
The final condition an agent has to fulfil in order to be responsible for an outcome is that 
they must have in some relevant sense been a cause or the cause of that outcome. In order 
for this to be the case, the causal chain needs to run from the agent to the action to the 
outcome. An agent is responsible for an outcome only if the agent’s actions or omissions46 
in some way47 caused the outcome. For example, imagine an agent who, voluntarily and in 
full knowledge of the potential risks, decided to drink and drive. As a result of their 
intoxication they lose control of the car and hit a pedestrian and kill them. The driver’s 
actions were a direct cause of the outcome (i.e. the death of the pedestrian) and as such we 
can hold the driver morally responsible for that outcome.  
We have to refine this view, though. Take Feinberg’s example of a drunk driver who, simply 
in virtue of driving past, spooks a horse and causes the rider to get injured. Now the horse 
                                            
45 The intuition that dirty-handed choices are voluntary appears to be shared, albeit for different reasons, by de 
Wijze who argues that a dirty-handed agent’s “decision was not involuntary or the result of an accident (unless 
we implausibly think of such scenarios in politics as accidents); it was made after careful practical deliberation 
knowing full well the values she will violate and the consequences of both doing and not doing so” (2004, p. 
464). 
46 It has been argued by, for example, Helen Beebee (2004) that omissions cannot be causes. For a discussion 
of the consequences of such a view on causal responsibility see, for example, Carolina Sartorio (2007). For the 
purposes of this thesis I will simply assume that omissions can be causes. 
47 For the purposes of this chapter it will not be necessary to go into more detail about the different ways in 
which our actions can be causally related to an outcome in such a way that we are responsible for it, because 
the political actors I consider will all stand relatively close in the causal chain of events to the action and outcome 
in question. I will go into a lot more detail on this in chapter seven when considering the more complicated 
case of tracing a causal chain from the actions of citizens to the political outcomes caused by the actions of 
their representatives. There I will argue that an agent can cause an outcome by either making a difference, 
individually or as part of a set, to that outcome, or by contributing to the wider background processes that 
could potentially affect the action leading to that outcome. 
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would have been spooked by any car driving past and nothing about the driver’s drunkenness 
contributed anything to this outcome (1970, p. 195). Feinberg therefore thinks that we have 
to add what he calls the “causal-relevance condition” to our analysis of the relationship 
between causation and moral responsibility. This condition says that “the harm-threatening 
‘faulty aspect’ of an act is a cause of a subsequent harm when the risk or certainty of harm 
in virtue of which the act was at fault was a risk or certainty of ‘just the same sort of harm 
that was in fact caused’ and not harm of some other sort” (1970, p. 199). This condition is 
to ensure that we hold the drunk driver only morally responsible for the horse bolting and 
the rider’s injury if it was the drunkenness (the “faulty aspect”) that caused the horse to bolt 
and the rider to get injured. Seeing as the horse would have reacted like this no matter the 
state of the driver, we do not want to hold the driver morally responsible for the rider’s 
injury. We might still blame them for having been drink driving, but this is a separate issue 
from the incident with the horse. 
6.2.5. Liability 
The four conditions above jointly establish that an agent is morally responsible for an 
outcome and is thus an appropriate object of our reactive attitudes. They are essentially 
backward-looking conditions that ask who has committed a certain act or brought a certain 
outcome about. Liability to make up for the negative outcome, however, is not concerned 
with such backward-looking conditions but primarily with the forward-looking notion of 
who should rectify the consequences of an outcome. A finding that someone is morally 
responsible for a certain outcome is not in and of itself sufficient to show that this agent is 
also liable to make reparations for the damage done. While I cannot hope to give a full 
analysis of this complicated relation, I want to highlight some of the cases in which being 
responsible and being liable can come apart. 
First let us deal with reasons why we might not want to hold someone liable who is morally 
responsible for an outcome. Consider the case of Germany after WWII. The atrocities of the 
Third Reich were countless, and the number of public officials and citizens who were either 
directly responsible for or complicit in them was equally large. While it might be relatively 
straightforward to show that, for example, a large number of low-ranking bureaucrats share 
in the moral responsibilities for the grave human rights violations, it is another question 
whether it would make sense to try to hold all of them liable. The idea is that doing so might 
simply not be feasible and would distract attention from those higher-ranking officials who 
are more deserving of blame and condemnation. Feinberg has argued that “when more than 
one person satisfies the […] conditions [for moral responsibility] the judgement-maker may 
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sometimes choose between them on pragmatic grounds” because “when fixings of blame 
become too diffuse, they can no longer perform this function” so that “they might be true, 
but just not very useful” (1970, p. 211). Who we hold liable for an outcome is always going 
to be constrained by considerations of feasibility. It is worthwhile noting that Feinberg 
mentions a “judgement-maker” and this leads me to another case in which we may not want 
to hold someone liable even though they are morally responsible. Not just anyone can impose 
sanctions on another moral agent for an outcome, even if the latter was morally responsible. 
This may be because some agents would not be impartial enough or have sufficient expertise 
or experience to make a fair judgement about the sanctions appropriate in the particular case. 
Additionally, we might also think that agents who were involved in the moral wrongdoing 
cannot then claim the authority to hold the offending party liable; this would simply be 
hypocritical. This is going to become a particularly interesting issue when we consider 
whether to hold politicians with dirty hands accountable. If we think that some of the dirt 
from our political leaders and governments falls back on citizens, it may be difficult to see 
who would have the legitimate authority to demand that sanctions be imposed, or who could 
ultimately hold them to account. While my thesis concentrates on moral responsibility rather 
than liability, I will briefly hint at some of the discussions around this in the conclusion. 
There may not only be reasons to not hold someone liable who is morally responsible, but 
also to hold someone liable who is not morally responsible. Feinberg notes that “to impose 
liability on a person to enforced compensation or other harsh treatment for some harm does 
not always require that the harm be his fault” (1970, p. 210). The most well-known case of 
this is that of strict liability in criminal law. In cases of strict liability an agent is being held 
accountable without the burden of proving that they were at fault. Strict liability laws are 
most commonly used to improve health and safety conditions for parts of the public. 
Imagine, for example, a patient who forges a doctor’s prescription and with it illegally obtains 
drugs. The pharmacist could, in principle, be held accountable for having sold drugs to 
someone without a prescription, even though he had no knowledge and could not have 
reasonably been expected to know that the prescription was not genuine. The idea behind 
such an instance of strict liability might be that the wrongful sale of drugs is such a grievous 
problem that the public ought to be protected from it at all costs, even if that is to include a 
heavy deterrent that will sometimes lead to an unfair burden on a single individual.48 
Arguably, the common good may sometimes provide us with reasons to hold someone liable 
                                            
48 This is a rather contentious issue. While strict liability was enforced in the UK in exactly such a case, other 
countries such as, for example, Germany do not allow strict liability in criminal law. 
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for an outcome even if they were not morally responsible for it and even if that places an 
unfair burden on that agent. 
While it is important to have these potential exceptions in mind, this should not prevent us 
from acknowledging that in the majority of cases, if an agent is morally responsible for an 
outcome, she should also be liable for it and conversely, if she was not morally responsible, 
she should also not be liable. My approach in the case of dirty hands will therefore be, in the 
first instance, to establish who could be said to be morally responsible for the outcomes of 
the dirty decision. In this thesis I will not to take up the further question of liability in much 
detail but will only hint at some of the discussions on liability in the conclusion. In dirty 
hands situations one or more people will be left off worse, harmed, or even killed. In a first 
step it will therefore be important to understand who is responsible for it. This information 
can then be used to make further inquiries into the issue of whether anyone should be held 
liable for dirty-handed outcomes, and if so who. I will start by considering the grounds of 
responsibility of political leaders. I will then consider the responsibility of public officials, 
those that advise political leaders as well as those that actually execute their orders. After 
discussing some of the theoretical background of their roles and how this is said to affect 
their moral responsibility for a dirty-handed outcome, I will apply this to a real-life case of 
dirty hands – the Claudy Bombing in Northern Ireland. In the next chapter I will take up the 
question of the responsibility of the public.  
6.3. The Responsibility of Political Leaders 
As Walzer puts it in his discussion on the responsibility for just and unjust wars: “acts of 
states are also acts of particular persons” (2006, p. 291) and that makes these persons 
legitimate targets for ascriptions of responsibility. It seems natural, therefore, to start by 
considering political leaders such as heads of state and their responsibility for dirty-handed 
actions. For Walzer “their accountability is clear […] for they are the source rather than the 
recipients of superior orders”  (2006, p. 291). With authority and the ability to have the 
ultimate decision-making power also comes a clear responsibility for the actions that they 
authorise. Political leaders can generally be said to fulfil the criteria necessary for moral 
responsibility. We can assume that they possess the mental capacities to fulfil the cognitive 
condition. Additionally, through their advisers and public officials, they are supplied with a 
comprehensive picture of the decision-making context. They are also given the opportunity 
to hear opposing sides and therefore to come to a considered judgement about the options 
available. It is true, however, that political questions may be very difficult and complex at 
times and we might think that no-one could be reasonably expected to know what ought to 
be done. Uncertainty and unexpected consequences are, after all, rife in politics. In such 
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cases, the extent to which certain consequences were genuinely unforeseeable may 
undermine the epistemic condition. Note, however, that I think that this will only very rarely 
be the case. Because political leaders shoulder major responsibilities, it is their obligation to 
play through a multitude of potential scenarios and to seriously consider the risks and 
benefits, and their respective likelihood, of each course of action available to them. They can 
be expected to have both the expertise and resources available to them to do this successfully. 
The epistemic condition should therefore be fulfilled. Because political leaders tend to have 
the final say in dirty hands type situations their causal relation to the end outcome is also 
obvious. They consciously set into motion the causal chain leading to the dirty-handed action 
and the negative outcome that leaves people worse off, harmed, or killed. Political leaders 
can also be said to act voluntarily. It is often acknowledged that dirty hands happen under 
the “harness of necessity” (Williams, 2008, p. 132; de Wijze, 2004, pp. 468-469) and the 
thought might go that acting in circumstances in which one’s options are reduced by external 
circumstances beyond one’s control to a choice of lesser evils could not be regarded as 
voluntary. As I have argued in section 6.2.3., we nonetheless have good moral reasons to call 
the actions of our political leaders voluntary. We need political leaders to have the ability to 
issue binding directives that ensure that the lesser evil is chosen and that the citizens for 
whom they are responsible are protected. In order for their decisions to have this binding 
force, though, they will have to have been voluntary. The dirty-handed actions of politicians 
are therefore best conceived of as voluntary. Given that political leaders satisfy all four 
conditions, holding them responsible for the outcomes of dirty-handed decisions seems 
obvious. 
Walzer, however, goes on to consider that political leaders are, after all, representatives and 
as such can be said to act not out of their own volition but for the sake of others, i.e. their 
citizens. On the account that I have offered above, this might lead us to think that, because 
citizens are the true authors of political action, we have good moral reasons to argue that the 
politician’s actions were involuntary and only the result of following orders (e.g. we do not 
want people to be able to escape moral responsibility by delegating their action to others). 
Walzer quickly dismisses this problem, though, because he contends that political 
representation is not a risk-free undertaking. He argues that “political power is a good that 
people seek. They aspire to office, connive at control and leadership, and compete for 
positions from which they can do evil as well as good. If they hope to be praised for the 
good they do, they cannot escape blame for the evil” (2006, p. 290). I think that he is too 
quick to dismiss the potential impact that the representative function of political leaders 
could have on their responsibility, though. Walzer did not consider the weaker, and more 
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plausible, claim that while representation cannot wholly eliminate a leader’s responsibility for 
an outcome, it might be able to lessen that responsibility. In this section I will hence be 
concerned with understanding the representative relationship to assess the extent to which 
it affects the responsibility of political leaders. 
The basic thought behind representation is to make something present that is currently 
absent. In the case of democratic representative government, this is the idea of making 
citizens who are absent present in the assembly. Representation is therefore often thought 
to be an instrument to bridge the gap between direct democracy and large modern states in 
which it is not feasible for all citizens to assemble together. Representation does not, 
however, have to be a merely instrumental value; instead it could be argued that 
representation is an inherently democratic value. To understand this, let us take a look at 
Nadia Urbinati’s depiction of the way in which citizens in Athenian direct democracy were 
involved in the democratic process. There were three categories: those who did not attend 
assemblies, those who attended and voted but who did not actively take part in discussion, 
and those who were fully participating members in debate. The latter group was small and, 
consequently, Athenian direct democracy resulted in the creation of an elite who used 
rhetoric to bring forward the interests of a particular group of citizens (even though they 
might not have been given a formal mandate to do so). What we can see then is that “it is 
not indirectness per se that distinguishes representative democracy from direct democracy” 
(2000, p. 765). Urbinati goes on to argue that the real difference between these two forms of 
democracy lies in the way in which they mediate between those actively and those only 
passively engaged in the political process. For Urbinati, the distinguishing feature of 
representative democracy is the lack of simultaneity between deliberation and decision-
making. The result of this for her is that  
representation allows citizens to shield themselves from speech. It gives 
them the chance to reflect by themselves, to step back from factual 
immediacy and defer their judgement. Representation creates distance 
between the moments of speech and decision and, in this sense, enables 
critical scrutiny while shielding citizens from the harassment of words and 
passions that politics engenders. (2000, p. 768) 
This implies that representation is more than a useful instrument to make up for the 
impossibility of implementing direct democracy in large modern nation states. Instead, there 
is an intrinsic democratic value to the use of political representation because of the way in 
which it facilitates good deliberation.  
In order to understand the representative relationship we need an understanding of two 
distinct, but related, questions. Firstly, whom does the politician represent? And secondly, 
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how does the politician then represent them? Finding answers to these questions is 
complicated when we assume that citizens and politicians will reasonably disagree about 
moral values and how they ought to be achieved. I will argue that the best way to deal with 
this complication is by relying on an adversarial conception of democracy and representation 
that values compromise over consensus. On my account politicians should represent with a 
degree of autonomy that allows them to engage in adversarial deliberation and compromise 
with other political actors. 
6.3.1. Who to represent 
The first question we have to ask ourselves is who exactly the politician is supposed to 
represent. Answers to this have most commonly ranged from (1) all citizens, (2) the 
politician’s party, to (3) the politician’s constituency. The most famous defence of the first 
was given by Edmund Burke (1889) in his speech to the citizens of Bristol. He argues that 
when the constituents of Bristol elected him, they elected him to act in their name for the 
national interest.  
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile 
interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, 
against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly 
of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local 
purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, 
resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member 
indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but 
he is a member of parliament. (1889, p. 96)  
Burke assumes, firstly, that there is a single and discernible national interest; secondly, that 
the national interest is not simply the sum of the interests of the nation’s constituencies; and 
thirdly, that representatives have the wisdom and ability to discern the national interest. 
Because of this, it is the representative’s mandate to pursue the national interest and, indeed, 
if a representative were not to act in this way, she would be letting down her constituents. It 
has to be acknowledged, however, that representation appears to be more complicated in 
real life. In particular we ought to question the idea that there is a single national interest 
which is stable and easily discernible by our representatives without the input of their 
constituents. 
Maybe politicians also represent their party. To see why this might be the case we can look 
at Bernard Manin’s (1997, p. 206ff) helpful depiction of a party democracy. According to 
him, parties were established to mobilise larger numbers of voters by enabling them to align 
themselves with a combination of social issues through party allegiance. In such a system 
voters elect someone who is wearing the colours of a party and as such their representative 
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“is bound by the party to which he owes his election” (1997, p. 211). The role of a 
representative is, on such a conception, not to pursue an independent national interest but 
to align themselves with their party’s interests. The problem here is that the party’s interest 
may easily depart from what would be in the national interest. 
Probably the most famous articulation of the view that those elected should represent their 
particular constituents can be found in the Federalist Papers (Hamilton, et al., 2012, pp. 15-
33). They start from the competing and constantly shifting factions and interests that 
inevitably arise in society but that are also inimical to the national interest. A representative 
then has to weigh the partial interests of her constituents against the interests pursued by 
other representatives in the assembly. According to Hamilton and Madison, these competing 
interests will then balance each other out so that reason and the national interest can prevail. 
This view would then be one in which representatives are supposed to represent their 
constituents as a tool to promote the national interest indirectly. Because of their emphasis 
on factions and the fact that interests are not homogenous and stable, this also means that, 
like in the federal assembly, there can be no clear-cut agreement within the representative’s 
constituency. The politician is therefore bound to represent the interest of the majority and 
has to result in an acknowledgement that politicians cannot represent the interests of the 
entirety of their constituency.49  
Depending on the particular position of a politician they will be torn to various degrees 
between representing the national interest, their party’s position and the particular interests 
of their constituents. A political leader, for example, will need a particular focus on the 
interest of her nation as a whole. A frontbencher will have a particular focus on the area that 
they have been assigned to oversee. A backbencher will first and foremost bring forward the 
interests of her constituents who voted for her. A politician who was not directly elected by 
constituents but through a form of list proportional representation may focus on 
representing the stance their party takes to give credit to the interests and wishes of those 
citizens across the country who voted for her party. While I cannot provide a more sustained 
discussion of this aspect of representation here, I would suggest that, given the issues 
surrounding all three forms of representation, it makes sense that politicians with different 
roles concentrate on representing different elements (i.e. the national interest, their party, or 
their constituents). 
 
                                            
49 Note that saying that she cannot represent the interests of all of her constituents does not mean that she is 
not a legitimate representative of her entire constituency. 
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6.3.2. How to represent 
So how are elected politicians to represent? The main distinction that has been drawn in the 
literature on representation regarding this question is that between delegate and trustee, or 
what Hannah Pitkin calls the “mandate-independence controversy” (1972, p. 144), i.e. the 
question whether a representative should act according to what her constituents want or 
according to what is in her constituents’ best interest. While Pitkin talks about constituents 
the tension she identifies can be found in all representative relationships, for example, a 
political leader may be torn between the perceived interest of the nation as a whole and the 
express wishes of all citizens. Pitkin argues that the distinction between delegate and trustee 
is not a straightforward dichotomy but rather should be conceived of as the two ends of a 
continuum. At the most extreme end of the delegate side, representatives should only act on 
the express instructions of their constituents. On the side of the trustee, the extreme version 
would state that representatives can act in whatever way they want, the only restriction being 
that they think it is in their constituents’ interest. Between these two extremes there is a 
wealth of positions in the middle. A moderate conception of representatives as delegates, for 
example, might say that the politician is allowed to use her discretion as long as she consults 
her constituents about any new policies in advance. A moderate conception of 
representatives as trustees, on the other hand, might argue that politicians can act in any way 
they think will benefit their constituents as long as they do not turn around on their core 
election promises. Pitkin argues that there is a way to reconcile these understandings of 
representatives as delegates and trustees. She says that 
the representatives’ obligation is to the constituent‘s interests, but the 
constituent’s wishes are relevant to that interest. Consequently, the 
representative also has an obligation to be responsive to those wishes. He 
need not always obey them, but he must consider them, particularly when 
they conflict with what he sees as the constituent’s interest, because a reason 
for the discrepancy must be found. (1972, p. 162) 
Pitkin provides us with two reasons for why representatives ought to take into consideration 
the wishes of their constituents. Firstly, while we usually expect individuals to want what is 
in their interest, this is not always the case. On such an occasion, the politician therefore 
needs to ask themselves why there is a mismatch between what they perceive to be in the 
citizens’ interest and what the citizens themselves want. She may come to the conclusion that 
the citizens in question are in some way misinformed and therefore do not accurately 
perceive their own interest, but equally she may come to the conclusion that her judgement 
of what is in the citizens’ interest was misguided and ought to be revisited. Either way, when 
the perceived interests and express wishes of those being represented do not align, the 
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politician will have to come to a reasoned judgement about the nature of this conflict. 
Secondly, she argues that there appears to be some truth to the following statement: “surely 
it cannot be called genuine representation if the man habitually does the opposite of what 
his constituents want” (1972, p. 163). The idea is that when a politician repeatedly does 
something contrary to the express wishes of those she supposedly represents, this surely can 
no longer be in their interest. As a result I agree with Pitkin that politicians need to strike a 
balance between what they perceive to be in the best interest of those they represent in a 
given area (e.g. whole country, government department, constituency) and what those they 
represent expressly ask for. This is complicated by two factors. Firstly, people reasonably 
disagree about what the right thing to do is, so it will be harder for a politician to discern the 
interests and wishes of those she represents.50 Secondly, not only citizens but also other 
politicians reasonably disagree in this way. Therefore the representative will have to make 
her case in the assembly on behalf of those she represents to other politicians who will 
reasonably disagree with the case being brought forward. In order to engage successfully in 
such adversarial deliberation, representatives therefore need enough room to be able to 
deliberate, negotiate, and compromise with others. This means that representatives will need 
to have considerable leeway in what and how they represent. 
Taking the earlier insight from Walzer that representation is not free of risk for the 
representative, I acknowledge that political leaders will hold the ultimate authority and 
responsibility in virtue of their decision-making power. They had the final say in ordering the 
dirty-handed action and that means that they cannot evade responsibility and wash their 
hands clean. Given that representatives are, however, to some extent bound to act in a way 
that advances the interests and wishes of those they represent, we need to take this into 
account when assessing their responsibility for what they did. To the extent that they had a 
duty to act in such a way as to advance the interests and wishes of those they represent, they 
could potentially be excused from the moral responsibility for their action. After all, it may 
be argued, they were not acting as themselves but were simply a tool for the execution of the 
interests and wishes of others. For two reasons, however, I do not think that this excuse will 
work to a significant degree. Firstly, on a more cynical note, some may think that political 
leaders are more concerned with consolidating their own power and partisan interests than 
with acting in the genuine best interest of their citizens. This line of thinking fits with 
Walzer’s description of how politics is essentially a struggle for power. The extent to which 
this is true would ultimately have to be settled empirically. There is also, however, a second 
                                            
50 So even if we took an extreme delegate view, a fair amount of judgement on the part of the representative 
would still be required. 
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reason that follows directly from my above analysis and explains why the representative 
relationship can only excuse politicians to a very minimal degree. Political leaders have 
significant leeway in interpreting what is in their citizens’ best interest and how to implement 
those interests in practice. Even if the extent to which political leaders can use the excuse 
that they only acted in the name of their citizens is limited, that there is some room for this 
excuse is still important.51 In particular, this hints at the topic of the next chapter where I will 
be concerned with the responsibility of democratic citizens for the outcomes of dirty hands 
decisions taken by their leaders. 
6.4. The Responsibility of Public Officials 
It has been assumed by many philosophers discussing the problem of dirty hands that in 
such situations we are concerned with the actions of a single and solitary politician.  This, 
however, is not obviously the case in real life politics. It is not just political leaders who will 
be morally responsible for the outcomes of dirty-handed decisions. Far from having a 
“democratic prince”, as Bellamy repeatedly calls political leaders (2010, pp. 424, 427), they 
act with others in a complicated web of relations. Dennis Thompson calls this “the problem 
of many hands”, arguing that “because many different officials contribute in many different 
ways to decisions and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify who 
is morally responsible for political outcomes” (1987, p. 40). If we look at the four necessary 
conditions for moral responsibility that I have laid out above, it is not straightforward to see 
which agents engaged in complex democratic decision-making fulfil these and to what extent. 
It may be unclear how much each agent knew when making the decision, the way in which 
they causally contributed to the decision-making process, and the extent to which their 
contribution was voluntary. In order to understand decision-making in dirty hands situations 
in a democratic context we therefore need to understand the role of not only elected 
politicians, but also of the public officials – ranging from judges over civil servants to police 
personnel – and advisers who are involved in the democratic process. The question is how 
best to track these contributions and what weight we should assign to them respectively. I 
am generally sympathetic to Thompson’s approach to determining the moral responsibility 
of public officials and will use his analysis as a starting point for my own discussion. As will 
                                            
51 One might argue that there is no room for this excuse after all, because if political leaders did not agree with 
the public, they should simply resign. A failure to resign would be a clear sign that they committed the action 
in question because they thought it was right. I find this unconvincing for two reasons. Firstly, given the 
complexities of political decision-making, politicians will often have to make compromises and endorse 
positions that they do not fully agree with. Secondly, and following from that, it would be impractical for every 
politician to resign as soon as they have to compromise. Granted, it may be that, in extreme cases, resignation 
is the only appropriate option if the politician finds herself in a position in which she would have to sacrifice 
some of her most fundamental principles, and wants to signal to other actors that that is unacceptable. But, 
usually, resignation will not be necessary. 
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become clearer later on, I think that he has missed the way in which his analysis relates to 
dirty hands situations in particular. To show why this is the case I am going to introduce the 
difference between excuses and justifications later on and how these notions can or cannot 
be used by public officials in dirty hands situations.  
6.4.1. Models of Tracking Official Responsibility 
Thompson (1987, pp. 24-31) introduces three different models to track responsibility in the 
cases of public officials: the hierarchical model, the collective model, and the personal 
responsibility model. According to the hierarchical model the person responsible for a certain 
decision or outcome is the person on top of the chain of authority. However, Thompson 
identifies several problems with this model of tracking responsibility. It seems to ignore that 
officials act within overlapping areas in which it would be unclear what the chain of authority 
is and who would stand on top of it. Furthermore, politics is an area of bargaining and 
compromise in which success and influence are often more related to skill than to authority. 
The hierarchical model also seems to ignore that officials often have room for discretionary 
action that is not directly overseen by someone higher in the chain of authority. An additional 
issue, not mentioned by Thompson, is that this model overlooks the earlier mentioned point 
that moral responsibility is not a zero-sum game; just because someone at the top of the 
hierarchical order bears responsibility does not in and of itself take away from the 
responsibility of those lower down. The idea here does not run counter to my earlier 
argument that the political leader has a special responsibility in virtue of her authority. It is 
just that this cannot be the whole story. That others are also responsible does not have to 
detract from the leader’s moral responsibility. Having therefore rejected this idea of tracking 
responsibility in cases of “many hands situations”, Thompson moves on to consider two 
different ideas of collective responsibility.  
The first model is one that rejects any form of individual responsibility and focusses entirely 
on the collective as a suitable candidate for being responsible for an action or outcome. The 
argument is that agents are neither “self-contained” nor “self-subsistent” (1987, p. 45), so 
ascribing responsibility to them on an individual basis would be misleading. This, according 
to Thompson, would have very counter-intuitive consequences that would both decrease the 
responsibility we can ascribe to politicians drastically, and would also make us unable to draw 
more fine-grained distinctions between the degrees of involvement of various actors. The 
second model of collective responsibility Thompson goes on to introduce is based on the 
thought that sometimes certain outcomes are not the results of faulty individual decisions 
but are down to the faulty structure of the group. This is then supposed to lead us to the 
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view that we should analyse moral responsibility solely in terms of the collective instead of 
trying to track individual contributions. Thompson argues that, while this might be a suitable 
explanation for certain groups, it cannot account for the fact that politics is an ongoing 
activity in which the officials are involved and in which we can hold them responsible for 
not having made appropriate efforts at noticing or changing these very faults within the 
group structure. Again, this concept of collective responsibility would prevent us from 
distinguishing between the various degrees of responsibility that should be due to different 
actors within the decision-making process. Because of the failure to deal with the 
complexities of situations of many hands accurately, Thompson proposes a third model.  
According to this account of personal responsibility, officials are morally responsible if they 
are both causally responsible for the outcome and have volitional responsibility in the sense 
that the action that caused the outcome was not done due to non-negligent ignorance or 
compulsion. In essence he proposes to assess each agent’s individual responsibility according 
to the four conditions that I discussed earlier. He argues that the advantage of this individual 
account for approaching the responsibility of officials is that it can meaningfully analyse the 
validity of excuses and mitigating circumstances that officials will invariably claim. He then 
analyses a variety of such potential excuses and determines which ones could in fact be 
legitimate grounds for lessening or doing away with an official’s responsibility. Matters are 
slightly more complicated, though, than Thompson makes them out to be. To see why, we 
ought to distinguish between excuses and justifications. Following J.L. Austin’s distinction, 
to justify an action is to argue that, while the action may have looked wrong on the surface, 
it was in fact the right thing to do. To excuse an action, on the other hand, is to agree that 
the action itself was wrong, but that the agent is not blameworthy because of some mitigating 
circumstances that ought to be taken into consideration. If our action was justified “we 
accept responsibility but deny that it was bad”, and when our action was excused “we admit 
that it was [wrong] but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility” (1957, p. 2). Only very 
few excuses will, however, be able to get us off the moral hook completely. It is unclear on 
Thompson’s account whether the supposed excuses he offers are really intended to be 
excuses or could in fact be attempts to justify an official’s actions. Nonetheless it will be 
helpful to look at a variety of potential excuses and justifications to understand how we can 
assign responsibility within complex governmental structures. In particular I want to look at 
the following: (1) “I only followed orders”, (2) “I didn’t cause it”, (3) “I didn’t intend that”, 
(4) “I couldn’t have known”, (5) “If I don’t do it, someone else will”, and (6) “If I hadn’t 
done it, someone else would have done something worse”. This discussion will also helpfully 
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point out some of the underlying assumptions about representative democracy and the 
general context of political action for public officials. 
6.4.2. “I only followed orders”  
The first statement I want to consider is public officials claiming that “I only followed 
orders”. Such claims are clearly intended to be excuses acknowledging that the act in question 
was wrong but that they are only partially, or not at all, to be held responsible for it. If they 
either have good reason to believe that a superior wants them to act in a certain morally 
objectionable way, or if such conduct is supported by a given bureaucratic system that is in 
place then it might be thought to absolve the official from responsibility for the outcomes 
of their actions because such systemic issues can often not be changed by a single individual. 
Additionally, at least on the face of things, there may be good reasons not to act outside the 
perimeters of one’s role description because general adherence to this is important for 
political systems to run smoothly and effectively. This is what Luban et al. have called “the 
positivist excuse” (1992, p. 2351), i.e. the idea that even though the action may have been 
wrong, because it was sanctioned by official or legal channels means that the official cannot 
be blamed for it. Thompson argues that public officials cannot rely on this excuse, though, 
because “although the requirements of role can create a prima facie excuse” (1983, p. 559)52, 
they will have to consider whether the harm resulting from adhering to their role may be 
greater than the harm that would result from going against their role requirements. A similar 
approach is also taken by John Burke who argues that next to the immediate set of rules 
applying to their role that officials have to fulfil, they also have a duty to protect the wider 
integrity of their office. Burke draws this distinction between duties by using Dworkin’s idea 
of consenting to an “enterprise as a whole” (Dworkin, 1977, p. 105). When public officials 
are exercising the more explicit obligations of their office they always ought to bear in mind 
that they have not only consented to the specific requirements of their role, but have also 
committed to upholding the integrity of their office. Should they perceive a clash between 
their role obligations and their obligations toward the wider purpose of their role, the latter 
can establish a legitimate ground for forgoing the former. Public officials can therefore not 
hide behind the fact that they simply followed orders to get off the hook from ascriptions of 
moral responsibility for the outcomes of their actions. Statements along the lines of “I only 
followed orders” are not able to excuse officials from moral responsibility for their actions. 
 
                                            
52 Given my arguments in chapter two, what Thompson meant to say here is most likely that role requirements 
can create a “pro tanto” rather than a “prima facie” excuse. 
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6.4.3.  “I did not cause it” 
In other situations, a public official might claim that they do not bear the responsibility for 
an outcome because they did not cause it themselves. This claim presents us with an excuse 
that acknowledges the wrongfulness of the action but argues that the official in question 
bears no responsibility for it. The official may say that they simply advised or gave their 
opinion, but in the end it was someone else who actually made the decision or pulled the 
trigger. Therefore the causal condition necessary for moral responsibility is undermined. This 
excuse will only get officials so far, though. One’s advice and contribution to deliberative 
processes can have tangible effects on the ultimate decision taken and in that way can become 
a causal factor in the chain of events leading to the outcome. When what a public official 
says, or fails to say, makes the decision-maker change their mind, then that official bears part 
of the moral responsibility for that decision and the outcomes following from it. Thompson 
expands on this by arguing that, “an adviser often contributes significantly to the final 
decision an advisee makes. The way the adviser frames the alternatives, the weight he gives 
to various arguments, the language and the illustrations he uses (chosen perhaps to appeal 
especially to the advisee) – all these forms of influence may make the final decision different 
from what it would otherwise have been” (1983, p. 548). There are cases, however, in which 
a political leader changes their mind because of the advice given by the public official, and 
yet the latter should not be held responsible. If, for example, the political leader misinterprets 
the advice through no fault of the public official, then we would not want to hold the latter 
responsible. While they have a causal connection to the outcome, in such instances, I would 
argue, the epistemic condition would be undermined. To the extent that the public official 
could not have reasonably expected that their advice would be misinterpreted in this way, 
they can be excused. The excuse that, “I did not cause that” may also work in cases in which 
the advice or omission to give it would have made no difference to the way in which the 
politician acted. If what the public official said could have in no way strengthened or lessened 
the leader’s resolve because, for instance, the politician simply did not care to listen to their 
advisers, then we would not want to say that the public official was part of the causal chain 
in the decision-making process. The statement of “I did not cause that” will only work to 
excuse an official from moral responsibility for an outcome in a limited set of cases. In the 
cases where it does it will either undermine the causal condition because the official was 
genuinely unable to affect the decision-making, or the epistemic condition because the 
official was genuinely unable to foresee that her contribution would have the effect of leading 
to the outcome in question. 
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6.4.4. “I did not intend that” 
Sometimes the outcomes of the actions we take are not the ones that we expected or foresaw. 
Public officials may have had the best intentions in implementing certain policies, and yet, 
the outcomes of those policies were that people are left off worse or harmed. To say “I did 
not intend that” is an attempt to show that the epistemic condition for moral responsibility 
has not been met. This is an excuse that acknowledges the wrongfulness of the action but 
tries to show that the public official is not responsible for it. As we have already seen in the 
above discussion about the epistemic condition, good intentions cannot shield an agent from 
moral responsibility if she should have anticipated that her actions, however well-intentioned, 
would lead to the negative outcome. What we can expect public officials to know can be 
quite far reaching. Take the following example: when President Johnson was making 
decisions about sending more troops into Vietnam he listened to the opinions of his advisers. 
They advised him against such an expansion of US military involvement. This, however, far 
from having the consequence of persuading Johnson against such an expansion, had the 
opposite effect and strengthened his resolve to send more troops to war. By allowing his 
advisers to speak he gave himself the illusion that all positions had a fair chance to be heard 
and that his opinion prevailed nonetheless. The advisers, contrary to their intention, became 
an integral part of the reason why Johnson justified to himself, and others, that US military 
involvement in Vietnam ought to be broadened. Thompson concludes that 
at the point we could expect any reasonable person to recognise that his 
dissent has become counterproductive in this way, we would presumably 
consider a dissenting adviser at least a moral accessory. Good intentions 
may make us think less badly of the adviser than of the advisee, but they 
cannot, at this point, absolve the adviser of responsibility for the 
consequences to which he contributes. (1983, p. 552) 
The public officials should have, arguably, removed themselves from the advisory process 
and through that made a clear statement to Johnson that he was not giving all competing 
opinions their due. This would have signalled their unwillingness to be used by Johnson to 
justify his policy decision. Unintended consequences are rife in the political arena, but many 
of these consequences should have and could have been foreseen by public officials. To say 
that one had good intentions can therefore not excuse one from moral responsibility. 
6.4.5. “I could not have known” 
Following on from my discussion of the epistemic condition, what could also count as an 
excuse is a public official stating that “I could not have known”. While they do acknowledge 
that the outcome was morally problematic, they argue that they cannot be held responsible 
for it. If the negative outcomes of their actions were not foreseeable, then we cannot hold 
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them morally responsible for those outcomes. Such a statement claims non-culpable 
ignorance. While this excuse can indeed work, we should be careful of when a public official 
can assert that they were not culpable for their ignorance. Thompson argues (1987, pp. 60-
61) that public officials are culpable for their ignorance and therefore morally responsible if 
they explicitly order or implicitly suggest to those around them not to give them full or wholly 
accurate information.53 The second case, according to Thompson in which ignorance will be 
culpable, is one in which the public official, even if she could not have foreseen that a specific 
political actor should behave in the way they did, should have realised that behaviour of that 
type was not going to be an unlikely occurrence. The final case regards public officials who 
are no longer in office. If they, during their time in office, initiated certain bureaucratic 
systems that were likely to encourage morally dubious behaviour and wrongdoing, they 
cannot escape moral responsibility for the outcomes of these mechanisms once they leave 
office. Even though they are no longer in the privileged position to have access to 
information about the actions of government actors, they can still be responsible for what 
happens as a result of the systems they initiated. While officials can use the fact they could 
not have known the outcomes of their actions as an excuse to shield themselves from moral 
responsibility, this is limited by the extent to which they caused their own ignorance. If they 
contributed to the circumstances that meant that they could not have known, their ignorance 
becomes culpable and we can hold them responsible for the outcomes of their actions. 
6.4.6. “If I had not done it, someone else would have” 
Public officials may claim that “If I had not done it, someone else would have” (Thompson, 
1987, p. 49) in order to shield themselves from moral responsibility for an outcome. Again, 
this is an excuse that acknowledges the wrongness of the action but tries to claim that the 
official ought not to be held responsible, or at least be held less responsible, for it. If one 
public official refuses to fulfil the demands of their role or to follow an order, then their 
superiors might simply exchange them for another public official who will then do it anyway. 
This could be said to undermine the voluntariness condition for moral responsibility because 
the public official only acts in the way she does because she knows that there is no way that 
the outcome can be avoided. Thompson argues that the excuse, in this form, is simply 
incoherent (1987, p. 49). If the agent was not morally responsible because someone else 
would have just done the action, then this would be true of the alternative agent, and so on 
up to the point where no one would be responsible. The problem is that the excuse implies 
that one agent is relieved of moral responsibility because someone else would have been 
                                            
53 This is in line with my earlier argument in section 6.2.2. about the kinds of behaviour that can make ignorance 
culpable. 
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morally responsible.  This cannot be the case when every alternative agent can claim that 
someone else would have done it, though. This would mean that we would routinely end up 
in a situation in which no one is responsible for acting within an organisation. On my account 
of voluntariness this provides us with good moral reasons to call their action voluntary after 
all. If the option is either to commit a morally wrong action, or to resign or be removed from 
that position, then we might reasonably expect our officials to choose the latter over the 
former. Should a new official then be instated who will commit that very wrongful action 
after all, this would no longer implicate the original official who would have been able to 
remove themselves from the causal chain of events leading to that action. The excuse that 
“If I had not done it, someone else would have” does therefore not undermine the 
voluntariness condition. 
6.4.7. “If I hadn’t done it, someone else would have done something even worse” 
Now Thompson argues that a different version of the above excuse may potentially excuse 
an official from moral responsibility. This could be the case when the agent claims “if I hadn’t 
done it, someone else would have done something even worse”. In such circumstances 
Thompson argues the agent might have to minimise the harm, even if that means going 
against her personal principles and personal integrity, because not doing so “seems too close 
to moral self-indulgence. It could represent an effort to keep one’s hand clean no matter 
what happens to the rest of society” (1987, p. 52). It seems odd, though, that Thompson 
wants to describe such a statement as an excuse. The very fact that he uses the language of 
“keeping one’s hands clean” should alert us to the way in which the scenario he describes 
above could be described as a dirty hands case. The official is aware that the action in 
question is morally problematic, but that, under the given circumstances, it would present a 
lesser evil. I have defined dirty hands cases as instances of justified violations of important 
moral values at the beginning of this thesis. If the action was justified, then it would appear 
odd to call this claim an excuse as Thompson does. When an official claims that “If I hadn’t 
done it, someone else would have done something even worse”, they are therefore offering 
a justification for their conduct. According to Austin’s definition of a justification this would 
entail that they accept responsibility but want to show that the action in question was not 
wrongful after all. In cases where the agent has to choose a lesser evil, however, matters are 
slightly more complicated. A justification in such circumstances cannot show that the action 
in question was entirely right after all, because this would be to ignore one of the core insights 
of dirty-hands reasoning, namely that the value violated by the agent has not been cancelled 
or annulled but instead still exerts an important moral weight. A justification that the agent 
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only acted in a given way to avoid an even greater evil is then intended to accept responsibility 
and to show that the action in question had at least some right-making features.  
6.4.8. Excuses, Justifications, and Dirty Hands 
There are then a variety of excuses that public officials might use to try and show that they 
did not meet the four conditions necessary for moral responsibility for a given outcome. As 
I have shown above, some of these such as “I only followed orders”, or “If I had not done 
it someone else would have”, or “I didn’t intend that” are not sufficient to do so. Others, 
however, like “I did not cause it”, or “I could not have known”, can sometimes provide a 
sufficient excuse to shield the agent from moral responsibility, or at least diminish it. We 
started to look at these excuses because we followed Thompson in pursuing public officials 
through personal responsibility, as opposed to a more hierarchical or collective approach. In 
the course of this analysis we have clarified the different ways in which an official can stand 
in relation to and responsible for the outcomes of a complex democratic decision-making 
process. Where I differ from Thompson is in his analysis of cases in which an official might 
claim that “If I hadn’t done it, someone else would have done something even worse”. I 
have argued that such statements do not constitute excuses but justifications. In fact, the 
situation described by Thompson here sounds very much like instances of dirty hands in 
which an agent has to choose a lesser evil. When an agent resorts to such a claim they are no 
longer trying to remove themselves from moral responsibility for that outcome. Instead, they 
are trying to re-describe the situation in such a way that we can see that, what looks like a 
morally wrong action on the surface, had right-making features after all, namely the 
prevention of an even bigger evil.  
Now one might argue that Thompson’s approach does not take into account all of the 
complexities of political decision-making. There are elements of all three approaches that we 
ought to take into consideration when evaluating the responsibility of political actors. We 
should give some extra weight to those that are in positions of authority and as a result have 
a higher bargaining power or the final call. Additionally we should question whether, in some 
cases at least, there are structural features of the organisation that no single individual could 
have changed and that contributed to a certain action being taken. I think that this is plausible 
but that the personal approach to understanding the responsibility of public officials in 
situations of many hands can allow for that. When we are considering the extent of an 
individual’s moral responsibility for an outcome we ought to take into consideration whether 
they were in a privileged position that made it, for example, easier and less costly to speak 
their mind and disobey orders. Similarly, tracking personal responsibility does not exclude 
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the possibility of considering that sometimes there will be situations in which none of the 
agents individually acted in a morally objectionable way, but that their actions as a whole 
resulted in a negative outcome. Ultimately, public officials can, and often do, share in the 
moral responsibility for dirty hands. The dirt is not borne by a single political leader, but also 
transfers to the officials that she works with. 
6.5. Praise and Blame 
In the previous sections I have shown why a variety of political actors will satisfy the 
conditions necessary for moral responsibility. This means that it will be appropriate for us to 
experience and express certain reactive attitudes toward them. The question now is whether 
these should be positive or negative, i.e. whether praise or blame are most appropriate. 
Ultimately I want to argue that if we take seriously the complex nature of dirty hands 
decisions and acknowledge the appropriateness of a variety of first-person emotional 
responses to the act done, then this complexity also ought to be reflected in our third-person 
reactive attitudes to the agent. 
There appears to be some agreement that the agent ought to be praised (Walzer, 1973, p. 
179; Levy, 2007, p. 43; de Wijze, 2013, p. 896). After all, she brought about the lesser evil in 
a situation in which discerning the better course of action was very difficult. We ought to 
praise her for withstanding that pressure and doing the best that she could given the 
circumstances. While I think that, theoretically, it is appropriate to praise the agent, I think 
that there are good reasons to limit such a response in practice. Granted, we can acknowledge 
to a certain extent that the agent did well in choosing the lesser evil, but concern for the 
victims of her dirty hands should prevent us from emphasising this reactive attitude too 
much because it would show a disregard for the people that have been negatively affected 
by the dirty-handed decision. Imagine, for example, a situation in which a political leader 
decides to abandon a rescue mission for hostages captured by an enemy. They make this 
decision because the rescue would be likely to kill or seriously harm the soldiers involved and 
would also likely antagonise the enemy further resulting in an even worse retaliation attack. 
The hostages die in captivity. While we can acknowledge the courage that it must have taken 
to make this difficult decision, it would be inappropriate for us to dwell too much on the 
praiseworthiness of the leader for her action. Giving our praise for actions that made people 
significantly worse off, or harmed or even killed them would be disrespectful to those victims 
and would show a lack of understanding for the seriously negative effects that one’s actions 
had on other people and their lives. So while I agree that, in theory, it is appropriate to praise 
a dirty-handed politician for having chosen the lesser evil when doing so was a difficult 
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decision, we should limit reactive attitudes of praise in practice, in order to show respect for 
the victims of those dirty hands. 
While there has been some debate about whether we can, aside from praising, also punish 
the political actor, the question of whether the agent can be blamed as well as be praised has 
been largely left untouched. The only detailed discussion of this can be found in Levy (2007). 
He states that “agents are blameworthy for an action just in case there is some alternative act 
or omission available to them which would have allowed them to avoid blame” (2007, p. 44). 
As I have argued in chapter three, once an agent is faced with a dirty hands situations, there 
is no way that she can emerge with her hands still clean because she will have to violate a 
core moral commitment either way. Levy takes the same position and as a result concludes 
that “they therefore cannot avoid blame; by the principle of the avoidability of blame, they 
are therefore blameless” (2007, p. 45). Saying that the dirty-handed agent is not blameworthy, 
he argues, does not result in us explaining away the problem of dirty hands in the first place. 
According to Levy, just because we cannot blame them does not mean that their hands are 
clean. The dirty-handed agent has done something morally bad, even though it was not 
morally blameworthy. This is so because “if I perform the best action in the circumstances 
in which I find myself, but the best action is categorically wrong, then I perform a wrong 
action without being blameworthy for it” (2007, p. 45). His argument relies, on the one hand, 
on the premise that the politician in question engaged in a voluntary exercise of their agency 
when determining and choosing the lesser of two evils and as such can be morally responsible 
as well as praiseworthy for doing so. On the other hand, as mentioned above, it relies on the 
second premise that choosing to do something morally bad in a dirty hands situation cannot 
be seen to be a voluntary exercise of their agency because there was no acceptable “alternative 
act or omission available to them which would have allowed them to avoid blame” (2007, p. 
44). In other words, while the agent has voluntarily chosen to do the best thing possible in 
the situation, she was unable to change the fact that the best thing possible was a morally 
bad action. We can therefore praise her for choosing the lesser evil but we cannot blame her 
for the lesser evil still being an evil.  
Remember that I argued in section 6.2.3. against the conception that in order for an act to 
be voluntary the agent must have had an acceptable alternative option available to her. 
Instead, I argued that the voluntariness of an action depends on the moral features of the 
situation. Politicians have volunteered to take up political office knowing that doing so is not 
risk-free and that they are likely to have to make certain difficult decisions. They have 
accepted the power that comes with such a position and part of their role is that that the 
buck for governmental decisions will ultimately stop with them. They volunteered for this 
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position and we ought to treat it as their autonomous choice to take on this power together 
with the risks and responsibilities attached to it. In order to acknowledge their autonomous 
choice we should say that their decision to take office and bear the risks and greater 
responsibilities is voluntary. As such we have good moral reasons to believe that their 
conduct was voluntary and ultimately blameworthy even though they could not have avoided 
blame. Politics is not a risk-free enterprise and sometimes the best they can do will not be 
enough for them to avoid blame. This fits with the insights from chapter three in which I 
argued that the nature of dirty hands points us toward the tragic aspect of our moral lives. 
We have yet another moral reason to call the politician’s conduct voluntary and as a result 
blame them for their dirty hands. Politicians have been given great powers and we should be 
wary of creating responsibility shortfalls in situations in which they have used these powers 
in ways that have left people significantly worse off or even killed. In such instances it will 
be important that we reaffirm our commitment to this value and express our solidarity with 
those whose rights have been infringed and ensure that the stakes remain high for violating 
important moral values by those in power. If we want to avoid responsibility shortfalls in 
government through which people are left off worse through the actions of those that 
represent them, without being able to blame those who caused them to be worse off, then 
we have good moral reasons to say that dirty-handed politicians voluntarily chose to violate 
an important moral value. 
Just as in the case of praise, though, our blame should be tempered by an acknowledgement 
of the complexity of dirty hands. I have bracketed the question of punishment for the 
purposes of this thesis but this would, for example, entail that even though we can blame 
politicians for their dirty hands, we cannot hold them liable in the same ways as for cases of 
ordinary wrongdoing. We ought to acknowledge that good moral politicians had moral 
reasons for their moral violations, and acknowledge this complexity in our third-person 
responses to their dirty hands. Ultimately, I would like to argue that we can both praise dirty-
handed politicians for having made the overall best decision possible, while still blaming 
them for having chosen to violate an important moral value which has left people worse off 
– often the very people they were asked to protect and represent. 
6.6. Example: Claudy Bombing 
Let us illustrate these ideas with a real-life example. While I acknowledge that real-life 
examples will be a lot messier and I am unlikely to have all of the relevant information 
available, for the purposes of showing that dirty-hands reasoning can in fact be applied to 
complex decision-making processes and that the account of responsibility I have supplied so 
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far can successfully navigate this, using a real-life example will be necessary. I have chosen 
this particular example because there is an unusual amount of detailed information on the 
different agents’ reasoning, and how they interacted with one another publicly available. On 
31st July 1972 three car bombs exploded in Claudy, a rural village in Northern Ireland, and 
killed nine (three of them children) and injured over thirty civilians. 1972 was one of the 
most violent years of The Troubles in Northern Ireland; that year alone nearly five hundred 
people had died as a direct result of the conflict. At the time no one was charged with the 
bombings and no organisation claimed responsibility for the attack. In 2010, after several 
years of investigation into the matter, a report (Hutchinson, 2010) was published which 
concluded that then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, together with 
high-ranking officials from the police and the Roman Catholic Church, conspired to cover 
up the involvement of the person they thought was responsible for the attack. The person 
the police believed to have directed the bombing was the Catholic priest James Chesney who 
was a high-ranking member of the local IRA. At the time, however, he was never taken in 
for questioning even though several police reports alleged his involvement. While at least 
one police officer wanted to arrest him based on the evidence that had been accumulated, 
he was told by a senior officer that “matters are in hand” (Hutchinson, 2010, p. 9). This latter 
officer then wrote a statement that was shared with both Whitelaw and Cardinal William 
Conway, the head of the Catholic Church in Ireland. The two then met and agreed that the 
way forward would be to transfer Chesney silently to the Republic of Ireland. This decision 
was fed back to the Chief Constable Sir Graham Shillington who agreed to these terms. 
Chesney spent the rest of his life until his death in 1980 in parishes in Ireland. An article in 
The Guardian summarised the justification senior officials gave for their decision as 
following:  
The arrest of a priest in connection with such an emotive atrocity at a time 
when sectarian killings in Northern Ireland were out of control and the 
province stood on the brink of civil war was feared, by senior politicians, 
as likely to destabilise the security situation further. A deal was therefore 
arranged behind closed doors to remove Fr Chesney from the province 
without provoking sectarian fury. (Gabbatt, 2010) 
We are unlikely to come to an agreement about whether this was the lesser evil or not. For 
the sake of argument I will simply accept the explanation given above and stipulate that 
dealing with Chesney internally was the lesser evil. 
So who are the people that are responsible for the fact that a man who killed several innocent 
people, some of them children, was allowed to go free? We have a police officer that wanted 
to bring in Chesney for questioning but failed to pursue this any further because a superior 
assured him that matters were already being handled. The superior in question forwarded the 
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issue to higher authorities and failed to raise any objections to their decision. Whitelaw and 
Conway agreed to deal with Chesney internally rather than bringing him to justice in public. 
Shillington then failed to put up any objection to this decision. When we consider real-life 
situations such as this, responsibility will not simply fall on one single person. Instead a 
variety of actors at different levels will potentially be getting their hands dirty by contributing 
to the decision-making process or by their failure to become involved in it. 
We can start by considering William Whitelaw. I think we can safely assume that he had the 
necessary mental abilities to satisfy the cognitive condition. In addition, he clearly foresaw 
that his decision not to arrest Chesney would lead to the outcome that a murderer would go 
free. The epistemic condition for moral responsibility therefore seems to be clearly fulfilled 
as well. What about his voluntariness? Whitelaw, as Secretary of State, had the ultimate 
decision-making power and authority. He gave the order that the police should ignore this 
lead in their investigation. There is therefore no doubt that he was acting on his own accord 
and was in control of the dirty-handed decision. Now one might object that there is a 
particular complication in dirty hands situations. By their very nature they are situations in 
which the agent is seriously constrained by outside circumstances in the options available to 
her. As mentioned earlier, the fact that Whitelaw was constrained by what Bernard Williams 
has called the “harness of necessity” (2008, p. 135) does not undermine his voluntariness. 
While this objection raises the tragic element of dirty hands cases it does not show, as I have 
argued earlier, that Whitelaw did not act voluntarily. We have good moral reasons to call such 
an action voluntary because we ought to ensure that leaders can give binding directive in 
such situations to ensure that the lesser evil can be effectively chosen. Whitelaw can therefore 
not claim that his actions were not voluntary because he only had options with significant 
moral costs available to him. Whitelaw was also clearly causally responsible because he gave 
the order to the police not to prosecute and sanctioned the church dealing with Chesney 
internally. So far it therefore seems clear that Whitelaw got his hands dirty and is responsible 
for the outcomes of that decision. Now one might want to object that I pointed out earlier 
that the representative relationship may to some degree lessen a political leader’s 
responsibility in as much as they acted not on their own accord but in the interest of their 
citizens. I do not think that this will work in the case of dirty hands cases such as this one, 
though. The nature of dirty hands situations means that there are good moral reasons to say 
that either action would be in the interest of the public, and the lesser evil may not be clearly 
discernible. In a state of civil unrest as in Northern Ireland at the time it arguably would have 
been in the public interest not to give the opposing sides reasons to escalate the conflict even 
further. At the same time it arguably also would have been in the public interest to uphold 
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justice to ensure that chaos and lawlessness would not take an even tighter hold on the 
community. Because of these conflicting moral reasons, Whitelaw would have had to do a 
considerable amount of interpretative work and would have had a large leeway in deciding 
what would be in the best interest of his citizens. He therefore cannot shield himself from 
responsibility to any significant degree by claiming that he was entirely constrained by his 
citizens. Overall, then, Whitelaw clearly got his hands dirty and is responsible as the person 
with the ultimate decision-making power and authority in this situation and neither 
representation nor the harness of necessity can undermine this. 
What about Cardinal William Conway? We can safely assume that he fulfilled the cognitive 
condition for moral responsibility on the same grounds as Whitelaw. Additionally, he 
definitely foresaw that his action would let a murderer go free, so he fulfilled the epistemic 
condition, too. What about his voluntariness and causal relation to the ultimate decision? He 
might try to take recourse to the claim “I did not cause it”. Conway could claim that he did 
not have the ultimate decision-making power, which lay with Whitelaw alone, and as such he 
did not get his hands dirty and is not responsible. This will not work in this case, though. 
Firstly, we can assume that Conway was in favour of dealing with Chesney internally because 
he complied with the decision and made active provisions to transfer Chesney out of 
Northern Ireland. The decision to do so was most likely made jointly with Whitelaw and as 
such Conway cannot escape the dirt and responsibility for it. Secondly, even if Conway was 
not in favour of Whitelaw’s decision he could not use this to hide from the responsibility. As 
the head of the church he had sufficient power and standing to refuse to comply with 
Whitelaw’s orders. He failed to refuse to deal with Chesney in an internal way rather than 
bringing him to justice. Such a refusal on Conway’s part would have almost certainly changed 
Whitelaw’s decision because the option of quietly transferring him out of Northern Ireland 
would have no longer been available. Conway could have changed Whitelaw’s decision but 
failed to do so. This means even if he did not agree with Whitelaw, he still got his hands dirty 
and is responsible for Chesney going free.  
We can now move on to the head of the police, Chief Constable Sir Graham Shilling. The 
same considerations that applied to Conway will also apply to him. He had the right cognitive 
abilities and the relevant information to foresee that not prosecuting Chesney would result 
in a murderer going free. Like Conway he was also in a position to refuse the order to let 
Chesney go and as head of the police in Northern Ireland he clearly would have had the 
authority and standing to prosecute him despite opposition. In comparison to Conway, 
however, Shilling is a public official and as such more open to pressure from the government. 
Not complying with Whitelaw’s order could have significantly affected his career and as such 
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he might claim that he was forced to comply and his decision not to prosecute Chesney was 
not voluntary. This, however, will not do. When it comes to matters in the public interest 
such as upholding the rule of law and due process then one cannot hide from responsibility 
by citing the possible negative consequences to one’s career. Remember that we said that 
representation was not a risk-free enterprise; taking on any leadership position in public 
office is similarly not without risk. Shilling would have taken on his role knowing full well 
that he had an obligation to uphold the rule of law and that this might come at certain 
personal costs. If certain features of the choice decision exerted an influence on the agent’s 
decision-making, even if these were not sufficient to undermine voluntariness as such, we 
can, however, acknowledge that they may lessen the degree to which we want to hold the 
agent morally responsible. In the case of Shilling I do not want to make too much of an 
allowance for this, however, because he was holding a position of sufficient power at the 
time to be able to withstand a lot of outside pressure. He has dirty hands and is responsible 
for Chesney going free.  
There is good reason, then, to believe that the secretary of state, the head of the church, and 
the head of the police in Northern Ireland at the time got their hands dirty and are morally 
responsible for Father Chesney not being brought to justice. What about the unnamed police 
officer who wanted to bring Chesney for questioning and his unnamed superior who assured 
them that matters were in hand? Again, we can assume that they both had the relevant mental 
abilities to fulfil the cognitive condition. It might, however, be claimed that they did not have 
access to all of the relevant information necessary to foresee reasonably that to acquiesce in 
the order not to prosecute would mean that a murderer would go free. To a certain extent 
they have to trust that those in a position of authority who may have access to information 
that is unavailable to those on the ground make a decision that will uphold the law.  The idea 
is that maybe the police officers could claim “I could not have known” to undermine the 
epistemic condition and ultimately their responsibility for the dirty-handed outcome. This 
excuse will only go so far in their case, though. Remember that Thompson provided us with 
several cases in politics in which ignorance may be ultimately culpable. One of them stated 
that ignorance is culpable if an actor, even though she could not have foreseen that her 
actions would lead to a certain outcome, could have been expected to understand that others 
would be likely to act in certain ways. In this case, given the politically charged nature at the 
time it would not be unreasonable to expect that those in authority could make a backdoor 
deal to circumvent justice and the rule of law. While I think that the epistemic condition was 
fulfilled for the police officers, there is good reason to hold them less responsible for the 
outcome given that they would have had to rely on a good deal of assumptions to come to 
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the conclusion that following orders in this instance would in fact mean that a murderer was 
able to go free. In particular this is the case for the lower-ranking police officer who first 
wanted to bring in Chesney because they were particularly far away from the decision-making 
process and the available information. What about their voluntariness and causal relationship 
to the dirty-handed action? In essence they face the same issues as Shillington. In their case, 
however, these are heightened because they are not in positions of authority, are more 
expendable, and would not have taken on the same risks as Shillington who accepted a 
leadership position. Additionally, we might wonder what they ultimately could have done to 
change the decision once it was jointly made by the secretary of state, the head of the church, 
and the head of the police. We might point out that they could have become whistleblowers. 
If they alarmed the public to the decision taken about Chesney they would have changed the 
options available to those in power and in that way affected their decision. In as much as 
they failed to object and in as much as that objection would have changed how Chesney 
would have been dealt with, they can be said to be complicit in the dirt and morally 
responsible. But things get even messier here: given the partial information available to them, 
whistleblowing would have been quite presumptuous and potentially dangerous. In the 
sensitive political climate of the time, making such an accusation publicly without being one 
hundred percent sure of it would have been problematic. Ultimately the police officers may 
be said to fulfil the voluntariness and causal condition, but we should take it seriously that 
they only do so on a very minimal level. They share in the dirty hands and moral responsibility 
but only to a very small degree given the position they were in. 
We can take away a variety of important points from this discussion. Firstly, it is important 
to note that political leaders stand in a representative relationship that, in principle, can lessen 
their moral responsibility to the extent that they were bound by the public interest to act. As 
briefly mentioned earlier, this insight opens up the possibility that citizens in a democracy 
may hold some of the moral responsibility for the acts of their representatives. In dirty hands 
situations, however, the extent to which politicians can shield themselves from moral 
responsibility by taking recourse to the representative relationship is significantly limited. The 
morally complex nature of these situations requires too much interpretative work and gives 
the political leader too much leeway to claim that they were not acting voluntarily and on 
their own accord. Secondly, the fact that dirty hands situations seriously limit the options 
available to a political leader does not impede their voluntariness and therefore cannot be 
used to refuse to accept moral responsibility for a dirty-handed decision. Thirdly, the fact 
that a political leader is ultimately morally responsible does not exonerate others who also 
contributed or failed to object. Moral responsibility in democratic politics is not a zero-sum 
  
127 
  
game and the dirt can fall on a variety of political actors. The more they are removed from 
the actual dirty-handed decision-making, however, the more they will be able to claim that 
they did not have the relevant information available to them or were not able to control or 
take causal influence over that decision.  
6.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have briefly introduced my account of moral responsibility and showed how 
a variety of political actors can be said to share in the responsibility for dirty hands decisions. 
In order for an agent to be a legitimate target for ascriptions of responsibility they have to 
fulfil certain cognitive, epistemic, voluntariness, and causal criteria. In the case of political 
leaders these will be most clearly fulfilled. They have the required mental capabilities to 
reason about complex decisions, they have the relevant information about the choice 
situation available to them, we have good moral reasons to call their decision voluntary, and 
their choice is the clear origin of the causal chain that leads to the dirty action. The buck does 
not stop here, though. Unlike much of the dirty hands literature which has focussed on the 
single political leader, I have argued that the dirt extends to a variety of other political actors 
that work in conjunction with the political leader. While such actors may try to make use of 
a variety of excuses to shield themselves from this responsibility, the majority of these will 
not work. That other political actors share in the responsibility and dirt ought not to distract, 
however, from the leader’s responsibility. Moral responsibility, after all, is not a zero-sum 
game and that additional agents share in the dirt does not have to distract from the leader’s 
responsibility. The question left to answer now is whether the dirt and responsibility reach 
even further and are shared by the citizens of a democracy. I will take up this issue in the 
next chapter.  
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7. Who is Responsible: Democratic Citizens 
7.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter I discussed the distribution of moral responsibility for a dirty-handed 
outcome among different political actors. In this chapter I turn to the question of whether 
the moral responsibility for dirty hands can extend to the citizens of a democratic country. 
This question has been given some recent attention in the dirty hands literature (Bellamy, 
2010; Archard, 2013; de Wijze, 2018; Thalos, 2018). These writers seem to agree, in principle, 
that the actions of a democratic government are the actions of its citizens; however, the exact 
relationship between leaders and led is left unclear. It is important to note that so far 
discussions of the dirt that potentially attaches to citizens have treated the public as a 
homogenous group without differentiating between citizens. Additionally, the dirty hands 
literature has not sufficiently taken into account insights from the already-existing moral 
responsibility literature and linked it to the issue of the dirty hands of citizens. This chapter 
aims to change this not by simply asking whether citizens are morally responsible or not, but 
by asking what exactly it is that would make a citizen more or less, or not at all, morally 
responsible. Responsibility is a matter of degree and any satisfactory account of the moral 
responsibility of citizens will necessarily be complicated and messy. By starting from the four 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identified in the previous chapter, I 
am going to show what makes citizens more or less responsible and what could exempt them 
from responsibility altogether.  
I will start by giving a brief overview of the kinds of issue that have been highlighted by 
writers in the dirty hands literature. In particular, there are three questions in relation to dirty 
hands that my account of moral responsibility will have to be able to answer. (1) Is there a 
difference, qualitative or quantitative, between the responsibility of political leaders and of 
citizens for dirty hands? (2) How can citizens share in the dirt of their leaders when some, if 
not many, dirty hands decisions have been taken without their knowledge? (3) Can citizens 
claim that they do not bear any moral responsibility for the dirty hands of their leaders if they 
have distanced themselves from them in some form or another? I will then develop an 
account of the relationship between citizens and governmental decisions that can ground 
ascriptions of moral responsibility.  
I will argue that virtually all citizens participate in or contribute to a given political decision 
or the wider democratic process and that we can hence ascribe to them a causal role, to 
varying degrees, for the actions of their political leaders. Of those that satisfy the causal 
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condition, many citizens have participated or made a contribution voluntarily. Virtually every 
citizen could have done more to affect or change the decision taken, and deciding not to take 
such action was voluntarily.  Even for citizens who are seemingly only implicated in the 
decisions of their leaders because they have to obey the law and pay their taxes, as they 
happen to live in that state, can be said to have been so voluntarily in as much as they 
voluntarily embraced their membership of that state. In turn, of those citizens whose 
participation in or contribution to the political process has been voluntary, most will also 
satisfy the epistemic condition to varying degrees. Even when they did not know, and could 
not have known, that their actions would likely result in a certain dirty-handed decision, this 
will not be sufficient for them to evade responsibility. In as much as citizens not knowing 
how their actions would contribute to a dirty-handed action further down the line is due to 
citizens contriving their own ignorance, they will also satisfy the epistemic condition. After 
all, they could have known had they not contrived their own ignorance. Finally, of the set of 
citizens that has voluntarily participated or contributed and could have or should have 
known, a majority will also qualify as having the required cognitive abilities for ascriptions of 
moral responsibility. We are then left with a set of citizens who are legitimate targets for 
ascriptions of moral responsibility for the dirty-handed actions of their political leaders. 
Given the extent to which they fulfil each of the four criteria, though, the moral responsibility 
of citizens can vary greatly.  
The two questions raised by the dirty hands literature regarding the ignorance of citizens and 
their ability to distance themselves from their politicians, and thus evade responsibility for 
dirty hands, will be answered within these arguments (in the sections on the voluntariness 
condition and epistemic condition respectively). Finally, I will apply this account to the 
question of whether there is a difference, qualitative or quantitative, between the moral 
responsibility and dirt of political leaders and of citizens. I will show that there is a 
quantitative difference, in that political leaders will bear a greater responsibility than citizens.  
7.2. Some Issues Regarding Responsibility and Dirty Hands 
In order to understand whether citizens can be morally responsible for the actions of their 
political leaders, we will first have to understand what the relationship between leaders and 
led is and how this could ground a transmission of responsibility from one to the other. 
Discussions in the dirty hands literature have proposed a variety of ways in which we might 
be able to ascribe moral responsibility to citizens. What they all have in common, though, is 
that they conceive of the public as a homogenous group and do not distinguish between the 
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responsibility of different citizens. They simply assume that, if the particular conditions of 
their account are met, all citizens are in fact responsible for dirty hands. 
Both Thompson and Gowans claim that when politicians act with the consent of their 
citizens, then citizens share in the moral responsibility for the actions of their leaders. Neither 
provides much detail on how exactly citizens are consenting, to what they are consenting, or 
how this could affect their moral responsibility. Thompson simply stipulates that consent 
will be able to transfer responsibility (1987, p. 11), and Gowans restricts himself to the 
statement that “we grant a power of prerogative to the executive to do what is morally best, 
and in this way we consent to those actions properly taken under this authority” (1994, p. 
232). Neither of them takes up the matter of how exactly this process works in any more 
depth. They also do not engage with the question of whether all citizens can be said to have 
consented in this way, or whether some citizens may be exempt from this.  
In contrast, Miriam Thalos describes the relationship between citizens and political leaders 
not in terms of consent but in terms of authorisation. The nature of authorisation, she 
stipulates, implies that in a representative democracy citizens are the ultimate authors of the 
political leader’s action and as such bear moral responsibility for the dirty-handed action, as 
long as the political leader was acting in good faith within the boundaries of her mandate. 
This is so, according to Thalos, because political leaders stand in as representatives for the 
wishes of those who elected them. While the responsibility falls on citizens, the 
phenomenology of dirt sticks to the political leader because they “are literally the instruments 
used to perform the actions in question” (Thalos, 2018, p. 176). The idea here is that while 
the politician will feel dirty, it is ultimately not the politician but democratic citizens who are 
morally responsible for the action taken. On her account, political leaders are not acting in 
their own capacity but simply execute actions on behalf of another. Authorisation “deflects 
the moral responsibility” (2018, p. 181) from the politician who commits the action to 
citizens. Thalos, however, does not offer us an argument in favour of her particular view of 
authorisation. I will show later in this chapter why her account is unrealistic and cannot 
account for the workings of complex democratic decision-making.  
Finally, Garrett, Archard, and de Wijze argue that we can understand citizens as complicit in 
the actions of their leaders and as such they share in the moral responsibility for dirty hands. 
It is unclear on Garrett’s account what the basis for the complicity of citizens is supposed to 
be. At one point he claims that political leaders have some form of writ from the public, at 
another he focusses on citizens’ ability to supervise the actions of their leaders, and finally 
he implies that if citizens approve of a given policy decision they will be complicit (1996, pp. 
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17-18). The relationship between these different grounds and how exactly they can lead to 
complicity is not further elaborated on. Given that it is left ambiguous what exactly makes a 
citizen complicit on his account, it is also unclear whether all citizens will be complicit or 
merely some. Archard, on the other hand, is clear that the complicity of the democratic public 
is based on the authorisation of their political leaders and their possible actions. For him this 
means that, for any political decision within the politician’s mandate, “the public ‘owns’ the 
actions of its politician. […] As the etymology of ‘authorization’ indicates the public is the 
true author of the actions performed by others” (2013, p. 781). Unlike Thalos who claims 
that it is “the citizenry on whose shoulders responsibility falls” (2018, p. 179) because 
politicians are merely “the instruments used to perform the actions in question” (2018, p. 
176), Archard  instead claims that “politicians are identified as the appropriate source of 
political acts and yet constrained in what they are permitted to do in the name of those who 
gave them power so to act” (2013, p. 781). Political leaders are not mere instruments but 
moral agents when they make policy decisions. As such the democratic public does not hold 
all of the moral responsibility, as in Thalos’s account, but becomes complicit in the actions 
of their political leaders. Archard acknowledges, however, that this brief account is a 
simplified summary of the matter and that many important questions about the nature of the 
mandate given to politicians, and what exactly they can and cannot do within this mandate, 
is left unsaid. Archard is only interested in the public as a whole and appears to claim that all 
citizens, simply in virtue of their membership in the state, will automatically be responsible.  
The most sustained discussion of complicity in dirty hands cases is presented by de Wijze in 
a recent paper. He argues that citizens “are potentially and sometimes actually accessories, 
causally linked to the immorality done in their name” (2018, p. 140). He presents three 
reasons that jointly lead to that conclusion. Firstly, politicians who get their hands dirty 
commit a justified wrongdoing in the best interest of their citizens. Secondly, this shows that 
their intentions are good and that they do not commit these wrongdoings for the sake of 
personal gain, but for the public good from which all citizens can stand to benefit. Thirdly, 
“citizens rightly expect their politicians to protect them from harm even in situations where 
there is no morally cost free action or policy” (2018, p. 140). Given these considerations, de 
Wijze concludes that we can assume that citizens implicitly consent to their political leaders 
getting their hands dirty for them. This is then supposed to ground their complicity. It also 
follows, for him, that all citizens who are part of democratic society are to some extent 
complicit, whether they voted for that politician or not, because “citizens cannot seek to 
mitigate the moral pollution by insisting the [democratic dirty hands] were not in their name. 
Such actions were necessary and unavoidable to bring about the lesser evil from which all 
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citizens benefit” (2018, p. 142). As a result he argues that “a collective responsibility falls 
equally on all members of the public regardless of their choices or level of political activity” 
(2018, p. 142). Owing to the moral division of labour in which political leaders are the ones 
who ultimately act, they also shoulder a greater moral responsibility than ordinary citizens. 
This is so because the “exercise of political agency comes with special powers, duties, 
responsibilities, and privileges” (2018, pp. 141-142). De Wijze is not clear enough, however, 
on how the three reasons that ground the complicity of citizens are enough to establish a 
sufficient causal link to the politician’s action necessary for ascriptions of moral 
responsibility. He also does not sufficiently engage with the option that there may be good 
reasons to distinguish between the moral responsibility of different citizens and instead 
simply focusses on the public as a whole. Overall, much of the discussion of the responsibility 
of citizens for the dirty hands of their leaders has not made enough reference to the already-
existing literature on the responsibility that citizens hold for the actions of their government 
and state more generally. It is especially noteworthy that those writing on dirty hands seem, 
in the majority, to agree that individual citizens can be morally responsible for the actions of 
their leaders simply in virtue of their democratic citizenship. This is, however, a rather 
controversial claim to make (Feinberg, 1970; Parrish, 2009; Stilz, 2011; Lawford-Smith, 2018) 
and would require a substantive re-think of our conception of moral responsibility.  
To get clarity on the moral responsibility of citizens for the dirty hands of their political 
leaders, I will apply my account of moral responsibility from the previous chapter to this 
particular problem. In doing so we will encounter a variety of complications, though. 
Remember that in the last chapter one of the necessary conditions for individual moral 
responsibility for an outcome was a clear causal connection between the agent and that 
outcome. It is difficult, however, in the case of citizens in a large democratic state to see how 
such a causal link could exist. Secondly, given that we have not chosen the state we are a part 
of, how can our participation in and contribution to it satisfy the voluntariness requirement? 
Are we in an important sense forced to participate in or contribute to the state in such a way 
that we would not want to assign moral responsibility to ourselves for our actions? Also, 
what would it take for us to remove ourselves sufficiently from the decisions of our 
politicians so that we can no longer be held responsible for them? Thirdly, dirty-handed 
decisions will sometimes, or even often, be taken in secret and away from the public eye. 
Citizens will be lied to or deceived about the decisions and actions taken by their leaders. 
What if citizens simply did not know and could not have known about a particular instance 
of dirty hands54? Will this necessarily undermine their moral responsibility for the outcomes 
                                            
54 This question is raised by Thompson (1987, p. 22) and Archard (2013, p. 785). 
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of their politician’s decision? Some people might wish to argue that a certain amount of 
secrecy is essential for a political leader to work efficiently. From this it could be followed 
that, at least sometimes, citizens should not know about the dirty-handed actions of their 
leaders. In what way would this affect their moral responsibility for the outcomes55? Finally, 
not all citizens will satisfy the cognitive condition. Where should we draw the line in the 
capabilities required for understanding complex democratic decisions and procedures? Even 
if we establish that citizens somehow satisfy the above criteria, a successful account must be 
able to answer in which way the responsibility of citizens is going to be similar or different 
to the moral responsibility of their political leaders. Is there a quantitative or qualitative 
difference56? I will provide answers to these questions so that we can reach a comprehensive 
picture explaining why many citizens are legitimate targets for ascriptions of responsibility 
regarding the dirty-handed actions of their political leaders. 
7.3. The Moral Responsibility of Citizens 
In this section I will discuss how we could ground the moral responsibility of citizens for the 
actions of their leaders. Before introducing different accounts of this relationship it will be 
important to clarify a few points.  
Firstly, examining the moral responsibility of citizens is different to understanding their 
criminal responsibility or political liability. Criminal responsibility asks whether citizens are 
due any penal sanction for the actions of their leaders, and political liability is concerned with 
the question of whether citizens have any remedial responsibilities for the actions of their 
leaders. While these are interesting and important questions I will not take these up as part 
of this thesis. Instead, I want to understand which, if any, citizens can be appropriate targets 
for ascriptions of moral responsibility (i.e. being legitimate targets for ascriptions of praise 
or blame). That is, I want to understand what it is that makes citizens more or less, or not at 
all, morally responsible for what their politicians do.  
Secondly, and following on from this, I am interested in the moral responsibility of individual 
citizens as opposed to the collective moral responsibility of either the public or the state as a 
whole. I cannot do full justice to the debate surrounding collective moral responsibility here, 
but I want to give a brief indication of why I have chosen an individual rather than a collective 
focus for making sense of the moral responsibility of citizens. Generally we think that, in 
order to be held morally responsible, a collective needs to satisfy certain criteria to be called 
a moral agent in the first place. Peter French has argued that collectives can do so if they 
                                            
55 This question is raised by Hollis (1982, p. 396), Bellamy (2010, p. 426) and de Wijze (2018, p. 141). 
56 This question is raised by Gowans (1994, p. 233), Archard (2013, pp. 782-783), de Wijze (2018, p. 140) and 
Thalos (2018). 
  
134 
  
have sufficient “internal decision structures” (1984, p. 41). Such a structure requires an 
outline of the different positions within the collective and the way that power is distributed 
between them. Additionally the group also needs decision-making rules and regulations that 
govern the behaviour of the individuals within the collective. There are established decision-
making mechanisms in place that structure the interactions between individuals. Such groups 
will have a stable identity over time, interests, and goals, and can form and execute collective 
intentions through the above internal decision structures. If a group exhibits all of these 
features, it is an appropriate subject for ascriptions of collective moral responsibility. Anna 
Stilz has argued that the state can satisfy all of the above conditions and should therefore be 
understood as a collective agent to whom we can ascribe moral responsibility (2011, pp. 191-
192). Regarding the public, Avia Pasternak has concluded that it can only be understood as 
a collective agent if we loosen the above requirements and allow that “even if a group does 
not possess the same level of moral agency as (some) individual persons, it may still be 
subjected to moral evaluation” (2011, p. 107). For the sake of argument, we can simply 
assume that it is possible to argue along the lines of Stilz and Pasternak that both the state 
and the public as a whole could be held morally responsible for the actions taken by its 
political leaders.57  
So what follows from such a finding for the members of the state or the public? As Margaret 
Gilbert has aptly put it: “nothing. Everything depends on the details of a given member’s 
particular situation” (2006, p. 109). Depending on an individual member’s relationship to the 
group and their participation in or contribution to the particular act in question, an individual 
member of a morally responsible group may be themselves morally responsible to varying 
degrees. In some cases, individual members of a morally responsible group may not be 
morally responsible at all, for example if they were non-culpably ignorant of the action or if 
they were not a voluntary member. In the first instance, I therefore think that it makes more 
sense to try and find an account of how we can understand the individual level of moral 
responsibility that each citizen holds in virtue of her position within the state or the public. 
Given that we cannot make any inferences from a finding of collective moral responsibility 
about what this means for the members of that collective, nothing seems to be lost by 
focussing directly on individual moral responsibility. Now, there may be one rare case in 
which, without a collective analysis, we would end up with a responsibility shortfall. In 
extreme cases, even though Gilbert argues that this is unlikely to occur, it could be “possible 
                                            
57 Others have argued that because the public does not satisfy the conditions necessary for collective agency, 
we should not focus on ascriptions of moral responsibility, but instead be concerned with finding potential 
grounds for holding citizens politically liable for the actions of their leaders and the outcomes thereof. For 
example, see Parrish (2009). 
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that no member of a given collective is personally to blame in relation to the collective’s 
blameworthy action or actions” (2006, p. 110). In such instances there will be value in 
assessing the responsibility of the collective, though this would still leave us with the thorny 
question of whether and how we could distribute the burden of collective moral 
responsibility amongst members who are not individually blameworthy for that action or 
outcome. In the first place, however, I think it makes more sense to attempt to account for 
moral responsibility on the level of the individual. Should this leave us with a responsibility 
shortfall, we can then take recourse to talk of collective moral responsibility. As I will argue 
throughout this chapter, we can make sense of the individual moral responsibility of the vast 
majority of citizens for the actions of their political leaders, and so we can safely ignore the 
issue of the collective moral responsibility of the state or the public as a whole for the present 
purpose.  
As argued in the previous chapter, there are four individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions that an agent has to fulfil in order to be morally responsible. The cognitive 
condition requires the agent to have sufficient mental capabilities to, in principle, understand 
the possible implications of her actions and to reason about them. The epistemic condition 
requires that the agent knew, or should have known, that her action would lead to a certain 
outcome. Whether or not a citizen satisfies the voluntariness condition will depend on the 
particular features of the situation at hand and whether there are good moral reasons to call 
their actions voluntary. Finally, the causal condition requires that the agent’s action was part 
of the causal chain that resulted in that particular outcome. If we want to know whether 
citizens are morally responsible for the dirty-handed actions of their political leaders, we first 
have to answer four distinct questions: a) did citizens have the right mental capacities to 
understand their involvement in the democratic process? b) did citizens know, or should 
have known, that the politician would dirty her hands? c) did citizens participate in or sustain 
the democratic process voluntarily? d) did citizens cause the dirty-handed outcome in any 
meaningful way? I will take these questions in reverse order.  
7.3.1. Causal Condition 
Before starting the discussion on the causal condition I want to clarify briefly some 
distinctions that will be useful to bear in mind. When a single person causes an outcome, 
they are the cause of that outcome. When, however, more than one person causes an 
outcome, they are a part of that cause. One can be a part of a cause in two ways. Firstly, one 
can participate in causing that outcome by making a difference, whether individually or as 
part of a set, to that outcome occurring. On the other hand, one can contribute to an 
outcome when one’s actions make it more likely that another agent or group of agents will 
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cause the outcome, even if one’s own action is too far removed in the causal chain to have 
made a determinate difference to the outcome. These distinctions will become clearer 
throughout the section but it will be useful to have this rough overview when going through 
the following arguments. Ultimately I will argue that citizens can participate in or contribute 
to political decision and the wider democratic process more generally in three broad ways in 
order to satisfy the causal condition for moral responsibility. They can make an individual 
difference to a political decision, or they can make a difference to said outcome as part of a 
set of citizens. Finally, they could simply contribute to the wider democratic process in virtue 
of which political decision-makers are enabled or encouraged to take certain political 
decisions. 
Intuitively, we might think that we only want to hold individuals morally responsible for a 
particular political decision and outcome if they can be said to have made a difference to that 
action or outcome. This is what Christopher Kutz has described as the “Individual 
Difference Principle” (2007, p. 3). When we can trace a causal chain of events from the agent 
to the outcome, such that the agent’s action made a difference to that outcome, we can 
ascribe moral responsibility for that outcome to the agent. I will introduce an example of this 
view and then identify two problems with it that should lead us ultimately to look for 
alternative ways to understand causal responsibility. Walzer, who argues in Just and Unjust 
Wars (2006, pp. 296-303) that citizens could make an individual difference to political 
decisions in an ideal democracy, albeit not in a real one, appears to pursue this line of 
reasoning. He starts from the assumption that the nature of democracy makes it a system in 
which the moral responsibility for actions can be distributed because citizens get to have a 
say in the selection of their leaders and policies. If they have some input in the system they 
can also, in principle, be morally responsible for the parts on which they had a causal impact. 
He asks us to imagine an idealised state in which all citizens are well-informed and get to 
have a say in policy decisions. In such a situation, he argues, all citizens who voted for or 
helped to implement or sustain a particular policy would therefore be morally responsible 
for that policy and its outcomes. These citizens, according to Walzer, would have made a 
difference to the voting outcome and hence had a direct causal impact, and therefore must 
share in the responsibility of the actions of their leaders. Conversely, according to Walzer, 
those who voted against or did not cooperate with that policy cannot be morally responsible. 
After all, they did not make a difference to the voting outcome and do not stand in any causal 
relation to the policy or its outcomes. Finally, he considers those who did not vote because 
they were indifferent, lazy, or scared to commit to a position. In cases where they could have 
made a difference because their vote could have helped to prevent the policy, they can be 
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morally responsible for having failed to prevent it. From this analysis, however, he argues 
that it does not follow that we can straightforwardly assign moral responsibility to all citizens 
and to equal degrees. Instead, “our actual assignments will vary a great deal, depending on 
the precise nature of the democratic order, the place of a particular person in that order, and 
the pattern of his own political activities” (2006, p. 299). So Walzer leaves room for citizens 
in an ideal democracy to make an individual difference to political decisions and therefore to 
carry some moral responsibility for them. 
The problem, as I will show in the following, is that if we require individual citizens to satisfy 
the Individual Difference Principle in order to meet the causal condition, pace what the 
above argument may appear to suggest58, virtually no citizens will be morally responsible. 
This is because the Individual Difference Principle is faced with two challenges in democratic 
settings. The first problem is that of over-determination. Pace Walzer’s assumption that 
when citizens contribute in an ideal democracy they could be said to have made an individual 
difference to the political outcome, in large nation states the single vote that each citizen has 
cannot be said to make an individual difference at all. One could have the deciding vote, but 
the chances of that are infinitesimally small. Individual voting or shows of public support 
(i.e. in a demonstration) do not actually make a difference to the overall decision and as such 
the individual cannot be said to have caused the outcome. The same goes for abstaining from 
engaging in the political process. Even if a single citizen had participated, their contribution 
would not have changed the final outcome. This outcome is over-determined and the 
individual’s taking part is too minimal to actually make any difference. As a result, it does not 
matter what an individual citizen does, because they are only one of too many and cannot be 
said to make the causal impact necessary to ascribe moral responsibility to them. If the only 
way to satisfy the causal condition is to have made an individual difference to an outcome, 
virtually no citizen would be morally responsible for what their government does.59  
Even if we were to overcome this issue, we would be faced with yet another problem in 
ascribing moral responsibility to citizens. Even if they made a difference in an ideal 
democracy, real life politics does not look like the scenario described by Walzer. He goes on 
to argue that  
The state is an enormous state, governed at great distance from its ordinary 
citizens by powerful and often arrogant officials. These officials, or at least 
                                            
58 Walzer himself, as I will show, argues that the Individual Difference Principle would leave barely anyone 
responsible in a real, as opposed to ideal, democracy. What he, however, did not acknowledge is that even in 
an ideal democracy the Individual Difference Principle will run into serious trouble. 
59 The assumption of the Individual Difference Principle in conjunction with this criticism has, for example, 
led Holly Lawford-Smith (2018) to reject the idea that citizens could be morally responsible for what their 
politicians do. 
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the leading among them, are chosen through democratic elections, but at 
the time of the choice very little is known about their programmes and 
commitments. Political participation is occasional, intermittent, limited in 
its effect, and it is mediated by a system for the distribution of news which 
is partially controlled by those distant officials and which in any case 
allowed for considerable distortions. (2006, p. 301) 
In real-life politics, citizens only become involved in politics periodically during election time 
and can only vote for candidates rather than directly for certain policies, and decisions are 
taken by politicians without prior consultation of citizens, or even if they are consulted, the 
mind of politicians might already be made up irrespective of public opinion. Citizens may 
make a difference to which politician is elected, but they then have little influence over what 
particular policy decisions that politician takes, because politicians act largely independently 
of citizens. The actions of the politician present, as is called in legal theory, a novus actus 
interveniens which breaks the causal chain from the action of citizens to the eventual policy 
outcome. Because politics requires frequent bargaining, compromise, and amending or even 
entirely going back on one’s election promises, citizens cannot foresee with certainty what 
consequences will follow from their voting decisions. Once a politician is in power citizens 
have very little influence over what daily policy decisions that politician will take. The causal 
connection from citizens to any particular policy-decision will therefore be too far removed 
to ascribe moral responsibility to the vast majority of citizens. It is worthwhile noting that 
there may be a small subset of citizens that could satisfy the Individual Difference Principle 
and therefore the causal condition for moral responsibility nonetheless. These citizens will 
most likely be well-informed and hold some form of sway over political decision-makers. 
The majority of citizens, however, escapes moral responsibility. 
In the following I will argue that we ought to reject the idea that the only way a citizen can 
satisfy the causal condition for moral responsibility is by having made an individual difference 
to the outcome. I will deal with the issue of over-determination first and then move on to 
the problem of real democracies. 
In order to make sense of cases of over-determination, we have to re-think the basis on 
which we ascribe a causal connection between an individual agent and an outcome. While 
the Individual Difference Principle may work in most straightforward cases of causation, 
more complex cases that see several agents involved in the causal chain of events will require 
a more sophisticated account of causation in order to make sense of their respective moral 
responsibility. The problem with the Individual Difference Principle is that in more complex 
situations it commits what Derek Parfit has called a “mistake in moral mathematics” (1984).  
Let us consider an example in which “X and Y simultaneously shoot and kill me. Either shot, 
by itself, would have killed” (1984, p. 70). In such a case it is true, given the individual 
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contribution that each made, had one of them not made that contribution, the outcome 
would have remained unchanged. One might mistakenly follow from this that neither X nor 
Y made a difference and neither X nor Y caused my death and that, as a result, neither of 
them is morally responsible for killing me. Parfit argues that the reason we reach such an 
objectionable conclusion is because we have committed the second mistake in moral 
mathematics; we have falsely assumed that “if some act is right or wrong because of its 
effects, the only relevant effects are the effect of this particular act” (1984, p. 70). When it 
comes to cases of over-determination (or co-ordination problems) we cannot just take into 
account the individual act, but need to consider the set of acts of which it is a part. In as 
much as X and Y are part of one and the same act that kills me, X and Y together kill me. In 
as much as they have contributed to a set of acts that, together, brought about my death, 
they are causally responsible for their contribution to this set. To see the plausibility of this 
claim we might wish to consider a claim where praise, rather than blame, would be an 
appropriate reaction to an individual’s contribution to a set of actions. Parfit asks us to 
imagine a scenario in which, if four people were to stand on a platform, this could provide 
sufficient weight to set into motion a lift that will elevate a hundred people out of a well that 
is slowly filling up with water. Now as it happens, five bystanders jump onto the platform. 
In this case it is true that none of these people individually made a difference because, given 
the individual contribution that each made, had one of them not made that contribution, the 
outcome would have remained unchanged. And yet, together, they moved the lift into motion. 
All of the five have made a contribution to a set of actions that saved the hundred people. 
In virtue of this contribution they can satisfy the causal condition and be morally responsible 
so that we can assign praise to them for their action. I think it would be an odd conclusion 
to say that, if there were four people we could have praised them individually, but given that 
there are five of them over-determining the outcome, praise is no longer in order. In the case 
of voting and demonstrating the argument runs in a similar way. While my particular vote 
might not have made an individual difference to the election of the politician, I nonetheless 
was a contributor to the set of acts that elected her. As such I am causally responsible for 
being a part of that set of acts and can be open to moral responsibility.  
This idea of taking into consideration an agent’s causal contribution to a set, rather than the 
individual difference they made regarding an outcome, has led some legal scholars to use the 
NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set) Test by Richard Wright (1985, pp. 1788-
1803)60 in order to determine the responsibility of an agent. According to the NESS Test, “a 
                                            
60 The NESS Test shows great similarity – even though Wright’s project is not entirely identical – to J.L. 
Mackie’s “INUS condition” which an action fulfils if it was “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition 
which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (1965, p. 245). The important distinction between the 
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particular condition was a cause of (condition contributing to) a specific consequence if and 
only if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient 
for the occurrence of the consequences” (1985, p. 1790). The best way to show the difference 
between relying on the Individual Difference Principle61 and the NESS Test is to consider 
some of the examples that Wright uses. Take for instance a case of air pollution. Wright 
imagines a case in which five units of pollution would be both necessary and sufficient to 
harm an individual. There are seven individuals who all simultaneously emitted one unit of 
pollution. None of these seven could be said to have made an individual difference because 
their emission was “neither necessary nor independently sufficient for the injury” (1985, p. 
1793). Their single unit was not sufficient to cause harm by itself, and had they not emitted 
the single unit the harm would have still occurred, so it was not necessary for the injury 
either. The Individual Difference Principle would struggle to make sense of this case. When 
none of the polluters can be said to have been an individually necessary or sufficient cause 
of the outcome, none of them can be morally responsible on this view. This would leave us 
with the counter-intuitive result that no one is responsible for the harm to the individual. On 
the NESS Test, however, we can explain this because each unit of pollution was a necessary 
element of a sufficient set as part of which it could have caused the harm. There are several 
sufficient sets that could be said to be the cause of the harm. As long as the single unit of 
pollution in question was necessary for one of these sufficient sets, then this single unit of 
pollution can be said to have caused the harm as part of that set. Wright then goes on to 
supply us with a second example in which two agents, A and B, independently of one another 
try to kill a third agent, C. Imagine that A has poisoned C’s tea, and just when C is about to 
drink, B shoots and kills C. According to the NESS Test only B is responsible for the death 
of C, because B’s “shot was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of actual antecedent 
conditions that did not include the poisoned tea” (1985, p. 1795). Remember that, per 
definition, the agent is only causally responsible for her contribution to an actual antecedent 
condition, so “a set that included the poisoned tea but not the shooting would be sufficient 
only if [C] actually drank the tea” (1985, p. 1795), but C never actually drank the tea. The 
Individual Difference Principle, in comparison, would again come to the conclusion that 
neither A nor B were responsible for the death of C. Even if A had not poisoned the tea, C 
would have died because of B’s shot, and even if B had not fired the shot, C still would have 
                                            
two for the purposes of this thesis is that Mackie does not intend for his account to answer the problem of 
over-determination. In his example of a fire started by the combination of an electrical short-circuit, the 
presence of flammable material, and the absence of a sprinkler system, he clarifies that “no other sufficient 
condition of the house's catching fire was present on this occasion” (1965, p. 245). I will therefore rely on the 
NESS Test for the issue of over-determination instead. 
61 Wright calls this the “but-for test” (1985, p. 1792). According to this someone is causally responsible if, but 
for their action, the outcome in question would not have occurred. 
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died because of A’s poisoned tea; so neither of them can be said to have made a difference 
to the outcome. C would have died no matter what A or B individually did.  
So what can the NESS Test tell us about citizens engaging with politics through over-
determined channels such as voting?62 This will depend on our conception of voting. There 
are two ways in which we can perceive voting; one treats voting as if it were a simultaneous 
activity while the other one insists that it is not a simultaneous activity in practice and should 
not be treated as such.63 We can start by considering the latter conception. According to this, 
in the case of voting we in fact have two separate sets of actions so that one of them pre-
empts the other. The first one consists of the voters who up to time t1 voted for the politician, 
when the threshold of votes she required to win had not yet been reached. According to the 
NESS Test, their votes would have been a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual 
conditions that was sufficient for the politician winning the election. What about those, 
though, that cast their vote after the number of votes had already reached that threshold? If 
we understand voting as a case of pre-emption, the NESS Test would come to the conclusion 
that these voters were not in fact responsible for the politician winning the election. Wright 
argues in a footnote regarding a pollution case that if “five units arrived before the other two 
and produced the injury before the other two arrived, the first five units were causes of the 
injury and the last two were not” (1985, p. 1793). Equally in the case of votes, the number 
of votes up to t1 caused the politician to win, while any votes coming in after t1 cannot be 
causes of the politician winning the election. While such a result allows us to hold at least 
some citizens causally responsible, if voting was indeed a case of pre-emption, using the 
NESS Test means many citizens who voted for a politician would still not be causally 
responsible for that politician winning. If they are not causally responsible for that politician 
winning the election even though they voted for them, they are also not going to be 
responsible for the decisions that this politician is then going to take in their name and for 
them.64 While, according to the NESS test, some citizens are causally responsible for the 
election of leaders, it still leaves a lot of citizens entirely free from causal, and therefore also 
moral, responsibility for the actions taken for them and in their name if voting is a case of 
pre-emption.  
There is, however, another and, I would like to argue, more plausible understanding of the 
nature of voting. On this view voting is treated as a simultaneous activity. After all, we do 
                                            
62 This could also include actions such as protesting, but the voting case is particularly difficult, so I will 
concentrate on that issue here. 
63 For an account advocating the former see Alvin I. Goldman (1999). For an account advocating the latter see 
Jensen (2017). 
64 This is assuming that they do not act in such a way that at a later point they become a necessary element of 
a sufficient set that resulted in the politician taking that particular decision. 
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not care whether our vote is cast at 8am or 8pm on election day. We also do not care whether 
our vote will be counted first or last. In fact, those who voted first may be counted last and 
vice versa. We also do not announce the winner of an election as soon as they have received 
a majority, but only once they final vote has been counted. All of these observations suggest 
that we in fact conceive of voting as a simultaneous activity in which we would not have to 
distinguish between the actions of those before t1 and the actions of those after t1. Goldman 
in his paper on why citizens ought to vote also makes this point when he argues that 
“elections standardly feature a certain conventional element with respect to time. Even if 
voters cast their ballots at different times on election day […] the system conventionally 
abstracts from this actual or ‘natural’ order and considers all the votes on an equal basis” 
(1999, p. 213). If we accept this understanding of voting, then everyone who voted for the 
politician or policy would be a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that 
was sufficient for the politician or policy winning the election. In a similar vein, everyone 
who did not vote could also satisfy the NESS test if that set was large enough to have 
impacted the voting outcome. The only citizens that could not be held causally responsible 
for the voting outcome would be those who did not vote when that set was not of a sufficient 
size to have made a difference together, or those who voted against that politician or policy. 
It is worthwhile noting that in real-life elections, even in those with a relatively high voter 
turnout, the number of citizens who do not vote is usually large enough that their set could 
have made a difference. Generally only those who voted against a politician or policy can 
therefore evade causal responsibility for the outcome of the election.65 The first problem 
when thinking that only the Individual Difference Principle can satisfy the causal condition 
for moral responsibility was that it could not even account for citizens being responsible for 
electing a politician. The NESS test can account for such cases of over-determination and 
show why citizens can be responsible for the politicians they elect.  
But even if we now have an account of how citizens can, together, make a difference, we are 
still faced with the second problem for ascribing to them causal responsibility for political 
decisions. Electing a politician does not automatically equate to causal responsibility for what 
that politician does because the latter acts with a considerable degree of freedom, as I have 
argued in the previous chapter. Holly Lawford-Smith draws a helpful distinction between the 
                                            
65 Goldman, who comes to a similar conclusion, albeit through a slightly different approach, additionally 
speculates “that the reason so many people do vote, as a matter of fact, is precisely because of their grasp of 
the rationale offered here, including their grasp of the ‘contributing cause’ role that their voting occupies within 
the system” (1999, p. 216). If true, this would give further support to the idea that accounting for the way in 
which we cause outcomes together with others is in line with how we understand voting and similar instances 
of collective action. 
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direct (e.g. voting for a policy in a referendum) and indirect (e.g. voting for a politician) 
commissioning of acts:  
in cases of direct commissioning, the commissioners have a reasonable 
expectation that the commissioned action will be done, they can more easily 
foresee the effects of its being done, and they are a bigger part of the 
explanation of what is done (it strikes me as a plausible principle that the 
greater the distance between the commissioning and the action, the greater 
the responsibility of the agent who performs the action compared against 
the agents who commissioned it). (2018, pp. 117-18) 
We therefore need to find an account of how citizens can be causally implicated in the actions 
of their politicians, given that the actions of their leaders are relatively independent of the 
actions of citizens once they have been elected and could be construed as a novus actus 
interveniens that severs the causal chain between the citizen and the political decision in 
question. This problem is particularly relevant when the decision in question has been a dirty-
handed one. Such decisions will often have to be made quickly so that there is no time to 
consult citizens, or they will have to be kept a secret from citizens at the time of the decision. 
I will go into more detail on these issues when discussing whether citizens satisfy the 
epistemic condition for moral responsibility, but it will be sufficient to note at this point that 
dirty-handed decisions are likely to be taken independently from any input from citizens.  
I will argue that the causal condition for individual moral responsibility can be fulfilled by 
merely contributing rather than participating, in the sense of making a difference individually 
or as part of a set to the outcome in question. Even if citizens cannot be said to have made 
a difference, whether individually or as part of a set, to a particular political decision, we 
could hold them causally, and potentially morally, responsible for the way in which they 
contributed to the wider political process and therefore complicit in the political decisions 
taken within that system. When an agent merely contributes to rather than participates in an 
action that results in an outcome they can be said to be complicit in having brought about 
that outcome. Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin introduce a distinction between principal 
agents who commit the principal wrongdoing and secondary agents “whose actions do not 
constitute the principal wrongdoing but are part of a causal chain leading to it and even to 
agents whose actions appear related although, at a closer analysis, make no causal 
contribution to it” (2013, p. 33) and in virtue of this can be complicit. The idea is that even 
if the politician acts independently of citizens and their actions can be said to constitute a 
novus actus interveniens that severs the causal chain between a citizen and that particular political 
decision, the citizen is still connected to that decision through their wider contribution (e.g. 
electing that politician) in such a way that they can be said to fulfil the requirements for moral 
responsibility. A secondary and complicit agent makes “potentially causal contributions to 
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the principal wrongdoing of others, without their acts in any way constituting part of that 
principal wrongdoing in themselves” (2013, p. 41). A secondary act can contribute to the 
principal wrongdoing in a variety of ways, it can “make it possible”, “induce”, “facilitate”, 
“make it easier”, “incentivize”, or “encourage” (2013, p. 42). A common form of complicity 
is, for example, through collaboration. A collaborator is to some extent aware of the 
intentions or plan of the principal and acts in such a way as to support or further them. 
Complicity can, however, also come in less conspicuous forms. Sometimes it may be enough 
to connive in or condone the actions of the principal in order to be complicit, if doing so 
encourages the principal to execute or continue with her plan. Similarly, simply consorting 
or having contiguity with the principal could be sufficient for complicity if that encourages 
or strengthens the principal’s resolve to execute or continue with her plan.  The basic idea is 
that the secondary agent does not have to be part of some form of joint action with the 
principal66, but that it is sufficient for the secondary agent to in some way or another 
contribute to the principal executing her intention or plan. This is not to deny, however, that 
the more the secondary agent’s contribution is central to and joint with the principal 
wrongdoing, the higher their level of complicity will be. 
What can complicity tell us about the causal responsibility of citizens for the actions of their 
political leaders? If we allow that citizens in some way contribute to their leaders taking a 
given policy decision, we can show that they are complicit in a way that can satisfy the causal 
condition even if their actions did not, either individually or as part of a set, constitute the 
political action because their politicians take decisions independently of them, and can be 
said to constitute a novus actus interveniens that severs the direct causal chain between citizens 
and the decision taken. Using the language introduced by Lepora and Goodin, on a 
fundamental level we can argue that citizens “make it possible” for politicians to do the 
things they do. Citizens take part in a system that transfers individual decision-making power 
to elected representatives who are given the authority and leeway to take decisions for them 
and in their names. All citizens who participate in or sustain a democratic state would 
therefore share this baseline complicity. In addition, many citizens are likely to make a variety 
of the following, non-exhaustive list, of contributory actions: they “make it easier” for 
politicians to act independently of citizens by not taking an active stance on political issues; 
                                            
66 This is where Lepora and Goodin are different to Christopher Kutz’s account of complicity (2007). Kutz 
argues that an agent is complicit when they are part of a joint action through their overlapping participatory 
intention. It is, however, unclear what the lowest common denominator is for an intention to overlap and for 
an action to count as joint on his account. Additionally, as Lepora and Goodin note, it also eradicates the 
distinction between merely contributing to an action and joining in that action; on the most fundamental level 
complicity requires mere contribution instead of full participation as required by Kutz (2013, pp. 80-81). This 
is why I will use Lepora and Goodin’s understanding of complicity. 
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they “incentivize” or “induce” politicians to take certain decisions through promises of re-
electing or threats of not re-electing them; they “encourage” politicians to take certain 
decisions through public shows of support or opposition; and they “facilitate” politicians 
taking certain decisions by co-operating with these policies. 
The second problem we were faced with in this section was that causal responsibility for 
electing a politician does not equate to causal responsibility for what that politician does, 
because citizens cannot be said to have made a difference, whether individually or as part of 
a set, to that particular political decision as politicians act largely independently of citizens 
once elected. If, however, we allow that an agent can fulfil the causal condition for moral 
responsibility in virtue of being merely complicit in the principal wrongdoing, we can explain 
why a citizen’s contribution to the wider democratic process is enough to implicate them in 
the decisions their leaders take for them. The level of responsibility and corresponding level 
of blameworthiness will depend on how central a citizen’s contribution was to the principal 
wrongdoing of the politician; the less essential it was, the less blameworthy they ought to be. 
There are then three broad ways in which citizens can fulfil the causal condition for moral 
responsibility in the case of policy decisions: they can make an individual difference to a 
policy decision (e.g. a wealthy donor that has sway over a political decision-maker), they can 
make a difference to a policy decision as part of a set of citizens (e.g. a citizen voting for or 
against a given policy in a referendum), or, on the most basic level, they can be complicit in 
a policy decision in virtue of their contribution to the wider political process (e.g. voting for 
the particular politician or party, condoning the policy in an opinion poll or on social media, 
buying a newspaper that condones the policy, or on the most fundamental level by merely 
being a good citizens who votes, pays taxes, and obeys the law). Obviously the further down 
the list we go, the less responsible citizens become for their participation in or contribution 
to the political process. 
7.3.2. Voluntariness Condition 
So far I have established the set of citizens who have the right kind of causal connection to 
the dirty-handed actions of their political leaders to be potentially morally responsible for 
their actions. The question now is which citizens of this set can also be said to have made 
their participation or contribution voluntarily. My approach here, remember, is one of step-
by-step elimination in which I start by narrowing down the pool of citizens who satisfy the 
first condition and then ask which members of that pool can then also satisfy the next 
condition, and so forth. Voluntariness, as I have defined it, depends on the moral features 
of the situation at hand. Additionally, in the previous section I identified three broad 
categories to distinguish the sorts of actions that make a citizen causally responsible for what 
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a political leader does. Either they make an individual difference, or they make a difference 
as part of a set, or they are complicit through their contribution to the political process more 
generally. 
When democratic citizens actively participate and make a difference to the political outcome, 
either individually or as part of a set, they can be said to have done so voluntarily. In 
democratic states there are generally no forms of force, duress, or compulsion present that 
would make citizens vote a particular way or join a particular demonstration etc. Citizens do 
not have to fear any serious repercussions from the state or its agencies when they decide to 
vote one way or another or not go to the ballot at all. Just like citizens who participate in a 
democracy, citizens who actively contribute to the wider democratic process in a variety of 
different ways (e.g. voting for a politician or party and thereby enabling them to pursue 
certain policies, or buying newspapers that support certain political narratives, thereby 
allowing them to take a stronger hold in the public conscience) can also be said to have done 
so voluntarily. Again, the citizen in question was not forced or compelled to contribute to 
politics in this way. Given the absence of force, duress, and compulsion together with the 
fact that we think it is important for citizens to have the ability to make their own self-
directed and autonomous political choices in such situations, we have good reasons to think 
that their actions are voluntary. Of course, citizens could be faced with a dirty hands situation 
when participating in or contributing to the political process such as, for example, two 
policies in a referendum that would both have detrimental consequences and, as a result, 
present them with a choice of lesser evils. In this case, as in the case of politicians and public 
officials faced with dirty hands situations, we have good moral reasons to say that the citizens 
acted voluntarily. In this case, our reasons are similar to those in the case of the political 
leader faced with a dirty hands scenario. We only want to count people’s votes if they have 
been given voluntarily and not as a result of force, duress, or compulsion. We also think that 
it is important that people have the ability to make their voices heard in such a referendum 
and in this way indicate to us which of the options at hand is preferable (even though it may 
only be a lesser evil). This is, after all, one of the most important ways in which citizens can 
shape political discourse and policies. Were we to call their choice in such a voting scenario 
involuntary we would thereby invalidate their vote. Ensuring that citizens have an ability 
meaningfully to get involved in politics therefore gives us good moral reasons to call the 
decisions they make voluntary, even when faced with a dirty hands scenario. 
Other types of contributions, however, do not obviously appear to be voluntary. When 
citizens do not pay their taxes or obey the law more generally, they have to face the serious 
repercussions for not doing so. Some citizens may pay their taxes and obey the law because 
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they genuinely want to do so, independently of whether there are any serious repercussions 
for non-compliance. In these cases we would want their decision to do so to be called 
voluntary as it seems to be a genuine exercise of their agency and we want citizens to have 
the ability to make such self-determined decisions. But, I suspect, there will be a considerable 
set of citizens for whom this is not the case; they may only pay their taxes and generally obey 
the law because they feel that they are forced to do so by the state. In this case, the threat of 
the law represents a metaphorical gun to the head which coerces them in such a way that 
their choice to follow the law and pay their taxes is not a sign of their agency. On the face of 
it we would therefore not want to call their decision voluntary because calling actions done 
only for the fear of being, for example, imprisoned, cannot be said to help protect their ability 
to make autonomous and self-determined choices about their lives. If this characterisation 
were accurate, this would imply that their contribution to the political process is not 
voluntary and that they therefore cannot be morally responsible for what their political 
leaders do. I will argue that we ought to resist that conclusion. In order to show why, we 
need to understand the nature of the relationship between citizens and their state, because if 
citizens have in some sense voluntarily chosen to be part of the state, then they cannot argue 
that their contribution to it is not voluntary. To understand the relationship between citizens 
and the state it will be helpful to take a look at the political obligation literature which has 
discussed this connection in much detail. 
If we could show that their participation in or contribution to the political process is the 
result of consenting to enter that state, then their actions can satisfy the voluntariness 
condition because valid consent presupposes that it was given voluntarily. An account that 
argues for the position that citizens have consented to being part of the state can be found 
in John Locke’s work. He starts from a state of nature characterised by a state of perfect 
liberty in which no individual has more power than another. The only restriction on what an 
individual may or may not do comes from the law of nature that governs the state of nature. 
This law of nature,  intelligible to all individuals through their capacity to reason, is that, given 
the inherent equality of all individuals in the state of nature, no one may harm another 
individual. The only exception to this is when another individual has broken the law of 
nature. Any individual in the state of nature has the right to punish the offence. The problem 
for Locke is that in a state in which individuals are judges and executioners in their own case, 
chaos will likely ensue. The introduction of civil society and government is then supposed to 
present a remedy for this issue. Each individual gives up their own natural liberty in the state 
of nature in order to join society and gain the security and stability afforded by a central 
authority whose different branches take on the role of judge and executioner (1999, pp. 269-
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278; 318-330). The only way in which individuals can give up their natural liberty, however, 
is through consent. Consent can come in two distinct forms. Firstly, an individual could give 
their express consent to enter civil society. Express consent is given through verbal or written 
agreement at a distinct point in time. I will not pursue the idea of express consent any further 
because I agree with A. John Simmons that “most of us have never been faced with a 
situation where express consent to a government’s authority was even appropriate, let alone 
actually performed such an act” (1979, p. 79). Instead, I want to focus on the second way in 
which Locke argues that individuals could give their consent to entering civil society; this is 
the idea of tacit consent. He argues that “every man that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, 
of any part of the Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and 
is as far forth Obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that Government” (1999, p. 348).67 The 
idea here is that simply in virtue of taking up the advantages offered to us by civil society, an 
individual tacitly consents to become a member of that society and to have to obey its laws. 
Seeing as it is the individual’s choice whether or not to take up these advantages, an 
individual’s decision to enter civil society is voluntary. 
While this presents an argument for those individuals that initially decided to form civil 
society, Locke goes on to consider those in later generations who have simply been born into 
that society. The problem for his account is that it seems as if citizens cannot but have the 
kind of enjoyments that are a supposed sign of their voluntary and tacit consent. Locke 
responds to this issue that, in fact, there is a distinct point at which individuals have the 
power to decide whether to take up these enjoyments. Firstly, children are not born the 
subjects of any society or government. Instead they are simply born into the authority of 
their father. When this child then comes of age, they indeed have the ability to decide whether 
to take up the enjoyments of the civil society of which their father is a part. If they do so, we 
can infer that they have tacitly consented to becoming part of that society. Locke argues that 
“people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they 
are naturally subjects as they are Men” (1999, p. 347). Just because this is a choice that we 
are not usually aware of, does not mean that this choice does not exist. There is an obvious 
problem with this solution. Leaving aside the questionable premise that children are not born 
into civil society but under the authority of their father, really how much of an option is it to 
renounce our entire life and leave the society that we have grown up in when we come of 
age? As David Hume has noted, “can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a 
                                            
67 This understanding of what tacit consent entails has been questioned. For a convincing criticism see: 
Simmons (1979, pp. 75-100). Simmons then pursues a different understanding of tacit consent, but still comes 
to the conclusion that it cannot adequately explain our relationship with the state. For the purposes of my 
enquiry I will therefore simply concentrate on Locke’s original account of tacit consent. 
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free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives 
from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires” (2006, p. 193)? When the costs of 
exiting society are so high, then the mere enjoyments of the advantages of the society into 
which one was born cannot amount to any form of tacit consent to that civil society. Hume 
provides us an analogy to support this point (2006, p. 193). Imagine that in your sleep you 
have been kidnapped and carried on a ship. When you wake up the ship had long set sail and 
you find yourself in the middle of the ocean. Your only options are either to join the crew 
and obey the commands of the captain, or to jump ship and perish at sea. Hume argues that 
clearly, we would not want to take your remaining on the ship as a sign of your tacit consent. 
The same goes for individuals who find themselves part of a civil society. 
The result of this brief discussion of Locke and Hume is that we cannot take merely living 
in and obeying the laws of a state as a sign that a citizen has consented to that community 
and state. We therefore cannot use consent as a ground for explaining how citizens who obey 
the law and pay taxes only to avoid the repercussions of not doing so satisfy the voluntariness 
condition for moral responsibility in virtue of their contribution to the wider political 
process. Tacit consent is, however, not the only way in which writers in the political 
obligation literature have attempted to explain the relationship between citizens and the state. 
Tacit consent theorists such as Locke usually start from a state of nature and then argue that 
through a voluntary commitment we move into a political community. They then try, in a 
later step, to somehow justify what happens to people who are already born into a political 
community using the same theoretical grounds. Such an approach, however, seems 
misguided. When we want to understand the relation between citizens and the state we are 
looking at individuals who, for better or worse, are already embedded in a given social and 
political order. We want to explain how these people are related to the state. As a response 
to this worry, associative accounts, as opposed to consent theories, start from individuals 
who are members of a political community right from the start and how their relationship 
with the state can be made sense of. The basic premise of associative theories is that we come 
to stand in certain relations and acquire certain moral obligations in virtue of the social roles 
that we occupy and that this is the case even when we have not voluntarily chosen or 
consented to occupying that role. John Horton provides us with the analogy of a family 
(1992, pp. 145-152). We are born into families and our conception of our membership within 
that family is a crucial part of our self-identity. The way we conceive of our role within the 
family is important for shaping and making sense of who we are. This is so, even though 
families are characterised by a relationship and mutual obligations that have not been 
voluntarily chosen. This relationship and the obligations that come with it are ultimately 
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derived from the simple fact of our membership and do not require any further moral 
justification. We cannot say that the relationship and resulting obligations between, for 
example, siblings is on a most basic level explained by consent, fairness, or even love. After 
all, we do not get a choice in who our siblings are and we might think that this special 
relationship between us holds even if we are not receiving anything in return or do not 
particularly like that sibling. Standing in this relation and having these obligations to the other 
individuals in my family is simply what it means to be part of a family. Having such 
obligations is constitutive of being a member. The idea is that a similar case can be made for 
citizens.   
Associative accounts generally operate on the basis of two premises. Firstly, we are all born 
into a political community which fundamentally shapes our understanding of who we are. 
Secondly, political obligations are a constitutive part of our role as members of that society.  
As a result, when our identity is crucially shaped by the society of which we are a part and as 
a result identify as members of that society, then we also have to accept the political 
obligations that are constitutive of that very membership. This means that, as Horton puts it 
“the sense of identity which is constituted through membership of a particular polity is most 
naturally expressed through the acknowledgement of the authority of its laws and 
government” because “it is these that characteristically define the terms of association within 
a polity” (1992, p. 165). The underlying idea in associative accounts is that obligations arise 
in virtue of our membership, but a pre-requisite for that membership is that the individual, 
even if only unconsciously, identify as a member. This results in, what Horton calls, a sense 
of authorship for the actions of our political community and its leaders; “for there is an 
important, though limited, sense in which we understand ourselves as the authors of such 
actions, even when we oppose them: they are the actions of our polity, the polity of which 
we are member” (1992, pp. 152-153).  
Someone may object now by asking: what happens to citizens of illegitimate regimes? We 
clearly would not want to say that citizens of a violent dictatorship incur political obligations 
in virtue of their membership in the political community. Horton argues that associative 
accounts can deal with this worry. The institutional obligations we have in virtue of being 
members in a political community do not exist in a vacuum. Other moral commitments will 
put limits on what institutions can be justified and what obligations our membership in them 
can give rise to. Horton provides us with the following analogy: "if Fred promises Mary to 
murder John, Fred acquires no obligation to murder John, for it was not something Fred was 
entitled to promise, and Mary has no right to its enactment” (1992, p. 156). The promise in 
this case does not generate any form of obligation that is then overridden by our other moral 
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commitments (e.g. murder is wrong). Instead, there was simply no obligation because the 
features of the situation entail that no obligation can be generated in the first place. The same 
goes for membership and obligations in an unjust regime. Associative accounts therefore can 
make sense of our intuition that while membership in a democratic state generates political 
obligation, membership in a dictatorship does not. 
So how is an associative account supposed to help us in understanding whether there is a 
voluntary element in the relationship between citizens and the state sufficient to make the 
former morally responsible for the contributions they make to the wider political process, if 
they do so merely by obeying the law and paying taxes in order to avoid the serious 
repercussions of not doing so? Surely, if we acquire membership and our identity as a 
member automatically through birth and our upbringing within that political community, this 
would appear to be a highly involuntary process, because surely we have good moral reasons 
not to call conduct that was forced by the threat of, e.g. incarceration, voluntary. After all, 
allowing for such decisions to be called voluntary would hardly protect the agent’s ability to 
make self-determined and autonomous choices about their life. It is at this point that 
Massimo Renzo, when developing his particular associative account, argues that once we 
acknowledge that our self-identification as a member of a political community is crucial to 
the relationship that we have with the state, we have to make room for the idea of some 
form of voluntariness. 
He argues that while “we have family obligations simply because we occupy certain roles (of 
son, brother etc.), and since in many cases we do not choose to take up those roles, we 
cannot be said to have chosen the obligations attached to them […] the fact that we did not 
choose to take up these roles does not necessarily mean that we do not voluntarily occupy 
them” (2012, p. 120).68 The idea is that just because I was born into a family, does not mean 
that over time I cannot come to identify myself as a member of that family in such a way 
that I can be said to voluntarily occupy that role. Similarly, just because I have not voluntarily 
chosen to be born into a given society, this does not mean that I now cannot be voluntarily 
occupying my role as a citizen in that society. Unlike for consent theorists, voluntariness on 
this account does not require a specific point in time at which an individual needs to decide 
whether they want to be a member or not. Instead, “membership within the political 
community is […] the product of a gradual process of identification that we carry on 
throughout our entire life” (2012, p. 126). Throughout our lives we continually develop the 
                                            
68 Obviously this statement in and of itself is not sufficient to show that we now necessarily occupy this role 
voluntarily. I will elaborate on the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for someone to voluntarily 
occupy the role that they originally did not voluntarily choose as this section goes on. 
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understanding we have of ourselves and the roles that we occupy. As part of this, many, if 
not most of us, come to see our membership in a political community as a part of what 
constitutes who we are. There is no clear point at which this becomes true or not but instead 
is part of an ongoing process that changes over time. This process tries to make sense of the 
various roles that I occupy throughout my life, some voluntary and some not, and this is 
partly under my control. I have some control of how to fit these roles and the obligations 
attached to them together, and how to make sense of who I am based on this. Renzo wants 
to call this “quasi-voluntary” to distinguish it from the kind of choice that express or tacit 
consent theorists use (2012, pp. 121-122). While we have, in most cases, not voluntarily 
chosen to be a member of a given political community, we have quasi-voluntarily chosen to 
endorse this membership over time. We have good moral reasons to call such a choice 
voluntary because we want people to have the power to decide how they want to live and 
what positions and roles they want to occupy. As a result my acts as a member of that state 
that continue to sustain that political community can be said to be voluntary. While it is true 
that some people only pay their taxes and obey the law more generally because they know 
that this is what they have to do to live a peaceful life in their society, when they have 
voluntarily endorsed a picture of themselves as a member of their political community they 
can also be said to have voluntarily assumed the obligations constitutive of that membership. 
Those citizens can therefore satisfy the voluntariness condition for moral responsibility as 
long as they, like most of us, identify and act as members of their political community.  
Conversely, those who genuinely do not identify themselves as members of their community 
and only contribute in some ways because they have tried to but cannot avoid doing so, will 
not be morally responsible for the actions of their political leaders. Their actions are 
involuntary because we want to acknowledge that they have made a self-determined choice 
not to be members but are now forced to exercise the obligations constitutive of that 
membership nonetheless. It is not, however, sufficient for someone to claim that they do not 
identify as members without actually altering their conduct. As Horton argues,  
to participate fully and actively in the political life of a community; 
conscientiously to observe the rules and standards of the community; and 
generally, over a sustained period of time, consistently to behave in ways 
indistinguishable from those recognised as appropriate for a member of the 
political community; but then to deny that one acknowledges any political 
obligation lacks conviction. (1992, p. 160) 
Now someone might argue that if citizens who genuinely want to renounce their membership 
have to take some form of action to actually remove themselves from society, we are then 
back at Hume’s ship analogy. After all, it is one thing to realise that you no longer identify 
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with your membership of the political community, and another to actually remove yourself 
from your social role as a citizen altogether by moving away from your country. Doing so is 
in many cases so onerous that it would be too costly to renounce your membership even 
though you no longer identify as a member. If the only way to renounce your membership 
would involve taking such drastic measures, then your membership in that society could not 
be assumed to be voluntary. My response to this is twofold. Firstly, I want to argue that 
physically removing oneself from one’s country is not the only way that one can renounce 
one’s membership. Secondly, I want to clarify that physically removing oneself from one’s 
country is, in and of itself, not sufficient for escaping moral responsibility for the actions of 
one’s leaders anyway. 
Let us start by examining other ways in which citizens could reasonably renounce their 
membership. Consider citizens who have decided that they no longer identify as a member 
of their society but, rather than showing this by extracting themselves from their political 
community in order to avoid participating in or contributing to its actions, want to do so by 
staying in it in order to change it from within. Surely that is a worthwhile and noble approach 
and we should not follow from their remaining within the territory of the state that they still 
see themselves as endorsing their membership of that state. Take for example the case of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He was a German pastor who vehemently opposed the Nazi regime 
from day one. He found their actions to be entirely incompatible with his religious beliefs 
and was dismayed that the majority of his fellow citizens were following the Nazi ideology. 
There is no question then that Bonhoeffer could no longer conceive of himself as a member 
of Nazi Germany. For short periods of time he indeed left Germany but ultimately returned 
to join the underground resistance in order to undermine the regime from within. He used 
his standing in the church and his connections to preach against Nazi ideology and help Jews 
escape from Germany. At the age of 39 he was imprisoned and executed when his 
connection to the resistance became known. Bonhoeffer had the opportunity to disassociate 
himself completely from Germany and clearly renounce his membership, but chose to stay. 
What this example shows us is that moving away from one’s country is not the only way to 
renounce one’s membership fully. When one’s entire life and all of one’s actions are geared 
to protest against one’s polity and trying to affect change from within, then that should be 
efficient evidence of having renounced one’s membership. As a result the relationship 
between the agent and the state would be severed so that we would not want to hold that 
individual morally responsible for what the politicians in that country do. So even if we did 
not have the means to physically remove ourselves from our political community to renounce 
our membership, we could have worked to change it for the better from within by 
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committing our lives and actions to undermining the current regime or prevalent attitude. In 
as much as this is a viable option for citizens to renounce their membership, when they do 
not take up this opportunity to remove themselves from their political community in both 
word and deed they can be said to remain members voluntarily. 
We should, however, acknowledge that not all of us can become Bonhoeffers. Many citizens 
will simply lack the means (e.g. financial, reputational, educational) to remove themselves 
from their political community in the way and to the extent that Bonhoeffer did, no matter 
how much they would like to do so. These citizens who, over time, have come to the 
conclusion that they do not see themselves as a member of their political community should 
instead try to remove themselves from that society above a certain threshold given the means 
available to them. Throughout our lives we have ample opportunities to let those in power 
know that we disagree with the way in which they use their power (e.g. voting, going to 
demonstrations, signing petitions). We were in no way forced to take up these opportunities, 
our failure to do so can clearly be attributed to our agency and constitutes an autonomous 
choice, and to acknowledge and protect citizens’ autonomy we ought to call these choices 
voluntary. Only when a citizen has exhausted a large proportion of the means available to 
them to take part in these ways to show that they do not endorse their membership of a state 
that engages in certain behaviours, should we therefore say that their participation in or 
contribution to their state is no longer voluntary. These citizens would therefore not be 
morally responsible for the actions of their political leaders. Because the means available to 
engage in these behaviours vary, the threshold at which a citizen can be said to have 
renounced their membership and to be no longer voluntarily contributing to the political 
community will also vary accordingly. Especially people in the in the lowest socio-economic 
strata of society who genuinely do not identify themselves as members of that community 
anymore will therefore have a comparatively low threshold of what it takes to remove their 
name from the political community and no longer to be responsible for what those in power 
do. Given that the majority of us, however, do not exhaust a large proportion of the means 
available to us to renounce our membership, the vast majority of us can be said to contribute 
to the political process voluntarily and are as such legitimate targets for ascriptions of 
responsibility for the actions of our political leaders. 
So what about removing oneself from one’s country as a way to renounce one’s membership 
and to avoid moral responsibility for the actions of our political leaders? While this clearly is 
not possible for many citizens, it will be a viable option for some. When we consider that 
trying to change the system from within (to the extent that they have the means to do so) 
can be reasonably expected of citizens, then physically removing oneself from an immoral 
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situation is clearly not sufficient for evading moral responsibility for that situation. Leaving 
the state may be sufficient to escape its political authority, but that surely cannot be enough 
to escape moral responsibility for the harms that one’s country perpetrates. That would make 
it too easy for individuals to rid themselves of that wrongdoing even though they could have 
taken steps to lessen or even eliminate it. Imagine that you have joined a violent group that 
likes to beat people up in the street. After a while you start to question the morality of the 
group’s actions and half-way through perpetrating an attack you simply walk away. You do 
not try to help the victim yourself, you do not attempt to gather bystanders to help the victim, 
you do not call the police. You simply walk away. I think that we would not want to say that 
you have thereby avoided all responsibility for the attack on the victim. Your responsibility 
may have been lessened in as much as you are not handing out any further punches, but you 
could have reasonably been expected to try and save the victim. The same goes for citizens. 
By physically removing yourself from the state you are obviously no longer participating in 
or contributing to the harm in question, but surely you could have been reasonably expected 
to do more to lessen or eliminate the wrongdoing in which you had been complicit. In many 
cases I think that this is true, but I think that there are certain cases in which physically 
removing oneself from one’s country can be sufficient to remove oneself from responsibility. 
This is when one thinks that removing oneself can help stop the harm that is being 
perpetrated. Most likely this will take the form of publicly announcing that one would rather 
make the onerous decision to renounce one’s membership than be associated with that 
system any longer, in order to draw attention to the issue and build pressure on those who 
have the ability to make changes to that system. Recently a white student resigned from her 
fully funded PhD programme at the University of Cambridge because of the structural racism 
she encountered. She acknowledged that “it is always tricky to know whether to divest one’s 
energy from an unjust institution or to stay and fight to improve it”, but after having tried to 
change the institution from within and having found doing so impossible she decided to 
leave because she did not want to be “re-legitimising it by contributing [her] time, effort, and 
skills as a member of the university” (Seresin, 2019). Her public statement has sparked a lot 
of debate and in that way contributes to the pressure on the institution to make changes. In 
a similar way, when citizens make their reasoning to leave the state public, their leaving can 
become a tool in effecting change when doing so from within would be unlikely. While 
leaving the state can reduce one’s moral responsibility for any ongoing wrongdoing, it cannot 
eliminate it fully if it does not contribute to an effort to change the issues identified with the 
state in question. 
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I began this section by arguing that much of our participation in and contribution to 
democratic politics (e.g. voting, taking part in demonstrations, buying newspapers) can be 
said to be voluntary. I then considered that this does not seem to be obviously true for some 
other forms of contributions, though, in particular paying one’s taxes and generally obeying 
the law, because non-compliance would come at a significant cost to the individual such that 
they could be said to be forced to take part in politics in that way. If they do not contribute 
voluntarily, however, they could also not be responsible for the actions of their political 
leaders that they have indirectly enabled. I responded that some of the people who do 
nothing but pay their taxes and obey the law may still do so voluntarily if they do so because 
they genuinely want to, independent of the fact that there are serious costs to non-
compliance. We were then, however, left with a considerable number of citizens for whom 
this is not the case. Do all of them therefore only contribute to politics involuntarily and are 
they thus unable to be morally responsible? I argued that this is not the case in as much as 
many of these citizens will have voluntarily endorsed their membership in that state and 
therefore also the kinds of obligations such as paying taxes and obeying the law that are 
constitutive of that membership. They have done so voluntarily because it is open to them 
to renounce their membership, though this will have to be done both in word and deed. I 
have suggested that this can be done by, at the extreme end, becoming a martyr like 
Bonhoeffer or by moving away when doing so can contribute to institutional change. Neither 
of these options can be expected of the average citizen, though. In order to renounce their 
membership from the state they would have to exhaust a large proportion of the resources 
available to them to show that they take back their name from the actions perpetrated by the 
government. Given that the majority of us, however, do not exhaust a large proportion of 
the means available to us to renounce our membership, the vast majority of us can be said 
to contribute to the political process voluntarily and are as such legitimate targets for 
ascriptions of responsibility for the actions of our political leaders. 
A critic of my account may argue that these standards for renouncing one’s membership are 
still so high that not living up to them is not voluntary. Should it not be enough that I take 
some steps in my life (e.g. voting against the politician or party that embodies the things that 
I cannot identify with) rather than having to give up life as one knows it? While I agree that 
most of us will never exhaust a large proportion of the means available to us to renounce 
our membership in the political community as far as possible, I think that we simply have to 
accept that this makes us potentially responsible for the actions of our leaders. Given the 
way in which our actions enable and support the ability of our rules to make decisions that 
will leave people significantly worse off or even dead, it is important to ensure that it is not 
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too easy for people to divest themselves of responsibility and create responsibility shortfalls. 
As such, people’s decisions not to do more can be said to be voluntary. To be sure, this 
makes morality very demanding and might require us to re-think seriously what it takes to 
remove ourselves from responsibility for much that is wrong with this world, but that is a 
conclusion that I am happy to reach. Take the example of living in a capitalist society. I have 
strong anti-capitalist sentiment, I support and vote for political parties that want to counter-
act some of the capitalist forces in our society, and I share my worries about capitalism with 
my friends and family and hope that they will be convinced by them. I still, however, eat and 
shop at large multinational corporations that I know to embody much of what I dislike about 
capitalism (e.g. horrible working conditions, zero-hour contracts, and pay that is below the 
living wage for most of their employees). I might eat or shop at these places because it is 
more convenient, or because of peer pressure, or because I would like a product that only 
they supply. Either way, though I show some opposition to the capitalist system in terms of 
my political choices and engagement with others, I also actively support it through the 
consumer choices that I make every day. I think that we can ascribe moral responsibility to 
me for the way in which I participate in and contribute to this capitalist system. Voicing some 
criticism and acting in some ways to counter-act that system is not sufficient to renounce my 
membership in it. As such I ought to be responsible for the ways in which I sustain and 
further that system. Obviously the degree to which I criticise or act against a certain system, 
even if it is not sufficient to eliminate all moral responsibility for it, can still significantly 
lessen my responsibility. For example, someone who votes for anti-capitalist candidates, 
occasionally goes to anti-capitalist demonstrations, and reduces the amount of shopping they 
do at major international corporations will be less morally responsible than someone who 
votes for capitalist parties, publicly opposes legislation to hold multi-national corporations 
to account, and does not support local shops.69 If we do not physically remove ourselves 
from the political community in a way that could support institutional change, become 
Bonhoeffers who dedicate their lives to changing the system from within, or exhaust a large 
proportion of our resources trying to do either of these, we can be said to have voluntarily 
chosen to remain in the relative comfort of that system, and as a result we can be morally 
responsible for the results of that system. 
                                            
69 As a result of the capitalist argument someone might say the following: “Look, we’re all equally responsible, 
so you’re no better than me, so stop telling me to change what I’m doing”. This kind of example could be used 
to shut down arguments and ascribe some form of hypocrisy to those who want to motivate people to change 
their behaviour. I want to point out that this is not what my invocation of the capitalism example is supposed 
to do, and that this is at odds with my emphasis on the different grades of responsibility that citizens have in 
virtue of their participation in or contribution to democratic politics. My account is supposed to give us an 
incentive to re-evaluate our relationship to the actions of our political leaders and what this entails for our 
behaviour. 
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Another objection to my account might point out that so far I have only talked about citizens 
who clearly embrace their membership in the political community and those who have 
decided, at least in their mind, that they do not. But what about citizens who do not do 
either? There is most likely a non-negligible number of citizens who have simply failed to 
reflect on their membership in society and the ways in which their actions contribute to the 
wider political community. Do they thereby escape political obligation and, according to my 
argument so far, moral responsibility? Note that I mentioned earlier that unconscious 
identification with one’s political community is sufficient for membership on an associative 
account. Renzo briefly argues, in line with what Horton has asserted, that such individuals 
weakly identify with their political community and that this is sufficient for generating 
political obligation because “the question of what justifies political obligation over these 
individuals (the fact that they do identify, though only weakly, with the political community) 
is not to be confused with the question of what motivates them to obey the law (habit or 
self-interest)” (2012, p. 115). Now even if we were to grant that such weak identification 
could generate political obligation, for the purposes of my argument, would such weak 
identification not be involuntary and therefore not generate the moral responsibility that I 
want it to? After all, it would be odd to call our failure to do something that we were not 
aware of having to do voluntary. Making such demands would be at odds with the 
expectations that we can reasonably have of others. Firstly, we ought to remember that we 
are not thinking of the kind of choice that express and tacit consent theorists usually have in 
mind when talking about voluntariness. While the citizens in question have not chosen to be 
members at a specific point in time, they have, over the course of their lives, failed to make 
use of their ability to reflect on their social role as citizens. It is probably fair to say that many 
people are aware that they should and could know more about politics and their role within 
it but that they are not interested in reflecting on that area of their lives. They have voluntarily 
made a lot of autonomous choices and these have accumulated over time into a failure to 
remove themselves sufficiently from membership in their community and the responsibilities 
that result from that. Their voluntary choices have led them to become complicit in the 
actions of their political leaders. As mentioned throughout my discussion, their failure to 
reflect will obviously be involuntary if they did not have the means available to do so. For 
example, a single parent who has to work several jobs just to keep afloat is unlikely to have 
the time or energy available to them to reflect on their membership in the political 
community and can hardly be said to have voluntarily chosen not to do so. We also want to 
make allowances for the fact that, while many people have voluntarily chosen not to reflect 
on their membership, doing so would have been a lot easier for some than others. For 
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instance, someone who received little to no political education in school and was not taught 
the importance of understanding the way in which our lives are inextricably linked with the 
actions of our political community will be less responsible for failing to reflect on their 
membership than someone who received a basic political education but decided not to dwell 
on it. 
It is true that many citizens will neither endorse their membership of the political community 
nor reject it, but will simply have failed to reflect on it altogether. Their failure to reflect on 
this issue that they were not even really aware of was in many cases nonetheless voluntary. 
Unless they did not have, for various reasons, the means available to become aware of the 
fact that they ought to reflect on their membership in the political community and instead 
contrived their own ignorance by choosing not to dwell on such questions, they can said to 
have done so voluntarily. I will take up the issue of contrived ignorance in more detail in the 
following section. As a result, many of the citizens who do not embrace their membership 
in the polity but simply unreflectingly go on with their lives contributing to the political 
community do so voluntarily and therefore satisfy this condition for ascriptions of moral 
responsibility for the actions of our political leaders. 
In the previous section I showed that citizens can satisfy the causal condition for moral 
responsibility in a variety of ways through the different kinds of contributions they make to 
their political community and the wider democratic process. In this section I have then 
shown that for those citizens who satisfy the causal condition, their participation in and 
contribution to the political community can be understood as voluntary in as much as they 
were not forced into them and we can understand their voting, attending demonstrations, 
buying newspapers etc. as a result of their self-determined and autonomous agency. Even in 
the case of citizens who only have more tenuous causal links and only contribute because 
they happen to live within the confines of the state can be said to do so voluntarily in virtue 
of the individual’s voluntary identification and action as a member of that political 
community. 
7.3.3. Epistemic Condition 
So far I have argued that there is a large set of citizens who are causally responsible for the 
actions of their political leaders through the way in which they can make a difference, 
individually or as part of a set, to the decisions their leaders take or simply through the way 
in which they sustain or further the wider democratic process which makes them complicit. 
I then showed in the previous section that of this set of citizens, a large number will have 
made their participation or contribution voluntarily. Even for those citizens who only 
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marginally contribute to politics simply in virtue of happening to live within the confines of 
the state, this contribution can be understood as voluntary in as far as citizens have 
voluntarily endorsed a picture of themselves as members of their political community and 
where their actions are constitutive of that membership. Now that we have a set of citizens 
who have voluntarily participated in or contributed to the actions of their leaders and the 
democratic process more widely, we have to question which citizens within this set also 
satisfy the epistemic condition for moral responsibility. In short, they either need to have 
known, or should have known, that their action or inaction was likely to lead to the outcome 
in question. Many citizens can be reasonably expected to have informed themselves about a 
variety of ways in which their conduct makes them direct participants in or indirect 
contributors to a certain action. When citizens vote, whether in a referendum on a particular 
policy issue or an election for a particular politician or party, many of them can reasonably 
be expected to have gathered the necessary information to make an informed choice. In a 
democratic society in which a wide variety of information about the policy implications and 
voting intentions of particular options are freely and readily available, most citizens cannot 
claim ignorance in order to shield themselves from moral responsibility. Similarly, when 
citizens buy newspapers or contribute to social media sites that support a certain political 
agenda, or even when they simply follow the law and pay their taxes, many can be expected 
to understand how that may enable or strengthen the ability of a politician to take certain 
decisions.70  
Politics is not always that straightforward, though, and citizens may sometimes be faced with 
the rather unexpected consequences of their actions. What, for example, about a situation in 
which a party goes back on their core election promise? Consider the Liberal Democrats 
who promised their voters during the 2010 UK general election that they would not raise 
tuition fees for university students. They gained a lot of votes based on this promise which 
enabled them to enter a coalition government with the Conservative Party. Once in 
government, however, they no longer opposed the raising of tuition fees, and costs for 
students to attend university were nearly tripled. A citizen who voted for the Liberal 
Democrats may claim that there was no way that they could have reasonably expected the 
party to go back on their election promise entirely, so they should not be held responsible 
for having voted for a party that approved the rise of tuition fees. I agree that in some cases 
where politicians make u-turns on their core election promises, citizens could not have 
reasonably expected that to happen and should therefore not bear moral responsibility for 
                                            
70 I have purposefully said that we can expect this of many or most citizens, but not all. I will elaborate further 
on the expectations that we can have of different groups of citizens later in this section. 
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said u-turn. Some u-turns, however, could have been reasonably foreseen and as a result 
citizens who voted for that party are still directly implicated in that outcome. The Liberal 
Democrats argued that the reason they had to turn back on their election promise was 
because of the limited financial means available to them, something they had not foreseen 
before taking up government. In as much as it was foreseeable that the Liberal Democrats 
would support Conservative austerity measures that reduce spending on social, educational, 
and healthcare measures while at the same time opposing measures that could bring in 
additional revenue such as, for example, raising the taxes of high earners or large 
corporations, voters could have anticipated that the Liberal Democrats would not be able to 
hold on to all of their election promises. Given some of the core economic principles that 
the Liberal Democrats adhere to, some of the ambitious spending measures in their election 
manifesto would have always been difficult to implement. While citizens could maybe not 
have been reasonably expected to have known that the Liberal Democrats would support 
the raising of tuition fees, they could have been reasonably expected to foresee that the 
ambitious targets for social spending laid out in the Liberal Democrats’ election manifesto 
could not be realistic and that they were unlikely to stand in strong enough opposition to 
Conservative austerity measures. To this extent, citizens who voted for the Liberal 
Democrats could still be said to be partly complicit in the party’s actions, although clearly to 
a lesser extent than in a case in which they could have known for certain that the party would 
turn their backs on that particular election promise. 
So far I have argued that we can reasonably expect citizens to understand the way in which 
their voluntary participation in or contribution to different political processes can affect and 
lead to certain political outcomes. As a result, they could not claim ignorance in order to 
shield themselves from moral responsibility for those outcomes. This, however, presupposes 
that all citizens have the same ability to educate themselves sufficiently on complex political 
matters. That does not seem to be true, though. Firstly, the level of political education that 
different citizens receive varies greatly and as a result it will be a lot easier for some citizens 
to make sense of complex political information than for others. What can be reasonably 
expected of a citizen may therefore differ and also result in different levels of responsibility 
that we can ascribe to them. Similarly, some citizens will not have the time to stay on top of 
complex political issues. Someone who has to work several jobs just to make do is likely to 
be constrained by the tasks of daily life in such a way that getting to terms with complex 
political issues would be a much greater burden than for someone who has considerable 
leisure time available to them because they have secure finances to live off. Again then, what 
level of political knowledge we can reasonably expect of people may vary greatly, and 
  
162 
  
therefore the level of moral responsibility for policy outcomes that we can ascribe to them 
will vary as well. 
Understanding how citizens satisfy the epistemic condition is particularly problematic in 
many examples of dirty-handed actions, though. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the issue of secrecy and lies and the way in which this potentially precludes citizens 
from knowing how their actions will contribute to certain outcomes, has been a focal point 
of discussions on democratic dirty hands. Many dirty-handed decisions will be taken in secret, 
behind closed doors, and without the knowledge of the democratic public. The very nature 
of the kind of emergency situations that are emblematic of the dirty hands problem is that 
the public cannot and maybe even should not know about them at the time of the decision-
making. When a political leader has to make a decision on whether a hijacked passenger plane 
ought to be shot down, the time-sensitive nature of the situation will not allow for public 
consultation and deliberation. In the example of the Claudy bombing from the previous 
chapter, where a delicate balance had to be struck between bringing a murderer to justice and 
preventing a violent conflict from escalating, informing the public would have undermined 
the dirty-handed decision in the first place. Should a politician fail to inform the public, or 
act contrary to their wishes, then she seems to be faced with a second dirty hands problem. 
Not only did she commit the dirty deed in question, she also violated the democratic process. 
In the following I will briefly discuss Thompson’s discussion of dirty hands problems 
involving secrecy and lies. Thompson argues that in cases where dirty hands are hidden away 
from the public and where this is not mitigated in the three ways that he suggests, politicians 
will carry the dirty hands by themselves and citizens do not join in the responsibility for such 
actions. I want to show that this conclusion overlooks the way in which citizens may have 
helped to contrive their own ignorance in such situations. 
Thompson starts from the premise that “if citizens cannot know what officials have done, 
they cannot, in any substantial sense, approve or disapprove of their actions” (1987, p. 22). 
Thompson goes on to consider three ways to alleviate this problem: “retrospection”, 
“generalisation and “mediation” (1987, p. 24ff). Retrospection encourages a formal review 
process after the dirty-handed act has been done. The problem with this, however, is that by 
the time that citizens get the chance to judge, the damage might have already been done and 
they might even be forced to continue with certain policies that they object to because of 
that initial dirty hands decision. Generalisation suggests that while the particular act cannot 
be made known publicly in advance, we can discuss the general type of decision in public 
that can then be used as grounds for decisions by politicians in the future. This can only be 
of limited use, however, because general discussion cannot be a substitute for judging the 
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particulars of dirty hands problems. These often include highly contested options that will 
be very dependent on the specific context. Lastly, mediation is the idea of having certain 
legislative bodies overseeing the actions of the executive at the time of action. Even if the 
public cannot be told of some dirty hands decision in advance, these regulative bodies could 
ensure that decision-makers take into account and weigh appropriately the right kind of 
reasons. This method, like the two before, will unfortunately not be able to solve all the 
problems caused by secondary dirty hands problems. Thompson suggests that, when the 
regulatory body is made up of officials with outlooks similar to those of the executive, the 
process of overseeing them will run only too smoothly and in reality there will be very little 
oversight and mediation. At the same time, the more diverse we want these regulatory bodies 
to be, in order to represent as many views of the public as possible on these highly 
contentious issues and to encourage actual oversight and mediation, the higher the likelihood 
that we will have to include too many people in the process. Executives will then be less 
likely to disclose any relevant information to the regulatory body because there was a reason 
in the first place for the information not to be given to too many people. Thompson 
concludes from this that none of these strategies will be able to cover every case of secondary 
dirty hands problems fully “and for those left uncovered politicians do not have democratic 
dirty hands shared with citizens; they have doubly dirty hands, all their own” (1987, p. 32). 
He concludes that we should implement these remedial measures as much as possible 
because, for him, “partly democratic hands are less bad than just plain dirty hands” (1987, p. 
39). The issues of lies and secrecy lead Thompson to conclude that, while they can be 
mitigated in some ways, they will sometimes lead to situations in which politicians will have 
doubly dirty hands while citizens are absolved from moral responsibility for the actions of 
their leaders. After all, they could not have known and as such they cannot be legitimate 
targets for ascriptions of moral responsibility.  
What this misses, however, is the way in which citizens are complicit in sustaining and 
furthering a system in which politicians are given the power and ability to make such 
executive decisions without the knowledge or explicit approval of citizens. Remember that I 
argued in section 6.2.2., following Smith (1983, p. 544), that one of the ways in which an 
agent can be culpable for their own ignorance is by preventing herself at an earlier point from 
subsequently discovering the relevant information. This phenomenon has been called by 
Luban “contrived ignorance” (1998) and I want to argue that citizens are guilty of it. Luban’s 
argument focusses on the case of lawyers, but I think that the phenomenon can be extended 
to citizens as well. When it comes to the measures that our politicians take to protect us, we 
are often happy not to ask too many questions.  Luban argues that this is because “deniability 
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is the key to succeeding at the world’s work, which is often dirty, while keeping a clean 
conscience – or at least a serviceable facsimile of a clean conscience” (1998, p. 959). There 
are different motivations for contriving one’s ignorance. Luban uses the picture of the fox 
and the ostrich (1998, p. 968) to show why we may want to shield ourselves from knowledge. 
The fox is fully intent on committing wrong and, in order to avoid responsibility and liability, 
ensures that they will be ignorant of the details of that future wrongdoing. The ostrich, on 
the other hand, is too scared of being confronted with potential wrongdoing and of having 
to take a stance on it, and so the ostrich would rather put their head in the sand and live in 
ignorance. There are two types of ostrich, one who would have opposed the wrongdoing if 
they had taken their head out of the sand, and one who would not have had the resolve to 
do so even if they had taken their head out of the sand. It is unclear, both to outsiders and 
most likely the ostrich herself, which of these two types she is. We would probably judge the 
fox to be more blameworthy than the ostrich because their intention was set on wrongdoing 
from the outset.71 I think that many citizens are like the ostriches described by Luban, though 
we will never know which of the two types we are. I do not think that most citizens prefer 
not to know exactly what their politicians do as a result of them intentionally wanting to 
promote certain forms of wrongdoing. Instead it is a way for them to keep up the illusion of 
living in a morally faultless democracy, even though they know on some level that such a 
thing does not exist. Contrived ignorance is “a strategy for postponing the moment of truth, 
for sparing ourselves the test of our resolve” (1998, p. 968).  
This stance also seems to be reflected in at least some of the writing on democratic dirty 
hands. Stephen Lukes argues in his paper on torture in liberal democracies that there will 
always be people that will, “take on the burden of making decisions that we would prefer not 
to know about. Perhaps in these cases we democratically endorse being non-democratic” 
(2006, p. 15). If we in fact prefer not to know of certain morally questionable means being 
used by the politicians we elect and that are said to act in our name and for us, this would 
call into question whether the fact that we do not explicitly know about these acts implies 
that we are not morally responsible for them. Richard Bellamy gives the example of secret 
services: it is clear to most citizens that the operation of secret services can only ever be 
public to a limited extent, “so we tolerate wire-tapping of terrorists and spying on unfriendly 
powers, but prefer not to be told” (2010, p. 426). Once, however, we allow for such an 
                                            
71 Note that Luban has a slightly different view on this. He argues that we would judge the ostrich who was too 
scared to face the wrongdoing but who, maybe to their own surprise, would have opposed the wrongdoing 
once they became aware of its full extent more leniently than the ostrich who was morally too weak to confront 
the truth and would not have had the resolve to oppose it even if she would have known. It is unclear to me, 
however, why we judge the former to be less blameworthy than the latter for the wrongdoing. The former may 
have a slightly better character, but their responsibility for the actual wrongdoing appears to be the same. 
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institution to exist and to operate beyond our ken, then we cannot exempt ourselves from 
responsibility for the morally dubious actions that this institution might take without our 
knowledge. Similar considerations lead David Archard to ascribe a form of “collective bad 
faith” to the public in these cases, “both knowing and affecting not to know that something 
bad has been done in its name” (2013, p. 784). Even if we did not know, and could not have 
known, about a particular dirty-handed action, this does not exempt us from responsibility 
for that wrong when we are part of a system that enables and, even if only implicitly, approves 
of giving such executive decision-making power to those that represent us. When we are part 
of a society in which we give away our own decision-making power to someone else for our 
own benefit, there also is a corresponding risk that some of the actions taken in the name of 
that society and in the name of all of its members may be morally objectionable. Agents who 
are part of that society will simply have to shoulder that risk.  
Now we might want to argue that citizens not knowing exactly what their politicians do for 
them and in their name is actually a necessary part of that society functioning. Bellamy, for 
example, argues that “political legitimacy, measured by the tolerance of citizens for the 
government’s dirty tricks, depends on both parties keeping faith with ideal liberal democratic 
forms and norms even while selectively disregarding them” (2010, p. 426). The idea here 
seems to be that successful liberal democratic politics requires citizens not to know too much 
about what their politicians do. Bellamy argues that liberal democratic politics cannot live up 
to its own ideals of eliminating all conflict and the need for dirty measures, but in as much 
as it does a better job than other forms of political governance, it is important that we do 
not become too disillusioned with the system to the extent that it would collapse. If citizens 
not knowing is so crucial to the system, then should we hold them responsible for contriving 
their own ignorance? Again, I would like to argue that this is simply a risk that citizens will 
have to bear in virtue of the advantages they receive by giving up their decision-making 
power to their leaders and being part of a wider political community. If they participate in or 
contribute to a liberal democratic system of their own choice in order to gain the benefits of 
membership in such a system, they will also have to shoulder the risk of what that system 
does without their knowledge, given that they on some level ought to be aware that dirty 
means and the secrecy around them will be inevitable. As with the previous two conditions, 
citizens can obviously satisfy the epistemic criterion to various degrees. Citizens who have 
had the education to understand democratic processes better and have the time to reflect on 
their role as a citizen will be more morally responsible than someone who has these things 
to a lesser extent, while someone who did not have access to basic political education, and is 
so busy trying to make ends meet that they cannot devote any spare time to reflecting on 
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what their politicians do and how their role as a citizen contributes to that, ought not be held 
morally responsible.  
The secrecy, lies, and deception that will often be involved in dirty hands can therefore not 
be used to altogether undermine our moral responsibility in virtue of being democratic 
citizens. I say here altogether, because we obviously would want to make distinctions among 
the level of responsibility that different citizens incur in virtue of how easily the information 
would have been available to them and how much we could have expected them to try and 
gain that information. 
7.3.4. Cognitive Condition 
We are still left with a set of individuals who fulfil the first three conditions of moral 
responsibility to varying degrees, which includes the majority of citizens in a democracy. Of 
this set of citizens we now have to understand who fulfils the cognitive condition necessary 
for moral responsibility. We only want to hold those citizens responsible who have the 
required cognitive abilities to, in principle, understand the nature of democratic politics, their 
membership in it, and the way in which their actions contribute to sustaining and furthering 
the political community within which they live. Not everyone living within the bounds of the 
state will satisfy this condition. Adults with severe learning disabilities and children will not 
have the required mental capabilities to understand the complex nature and workings of 
democratic politics. As such we would not want to hold them morally responsible for the 
actions of politicians. The more difficult case is that of teenagers. There are two related 
considerations here: firstly, do they have the relevant mental capabilities, and secondly, given 
the common conception of their mental capabilities, have they been excluded from the 
democratic process in such a way that we would not want to hold them morally responsible 
even if they satisfy the cognitive condition after all? It has been argued by cognitive scientists 
that “adults and adolescents […] share the same logical competencies, but that age 
differences in social and emotional factors, such as susceptibility to peer influence or impulse 
control, lead to age difference in actual decision-making” (Steinberg, 2005, p. 71). The 
decision-making process of adolescents is distinguished, in particular, by being more 
receptive to peer pressure, being less risk-averse, and having a focus on short-term rather 
than long-term goals (Scott, et al., 1995, p. 222). The idea is that, when presenting older 
adolescents with abstract problems, they have the same cognitive abilities as adults to come 
to a reasoned conclusion. The problem comes when, in real-life decision-making, their 
judgement is clouded through, for example, emotional or social factors which, because of 
the developmental stage of their brain, they cannot yet sufficiently exclude from affecting 
their rational calculations. This is particularly problematic when it comes to decisions 
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involving immediate rewards (e.g. drinking, smoking) that are offset by long-term costs, 
where adolescents are more likely to take considerable risks than adults.  
So what can this brief interlude on developmental psychology tell us regarding the moral 
responsibility of adolescents for the actions of political leaders? In principle, individuals in 
their mid- to late teens have the cognitive abilities to understand the nature of democratic 
politics, their role as members within it, and complex decision-making structures in the same 
way that adults do. One of the factors that is likely to cloud decision-making in adolescents 
is that they are happy to take greater risks, especially if these might lead to immediate benefits 
while the costs would only manifest long-term, such as drinking or smoking for example. In 
general, this makes adolescents less risk-averse than adults. Political action is unlikely to 
include the kind of short-term gratification involved in drinking or smoking that makes 
adolescents more likely to ignore the long-term costs of their behaviour, though. As such 
this is unlikely to cloud their rational decision-making capacity in the case of political 
participation. What remains is that adolescents are more susceptible to peer pressure. They 
may be more likely to imitate the political behaviour of their friends or family in order to 
receive their approval. This is, however, not sufficient to shield them from responsibility for 
those actions. Adults also often act in ways to ensure that they find acceptance from their 
peers, and we still want to hold them responsible for what they do as a result. Given that this 
urge appears to be stronger in adolescents, to the extent that their actions were driven by 
peer pressure to which they are more prone to succumb, we should be more lenient in our 
ascription of responsibility to them. This does not, however, mean that their decision-making 
powers were suspended to such an extent that they can evade moral responsibility entirely. 
Given their ability of rational decision-making, we should conclude that older adolescents 
can, in principle, be held morally responsible for the actions of their politicians.  
There is one complicating factor, though. Most countries do not make formal channels of 
political participation available to its citizens until the age of eighteen. The ability of 
adolescents to contribute to politics is therefore seriously curtailed. This is not enough, 
however, to eliminate the moral responsibility of adolescents entirely. As I have shown 
earlier, citizens are causally connected to the actions of their politicians not only through 
their contribution to elections, but in a wide variety of ways. Adolescents who satisfy the 
cognitive condition can therefore still be morally responsible in virtue of these other ways of 
either participating in or contributing to certain political outcomes. Being excluded from 
formal channels of political participation, however, can lessen the level of responsibility that 
we want to ascribe to them. 
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The large majority of citizens, including older teenagers, will satisfy the cognitive condition 
and can, in principle, be morally responsible for the dirty-handed actions of their political 
leaders. Some citizens, however, will not have the required mental abilities to understand the 
complex workings of a democratic state and society and their actions within that system, and 
as such we should not hold these individuals morally responsible for what their political 
leaders do. Finally, just as was the case with the previous three criteria, citizens can satisfy 
the cognitive condition to various degrees. Some individuals may have a better ability than 
others to understand complex processes such as democratic decision-making and one’s role 
within it. If it was, as a result, very straightforward for a citizen to understand the impact of 
their participation or contribution they carry more moral responsibility than those for whom 
it would have been quite difficult to understand this relationship. 
7.3.5. The Moral Responsibility of Citizens – Summary 
I began by arguing that the majority of citizens will satisfy the causal condition in a variety 
of ways, either by making a difference to the political outcome individually or as part of a set 
of citizens, or by being complicit in these actions in virtue of their contribution to the wider 
political process. Of the set of citizens who satisfied the causal condition, a majority also 
satisfy the voluntariness condition because we ought to acknowledge their decisions as an 
exercise of their autonomous agency and ensure that citizens have the power to make these 
self-determined choices about their lives. Even those who only marginally contributed 
because they merely happen to live within the boundaries of the state have acted voluntarily 
in virtue of having quasi-voluntarily committed to their membership within their political 
community over time. The actions and corresponding responsibilities that come with this 
membership can therefore be said to have been assumed voluntarily. The only citizens who 
are completely exempt from this are those that have renounced both in word and in deed 
their membership in their political community as far as the means available to them allow 
them to. This can happen either when they physically remove themselves from the state as a 
public act of resistance, dedicate their life to opposing their state from within, or have 
exhausted a large proportion of their means in trying to do either of these. Of the set of 
citizens who have voluntarily participated in or contributed to a given dirty-handed action or 
the wider democratic process, again a majority will satisfy the epistemic condition, even in 
cases in which they did not and could not have known about the action in question being 
taken by their politician. As much as citizens are happy to delegate certain tasks to politicians 
in order to enable them to live their lives as they please without having to be too worried 
about some of the measures that have to be taken in order to make this possible, their 
ignorance is contrived and cannot shield them from moral responsibility. Finally, of the set 
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of citizens who have voluntarily participated or contributed and who could have or should 
have known that their action would possibly affect the decision in question, a majority will 
also satisfy the cognitive condition. Most citizens (from late adolescence onwards) have the 
required cognitive abilities for ascribing moral responsibility to them for the actions of their 
political leaders. 
While not all citizens are morally responsible and share in the dirt of their political leaders, a 
majority do. They will, however, do so to varying degrees depending on the extent to which 
they have satisfied all four of the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. 
7.4. Responsibility for Dirty Hands 
I now want to apply my above account to a particular issue that has been raised regarding 
the responsibility of citizens for dirty hands in democracies. If citizens share in the moral 
responsibility for dirty hands, is this going to be similar or different to the moral responsibility 
of their political leaders? Is there a quantitative or qualitative difference? I now hope to be 
able to answer this. Note that the accounts that I discuss ignore the differences between 
citizens and simply talk about the responsibility of the entire public for dirty hands. As I have 
shown above, there is, however, a huge variation in the level of responsibility of different 
citizens. When I say that citizens share in the dirt of their politicians I therefore only want to 
refer to those who have satisfied the four conditions above.  
Regarding the distribution of dirt and moral responsibility between politicians and citizens 
we should distinguish between three different positions in the dirty hands literature among 
those who argue that citizens share in some sense in the responsibility of their politicians. I 
will call these the “qualitative difference view”, the “simple quantitative difference view”, 
and the “mediated quantitative difference view”. I will argue in favour of adopting the latter. 
While all of them agree that democratic citizens are implicated in the actions of their 
politicians, they disagree about both the nature and the extent of the moral burden that 
citizens have to bear. The first position, which we can call the “qualitative difference view”, 
argues that the nature of our ascriptions of moral responsibility to politicians and citizens 
differs in kind. Such an account is defended by Miriam Thalos (2018) in a recent paper. Her 
starting point is that politicians are the authorized agents of citizens. She stipulates that, as 
long as an agent acts within the bounds of what she has been authorized to do, the 
responsibility for her actions falls not on herself but on those that authorised her. There are, 
however, certain phenomenological residues that attach to agents in virtue of the actions they 
commit as an authorized agent. What they have done, even if they were not acting in their 
own capacity, will stay with them and affect the kind of person they are. Thalos follows from 
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these assumptions that “the phenomenology of dirt […] falls on the authorized individual 
even though the responsibility […] falls on the citizenry whose authorization puts the 
authorized in the position to deploy the resources necessary to act” (2018, p. 176). According 
to Thalos, politicians get their hands dirty, but citizens ultimately bear the responsibility for 
this dirt. I call this the qualitative difference view because what we ascribe to politicians and 
citizens is of a different nature; politicians will feel dirty and morally polluted, while citizens 
carry the actual moral responsibility but will not feel dirty.  
Given what I have argued in both this chapter and the previous one, the qualitative difference 
view is implausible. Firstly, it wrongly absolves political leaders of moral responsibility. As I 
showed in the last chapter, politicians cannot shield themselves from moral responsibility 
because they have significant leeway in their decision-making and as such should be open to 
be praised and blamed for their actions. Secondly, given that citizens can be said to be 
complicit in the actions of their political leaders it is unclear why the phenomenology of dirt 
should not extend to citizens as well. Thalos argues that “the responsibility for the action is 
deflected [from the politician to citizens], but not the dirt” (2018, p. 176). The latter 
exclusively sticks to the politician. But this leader dirtied their hands for citizens and in their 
name; citizens have enabled politicians to take these kinds of decisions, decisions they are 
happy not to have to make themselves. But I cannot give away this decision-making power 
and therefore shield myself altogether from the nature of the actions taken for me. In the 
fourth chapter in which I discussed the inherent as well as instrumental value of experiencing 
the right emotional and phenomenological response to dirty hands scenarios. If this did not 
extend to citizens, this would hinder them in their thorough understanding of the nature of 
the action done for them. That would make it too easy to dissociate themselves from what 
is done in their best interest and in their name. When our politicians dirty their hands, our 
hands become dirty as well. So there does not appear to be a qualitative difference with 
regards to our ascriptions of moral responsibility to politicians and citizens.  
The second account argues that we should instead be concerned with the question of 
whether there is a quantitative difference in our ascriptions of moral responsibility. This 
comes in two forms. The first I will call, following Archard, the “simple view” (2013, p. 781). 
It argues that the moral responsibility attaching to politicians and citizens will be 
quantitatively the same. I think traces of this view can be found in Thompson’s account of 
democratic dirty hands. He argues that in cases where citizens can be said to democratically 
approve of their leader’s actions “officials cannot be burdened with any greater responsibility 
than citizens” (1987, p. 22). He goes on to argue, though, that in a not insignificant number 
of cases we will not be able to presume such democratic approval (e.g. because the action 
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was done in secret and citizens did not have the chance to approve), and that in those cases 
the politician alone will carry all of the moral responsibility. He starts by arguing that we 
might think that the moral responsibility of citizens and politicians differs because the latter 
are psychologically closer to the dirty action. The thought might go that “the more 
psychologically remote one is from the evil deed, the less morally culpable one is” (1987, p. 
20). This, however, he judges to be an inadequate assessment, in particular in the realm of 
politics where those that are furthest away from the action – i.e. political leaders who make 
the decisions but do not execute them – are those most responsible for the actions. As I have 
shown in the previous chapters, political leaders who are the ultimate decision-makers will 
also most likely be the agents who hold the most moral responsibility for a dirty-handed 
action. If psychological distance cannot ground a difference in ascriptions of moral 
responsibility, then citizens and politicians will be equally morally responsible. I want to resist 
this simple view.  
Based on the account that I have offered in this chapter we can see that this view does not 
sufficiently take into consideration the mediated relationship between citizens and the dirty-
handed action. In a democratic society, the responsibility of citizens will usually be less than 
that of the political actors who actually planned and executed the action. Citizens will stand 
in a more indirect relation to the action and outcome in question and we will judge them less 
morally responsible than those who actually committed the action with their own hands. We 
can call this the “mediated quantitative difference view” as opposed to the “simple 
quantitative difference view” mentioned above. Given how far citizens will often stand away 
from a particular policy decision, the degree to which we can ultimately blame citizens will 
be relatively low. While citizens may take part in an election or pay taxes, such actions are 
relatively far removed from any particular policy decision. Exceptions to this may be 
referenda or when a sufficiently large protest could directly sway a political leader’s decision. 
Most of the time, however, the impact that the majority of citizens have on the actual policy-
making process is far removed. Additionally, we may want to lessen the responsibility of 
citizens in as much as it would have been very onerous for them to remove themselves 
completely from any contribution and as it would have been difficult for them to know how 
their action would contribute to the dirty-handed decision. Thus, in the case of democratic 
politics, the principal actor or the co-principal actors in a wrongdoing (i.e. political actors) 
will carry more moral responsibility than accessories (i.e. citizens) who are merely complicit. 
Imagine, for example, a bank robbery out of control. A member of the criminal gang loses 
their temper, and shoots and kills one of the hostages. Clearly we would want to hold that 
individual agent morally responsible for the death of the hostage. But what about another 
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member of their criminal network who, while not present at the robbery, supplied the 
weapons? Surely we would want to hold them morally responsible to some extent. After all, 
by supplying guns to a criminal organization, they could have and should have known that 
this may result in innocent people dying; but their responsibility is less than the responsibility 
of the criminal who shot the hostage in cold blood. I think that our intuitions in the case of 
the bank robbery should be applied to the case of citizens and political leaders. Yes, we 
should hold citizens morally responsible for their participation and complicity in the 
democratic system that confers the power to make dirty-handed decisions onto politicians, 
but in the end, their causal relation to the action is a complex mediated one and this has to 
be taken into consideration. Their individual contribution to the democratic process is likely 
remote and not essential to the dirty-handed action. While their contribution makes them 
complicit, their actions are likely so far removed from the particular dirty-handed decision in 
question that we would judge them to be responsible only to a small degree.  
Following from this I think that the most accurate account is the “mediated quantitative 
difference view”. Citizens share in the dirt and moral responsibility of their political leaders, 
but they do so to a lesser extent. As Christopher Gowans has argued, such actions “are a 
direct expression of the particular deliberation and choice of the leader” (1994, p. 233). I 
have shown in the previous chapter that they clearly satisfy the four conditions necessary for 
moral responsibility. They have the required cognitive abilities and relevant knowledge of the 
situation, their choice is voluntary and they are clearly causally connected to the action and 
its outcomes because it is by their hands that the ultimate decision is taken. In contrast, 
citizens’ connection to the dirty-handed action is mediated through a complex system and 
this should be reflected in our moral assessment. Democratic citizens share in the dirt and 
moral responsibility of their political leaders. They do so, however, to a lesser degree than 
the politicians themselves, and among citizens moral responsibility will vary again in virtue 
of their participation in and contribution to the democratic system and democratic decision-
making process.  
7.5. Conclusion 
Democratic citizens are to varying degrees morally responsible for the dirty-handed actions 
of their political leaders. This responsibility is grounded in their voluntary participation in 
and contribution to democratic society when they should have known that being and acting 
as a member would likely enable and require politicians to get their hands dirty for them and 
in their name. The amount of blame we can rightfully ascribe to citizens will usually be rather 
minimal, though, because their connection to any given dirty-handed act will tend to be 
remote. The only citizens who are completely exempt from this are those that have 
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renounced both in word and in deed their membership in their political community as far as 
the means available to them allow.  The fact that those citizens who have voluntarily 
participated in or contributed to the democratic process will often not have known and even 
could not have known about a particular instance of dirty hands does not excuse them 
entirely because citizens are complicit in having erected the very system that enables 
politicians to operate in secrecy. When citizens have contrived their own ignorance, they 
cannot escape moral responsibility for dirty-handed actions that they could not have known 
about at the time. Finally, of the citizens who satisfy the above three conditions, most will 
have the cognitive abilities necessary to, in principle, understand politics and their role within 
the political community and can be held responsible for what that political community does. 
The majority of us, as democratic citizens, are therefore partly morally responsible for the 
outcomes of the dirty-handed actions committed by our political leaders. 
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8. Conclusion 
8.1. Summing Up 
The first part of this thesis aimed to clear up some of the confusions around the notion of 
dirty hands: dirty hands are a kind of moral conflict that is distinguished by the particular 
kind of moral remainder that attaches to it. The notion of dirty hands, however, has 
sometimes been charged with irrationality. The critique goes that understanding dirty hands 
as a clash between absolute moral values is impossible when rational moral judgement has 
to be coherent and always uniquely action-guiding. I have argued that we can, however, make 
sense of dirty hands even on this “consistency view” of rational moral judgement by 
describing dirty hands conflicts as clashes between pro tanto values. What this shows is that 
we can make sense of the concept of dirty hands as a conflict of values, whether understood 
in absolute or pro tanto terms, independent of our pre-conceptions of the nature of rational 
moral judgement more generally. I then went on to consider whether, once an agent is faced 
with a dirty hands problem, she could possibly keep her hands clean. Asymmetry positions 
that hold this to be possible have to conceive of the dirt in dirty hands as something above 
and beyond the violation of an important moral value. I showed that such views are 
undesirable because they require the agent to engage in a form of moral 
compartmentalisation and provide us with unpromising understandings of the notions that 
are supposed to make an action dirty instead. When an agent is faced with a dirty hands 
situation, it will be too late for her to keep her hands clean. Ultimately this means that 
accepting the reality of dirty hands must lead to an acknowledgement of the tragic nature of 
our moral lives. I then went on to discuss the role that emotions play in dirty hands situations. 
I argued that emotions have standards of appropriateness that result in emotions being 
rational and fitting responses to some of the qualities of a given situation. The very fact that 
people do seem to experience a certain negative emotional response in the wake of a choice 
situation, even though they did the overall best action they could have performed, then 
supports the existence of dirty hands problems. I then argued, following de Wijze, that the 
emotional response appropriate to the moral conflict inherent to dirty hands situations is 
tragic-remorse. Experiencing tragic-remorse additionally has important implications for the 
agent. I argued that it exhibits a commitment to the forgone value, aids in her deliberation, 
and can make her behaviour intelligible to others. Experiencing the appropriate moral 
emotion during and in the wake of a dirty hands conflict is both inherent and instrumental 
to being a good moral agent.  
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To sum up, dirty hands are a special kind of moral conflict in which the agent is forced to 
violate an important moral value whatever option she chooses. Once confronted with a dirty 
hands situation there is no way to keep her hands clean. She will experience a weighty moral 
remainder and tragic-remorse in the wake of her decision.  
While such dirty hands decisions can arise in all areas of life, they are particularly pertinent 
in the realm of politics. The second part examined some of the fundamental issues at stake 
when considering dirty hands in a democratic setting. Firstly I had to defend the notion of 
democratic dirty hands against the objection that surely it could never be permissible in a 
democracy to dirty one’s hands. This objection comes in three ways. The first is that getting 
one’s hands dirty is contradictory in principle because we cannot use dirty-handed means to 
pursue democratic ends. The second argues that it is contradictory in practice to use dirty-
handed means because they will always undermine democracy more than they will promote 
them. Lastly, the final criticism argues that the notion of democratic dirty hands makes no 
sense because the use of dirty hands signals that democracy has at that point failed. I showed 
that these objections fail because they are based on flawed conceptions of both democratic 
politics and dirty hands. Having defended the idea that it can be permissible to dirty one’s 
hands in democratic politics, I then moved on to analyse who actually gets their hands dirty. 
I briefly noted that both praise for having chosen the lesser evil when doing so was not easy, 
and blame for having violated an important moral principle will be appropriate third-party 
reactive attitudes to political actors holding moral responsibility for dirty-handed decisions. 
Dispelling the myth that dirty hands rely on the notion of a single-handed political leader, I 
analysed the way in which different political actors fulfil the four conditions (cognitive, 
epistemic, voluntary, causal) necessary for moral responsibility. Using the example of the 
Claudy Bombing in Northern Ireland I showed how this analysis can be applied to real life 
politics. Finally, I turned to the question of whether democratic citizens can be morally 
responsible for such decisions and therefore also get their hands dirty. In as much as citizens 
have voluntarily participated in or contributed to the dirty-handed decision in question or 
the wider democratic process more generally, they can also be said to share the dirt and moral 
responsibility, although to a lesser extent than their political leaders who were more directly 
involved in the decision-making process. Even if citizens did not and could not have known 
about the particular dirty-handed decision, this does not necessarily absolve them of moral 
responsibility. To the extent that their ignorance was contrived, they will still share in the dirt 
and the responsibility after all. Dirty hands in democratic politics are then not simply 
shouldered by a single politician acting alone, but by many of us in the polity. 
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To sum up, while the appropriateness of dirty-handed measures in democratic politics has 
been questioned, what I have shown in this thesis is that such objections are misguided. 
Sometimes using such measures will be permissible even in democratic politics. There is also 
no reason to think that dirty hands reasoning could not make sense of complex democratic 
decision-making. In such an environment the dirt will simply be shared to varying degrees 
between the actors involved in the process. Ultimately, because of the relationship that holds 
between citizens, their leaders, and the wider democratic process, some of this dirt will also 
fall back on citizens themselves.  
My account of both the nature of dirty hands and its application to the realm of democratic 
politics is important in order to move on in the dirty hands debate. This thesis has established 
the grounds on which we can ascribe moral responsibility for dirty hands to agents in 
democratic society, so that we can now take the next step and consider whether and, if so, 
how these agents could actually be held liable for these dirty hands. 
8.2. Clean Gloves, Liability, and Restitution 
At this point I want to indicate areas of enquiry that can be pursued with the help of the 
arguments developed in this thesis. This section is not intended to provide a thorough 
discussion but instead aims to highlight some of the existing debates in the literature and 
show the relevance of the arguments presented in this thesis to these issues. 
In chapter four I argued that the agent ought to experience a negative first-person emotional 
response to her dirty hands. In particular, she ought to experience tragic-remorse. This 
response is appropriate because it gives credit to the way in which the agent’s actions have 
violated important moral principles and left people worse off as a result. In the case of 
democratic politicians, though, it has been argued that this is not enough. When politicians 
dirty their hands in a democracy we require a public and retrospective phase of holding 
officials with dirty hands accountable in order to uphold the democratic process. Citizens 
need to have the ability to hold those whom they elect to act in their interests and in their 
name liable for their actions. If the democratic process is to remain meaningful we therefore 
might want to argue that politicians are required to reveal their dirty hands to the public. S.L. 
Sutherland argues that if we do not have this requirement of our politicians, there will exist 
“an unbridgeable gulf between those who lead and those who are led”, turning the public 
into “a passive collection of individuals” (1995, p. 483) instead of a meaningful political actor; 
it excludes “the prospect of the reciprocity between citizens and leaders” (1995, p. 486). She 
adds that to legitimise political actors avoiding this process of accountability would be to 
disregard the supremacy of constitutionalism that is supposed to ensure the rule of law and 
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the existence of those checks and balances that the public has to limit the power exercised 
by the government. She concludes that in cases of dirty hands situations in democratic 
societies we need to ensure that, “public judgement takes the place of the autonomous phase 
of self-judgement” (1995, p. 491).  Thompson seems to agree with this when he says that “if 
officials have the discretion to deceive, they also have a duty to disclose the deception” (1987, 
p. 26).  
While a phase of accountability in the sense of giving an explanation for their behaviour 
seems to be necessary to uphold the democratic process, it might be thought that to actually 
hold political actors liable would be both counter-productive and immoral. One might think 
that if the politician is able to explain herself, the need to take any further action and to hold 
her liable might simply vanish. This line is taken by Neil Levy who argues against holding 
politicians liable for their dirty hands on both consequentialist and desert-based reasons. He 
starts by describing the consequentialist reasons which we might think justify holding the 
dirty-handed politicians liable. Firstly, it seems necessary to ensure that the moral value 
overridden stands as inviolable after the dirty hands act. Secondly, if politicians are aware 
that they will be held liable for their actions, it ensures that they are taking those moral values 
seriously. Levy attacks this idea by arguing that as much as the prospect of liability can ensure 
that the right decision is taken, it can just as much discourage politicians from doing the 
lesser evil if they could in one way or another avoid liability by doing so. Additionally, it 
might even discourage good moral agents from entering politics in the first place. Levy goes 
on to explain that there can also be a potential desert-based justification for punishment in 
these cases according to which the politician deserves punishment in proportion to her moral 
violation. Levy objects to this because “our attitudes are too complex to find expression in 
punishment” (2007, p. 43). While we might wish to say that the politician did something bad, 
there is also something praiseworthy about having done the overall right thing in a very 
difficult situation. Now, Levy tells us, we have to ask ourselves whether there is any form of 
punishment that articulates both of those attitudes to the politician and society as a whole. 
He concludes by saying that such a form of punishment simply does not exist.  
Because there do not seem to be any obvious ways in which we can justify punishing those 
with dirty hands on either consequentialist or deontological grounds, Levy tries to solve the 
issue of whether we should hold them liable by re-iterating the distinction between the bad 
and the blameworthy that I briefly introduced in section 6.5. It is true, he argues, that in 
violating a moral value the politician has done something morally bad, but we should not 
take her to be blameworthy for it. He says that “if dirty-handed actors are blameworthy, then 
it must be the case that there is some act or omission available to them that would allow 
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them to avoid blame” (2007, pp. 44-45). Dirty hands situations, however, are characterised 
by the very fact that there is nothing the agent could have done to avoid violating one moral 
value or another, so “by the principle of the avoidability of blame they are therefore 
blameless” (2007, p. 45). And if that was not enough already, Levy continues, there is a 
further feature that should make us abstain from holding dirty-handed politicians in a 
democracy liable. The politician dirtied her hands because she was acting on our behalf, and 
if we agree that this implies that the dirt is shared by us citizens, we do not have any grounds 
to hold her liable for the fact that she was acting on her obligation to us. Meisels emphasises 
this point as well; when a politician has dirtied his hands for us and in our names, the act of 
holding him liable is morally dubious; “punishing him for what we ourselves would have 
wanted him to do is no longer an irony or a paradox; it is simply wrong” (2008, p. 173). She 
goes on to say that if a politician can successfully show that she acted under the constraints 
of necessity (put on her both by the situation as well as by the demands of citizens), she 
should be excused for her action. Not excusing her and, indeed, punishing her is for Ramsay 
“analogous to the indefensible case of punishing the innocent” (2008, p. 173). When a 
politician can give a satisfactory explanation for her dirty hands there is, according to Ramsay, 
no reason for us to punish her.  
What these criticisms should make obvious is that if there are grounds for holding politicians 
with dirty hands liable, these would differ from those on which we usually justify punishment 
and the like (these could be either entirely different to the grounds we have in other cases, 
or they could be simply additional considerations that need to complement our already 
existing grounds). This would also have to take into account that the dirt is potentially shared 
by politicians and citizens.  
On the one hand, then, we have a position that requires politicians to reveal their dirty hands. 
It has been argued that this is necessary because a mere personal phase of accountability in 
the form of the correct emotional response on the side of the politician would not be enough 
to uphold the democratic process and ensure a reciprocal relationship between citizens and 
rulers in which the former can hold the latter to account when they take decisions for them 
and in their name. This position is then further divided into two camps, one which wants to 
hold the politician liable to punishment while the other opposes such measures. On the other 
hand, however, there are those who think that a dirty-handed politician should not reveal her 
actions to the public. These accounts put forward the view that dirty-handed politicians, 
instead of revealing their guilt, should be wearing “clean gloves” (Bellamy, 2010) in public. 
To wear clean gloves is not to admit to one’s dirty hands and to keep them secret. Bellamy 
in his examination for the need to wear these clean gloves argues that “political legitimacy 
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[…] depends on both parties [i.e. politicians and citizens] keeping faith with ideal liberal 
democratic forms and norms even while selectively disregarding them. […] So politicians 
have good reason to be cautious” (2010, p. 426). Bellamy sees the nature of politics as 
inherently conflictual and follows from this that democratic practice can never live up fully 
to the liberal ideals on which it is built. In order for the basis of democratic politics to not 
be undermined by this, it is therefore important for all the parties involved to keep up the 
faith in these ideals even though we know that they can never be fully realised. Revealing 
dirty hands could pose a dangerous disruption to daily politics because the politician is torn 
between a non-ideal political reality and the idealistic picture of the public that requires the 
politician not to show anything that is ordinarily conceived of as a vice. The politician is then 
said to have to embrace a form of hypocrisy. 
Tillyris argues that, while the dirty hands tradition prides itself on taking Machiavelli’s lessons 
about having to learn how not to be good seriously, it fails to appreciate Machiavelli’s core 
insight that next to the cruelty of the lion, politics also requires the cunning and hypocrisy of 
the fox. For him, most dirty hands accounts are “paradoxically censorious over the practice 
of hypocrisy in democratic politics” (2016, p. 2). In contrast to these accounts he wants to 
argue that hypocrisy actually provides us with the framework for what it means to lead both 
a virtuous as well as a successful political life. He begins by defining what the cunning and 
hypocrisy of the fox in politics looks like; hypocrisy, in its essence, is the idea of putting on 
a public persona to deceive the public about one’s true actions and character, in order to 
attain certain political goods. Tillyris argues that the reason why hypocrisy is often seen to be 
an ultimate vice is because next to the fact that it is hard to detect, it also operates in order 
to conceal the politician’s other vices. This, however, according to Tillyris, makes hypocrisy 
not the worst of all the vices, but in fact the most necessary one for a political career. He 
states that “it is this function […] which holds together a virtuous political life: the 
preservation of a moral front enables practitioners of politics […] to cultivate the support 
necessary for satisfying certain political goods – to marshal on amidst a domain ridden with 
conflict, in which mutual antipathies, immoralities, betrayals and inconsistencies are 
inescapable” (2016, p. 5). Tillyris therefore sees no grounds for dirty hands theories to single 
out hypocrisy as the only vice that never ought to be acted on when faced with a moral 
conflict. Not only is there no basis on which dirty hands theory could makes this distinction, 
but it would also undermine the politician’s ability to navigate the complexities and 
inconsistencies of democratic politics. 
But not only politicians are faced with potential hypocrisy in dirty hands scenarios. 
Remember that there are good reasons to think that citizens, at least to a certain degree, share 
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in the politician’s dirty hands. If those citizens were to hold politicians liable for their dirty 
hands, citizens would create a scapegoat to redirect attention from their own complicity. 
Bellamy explains “that hypocrisy allows citizens to desert [the politician] and claim the moral 
high ground” (2010, p. 426). When we talk about the hypocrisy involved in dirty hands, 
Archard argues, “it is thus not so much a case of the politician getting his hands dirty but 
being required to wear clean gloves, as one in which he gets his hands dirty as do non-
politicians but the latter get to wear the clean gloves” (2013, p. 785). Citizens try to dismiss 
their own complicity in turning the politician into a scapegoat and in making an example of 
her.  
Assuming that, despite all of these complications, someone ought to be held liable for dirty 
hands, what form should this liability take? For Thompson, who wants to hold the politician 
liable, compensatory justice is an additional part of the process of retroactive accountability 
(1987, p. 22). He does not, however, mention in any form what this compensatory justice is 
supposed to consist of. Levy, who is against holding politicians accountable for dirty hands, 
follows from the fact that everyone shares in the responsibility of the dirty actions that society 
should compensate the wronged in the name of all citizens (2007, p. 50). Like Thompson, 
he does not focus on this point at any more length. We might think that liability should take 
the form of giving back to those that have been left off worse through the dirty-handed 
action. If we accept a certain complicity on the side of the democratic public it would seem 
that the public therefore acquires at least a shared duty to compensate or pay restitution. 
What we will have to consider in more detail in order to understand the consequences of 
dirty hands in democracies is both the potential justification for a duty to compensate or pay 
restitution on the side of the public, as well as the forms that this should take.  
Further enquiries into the issue of democratic dirty hands will have to make sense of the 
question of whether politicians ought to reveal their dirty hands, whether we ought to hold 
them liable, and who, if anyone, owes some form of restitution to those left worse off. 
Providing principled answers to these issues requires us first to have a thorough 
understanding of what it means to dirty one’s hands, how politicians and citizens are 
connected in a democracy, and how this affects the way in which they share in the dirt. With 
the help of the answers I have provided in this thesis to the latter issues, we can then move 
forward and investigate solutions to the former questions. 
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